LtpRARY^ 


CALIFORNIA         1 
SAN  0lE©O         I 


*.-    A 


^rioudu^ 


IRC .  •  •  C: 


BATTLE    FIRE 
TRAINING 


CAPTAIN  GfS:  TURNER 

WD 

CAPTAIN  J.  J.  FULMER 
U.  S.  ARMY. 


mhr  (Cnllrciintr  ^rr«« 

GEORGE  RANTA  PUHLISHING   COMPANY 
MENASHA.  WISCONSIN 


Copyrighted  1917 

by 

CAPTAIN  G.  S.  TURNER 

and 
CAPTAIN  J.  J.  FULMER 


CONTENTS     i^^ 

PAGE 

Musketry    1 

Determination  of  Ranges: 

By   Eye    8 

By  Trial  Volleys    13 

From   Other   Troops    21 

By  Instruments   21 

Use  of  Mil  Scale   22 

Table     Illustrating     Influence     of     Incorrect 

Estimate    31 

Tarokt   Designation    33 

Units  of  Measure   41 

Horizontal  Clock  Face   52 

Vertical  Clock  Face  55 

Sight  System    57 

Right  Angle  System   58 

Auxiliary  Aiming  Point  System    61 

Fire   Distribution    69 

Ii\  Defense   71 

In  Attack   72 

Communication,     Signals,     and     Transmission     of 

Fire   Data    91 

Fire   Discipline     107 

Attention  to  Orders  108 

Care  in  Sight  Setting 108 

Rate  of  Fire   112 

Application  of  Fire   128 

Adjustment  of  Fire  129 

Effect  of  Ground    133 

Employment  of  Fire  Units   136 

Kinds  of  Fire   145 

Time  of  Opening  Fire 147 

Combined  Sights   148 

Night   Firing    151 

Indirect   Fire    153 

Fire  of  Position    153 

-Vulnerability    155 

SiPPi.Y  oi-  A:\rMUNiTioN   159 

Conduct  of  Fire   167 

Battalion  Exercises  in  Attack  and  Defense.  .    187-204 

Combat  Practice 224 

Appendix     255 

Casey  Problem  255 

Records    263 

Signals      290 


EXERCISES 

PAGE 

Range  Estimation: 

For  Company   (No.  1)    10 

For  company  using  range  finder  (No.  2)   11 

For  company  in  attack  formation   11 

Use  of  Mil  Scale   22 

Target  Designation: 

To  teach  how  to  measure  properly  from  a  refer- 
ence   point    50 

To  train  in  accurate  and  clear  description  of  tar- 
gets   (Exercise   No.   1)    66 

To  train  men  to  locate  target  solely  from  descrip- 
tion  (Exercise  No.  2)    67 

Target  Distribution: 

Individual 79 

Squad   79 

Squad  leaders    79 

Platoon  leaders   80 

Company    84 

Communication  and  Signals: 

To  acquaint  men  to  use  of  (Nos.  1  and  2)    98 

To  train  officers  and  units  to  observe  and  execute  100 

Battalion  exercises  in   100 

To  accustom  men  to  properly  transmit  and  receive 

fire   data    104 

Transmission  of  fire  data  along  entire  front   ....    105 
To  hold  fire  in  designated  sector  106 

Fire  Discipline: 

To  train  men  to  set  sights  quickly   108 

To  train  men  to  set  sights  quickly  without  cessa- 
tion of  fire   Ill 

To  train  men  to  aimed  fire  and  proper  rate  of  fire  118 
To  train  men  to  fill  places  of  leaders  killed  or 
wounded  in  action    123 

Supply  of  Ammunition: 

To  train  in  the  supply  of  ammunition  to  the  firing 

line    ' 163 

To  train  battalion  to  draw  and  issue  ammunition 
from  combat  train    165 

Company  Fire  Problem: 

Conijiany  combat  exercise  in  attack    243 

Casey  ])roblem 2-55 

Battalion  Problems: 

Battalion  fire  problem  in  attack   187 

Battalion  fire  problem  in  defense  204 

Battalion  combat  exercises  in  attack   250 


PREFACE 

A  necessity  exists  for  tlic  adoption  through- 
out our  army  of  a  uniform  s3^stem  of  collective 
training  in  battle  fire.  A  system,  by  means  of 
which,  the  highly  skilled  individual  shots  we 
regularly  develop  in  time  of  peace  may  produce 
the  greatest  possible  collective  effect  in  time  of 
war.  If  given  time  and  opportunity  our  School 
of  Musketry,  which  has  such  a  system,  will 
supply  this  necessity.  The  present  exigencies 
of  the  service,  however,  prevent  the  operation 
of  this  school.  Meanwhile  time  goes  on  and 
we  adopt  no  uniform  system. 

This  book  is  offered  in  the  hope  that  it  may 
assist  towards  the  adoption  of  a  uniform  system. 
and  thus  aid,  even  though  it  be  in  a  small  way, 
the  furthering  of  the  work  so  necessary  for 
success  on  the  field  of  battle. 

The  system  outlined  herein  is  based  upon  the 
principles  laid  down  in  the  various  manuals 
upon  the  subject  of  fire  and  fire  tactics  pub- 
lished by  the  War  Department.  The  practical 
application  of  these  principles  to  concrete 
cases,  and  the  method  by  which  they  are 
embodied  in  terrain  exercises  are  largely  derived 
from  a  series  of  "Musketry  Bulletins"  written 
by  a  board  of  officers.  Also  from  a  personal 
observation,  in  a  supervisory  capacity,  of 
forty-eight  companies  of  infantry  during  four 


months'  training  devoted  almost  exclusively  to 
"musketry."  The  system  of  indoor  training  by 
means  of  landscape  targets  and  the  complete 
development  of  the  various  methods  of  target 
designation  and  distribution  are  the  results  of 
some  three  years'  work,  by  one  of  the  writers, 
with  the  Disciplinary  Battalion  at  the  Fort 
Leavenworth  Disciplinary  Barracks. 

Few  of  the  methods  outlined  for  control, 
communication,  designation,  distribution,  etc., 
have  received  the  test  of  actual  war.  They 
have,  however,  all  been  applied  by  a  number  of 
independent  organizations  over  an  extended 
period  of  time,  and  with  uniformly  excellent 
results.  In  the  light  of  this  knowledge  and  with 
the  lessons  of  military  history  as  a  guide,  it 
may  be  stated  as  a  fact  that  this,  or  some  other 
similar  system,  is  not  only  applicable  in  war 
but  necessary  to  its  successful  prosecution. 

By  permission  of  the  authorities  of  the 
School  of  Musketry  the  pamphlets  issued  by 
that  school  have  been  freely  drawn  upon  and 
acknowledgment  is  here  offered. 

To  Colonel  Sedgwick  Rice,  Commandant, 
United  States  Disciplinary  Barracks,  Fort 
Leavenworth,  Kansas,  whose  interest,  help,  and 
support  made  possible  the  application  to  indoor 
work  of  many  of  the  principles  herein  con- 
tained; to  Major  H.  E.  Eames  and  Captains 
W.  A.  Kent  and  C.  H.  Mason,  who,  with  one 
of  the  writers  composed  the  board  referred  to 


above,  and  to  Captain   James  D.   Taylor  and 
F.  B.  Davis  our  sincere  thanks  arc  due. 

The  following  books  liave  been  consulted : 
Eames'  Rifle  in  War;  Morrison's  Training 
Infantry;  Technique  of  Modern  Tactics,  Bond 
and  McDonough ;  Fire  Problems,  Pilchcr ; 
Musketry  Bulletins,  Twelfth  U.  S.  Infantry; 
Studies  in  Minor  Tactics  and  Problems  in 
Troop  Leading,  Military  Art  Department, 
Leavenworth ;  and  the  manuals  bearing  upon 
tlic  subject  published  by  the  War  Department. 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 

Fort  Bayard,  New  Mexico. 

April,  1907. 


INTRODUCTION 

The  broad  doctrine  that  only  with  the  aid  of 
superior  fire  is  it  possible  to  carry  through  a 
successful  attack,  has  been  confirmed  on  every 
battlefield  of  the  present  great  war.  Given  a 
superiority  of  fire,  infantry  can  advance  and 
suffer  only  losses  that  can  be  borne;  without 
superiority  of  fire,  the  finest  troops  will  be 
stopped  by  the  ruinous  losses  they  receive.  The 
opposing  lines  in  western  Europe  have  remained 
for  many  months  practically  stationary,  and 
consequently  embody  every  refinement  of  the 
engineer's  art.  In  the  preparation  of  such 
fjaborate  entrt'iichments  for  assault,  the  havoc 
of  the  artillery  becomes,  therefore,  more  impor- 
tant than  that  of  the  rifle.  Yet,  with  all  of  its 
tremendous  modern  power,  artillery  alone  is  not 
able  to  drive  the  enemy  from  his  trenches.  To 
do  this,  even  in  the  war  of  position  in  France 
today,  requires  the  attack  of  infantry;  and  for 
infantry,  notwithstanding  the  extensive  use  of 
machine  guns  and  grenades  which  this  sta- 
tionary war  permits,  the  rifle  remains  the  para- 
mount weapon. 

There  is  little  chance  of  the  employment  in 
the  United  States  of  masses  sufficiently  large 
ever  to  rest  both  flanks  on  impassable  obstacles. 
Consequently,  we  are  not  likely  to  find  warfare 
in  the  United  States  reduced  to  a  standstill  as 


is  now  the  case  in  western  Europe.  Our  cam- 
paigns will  be  campaigns  of  maneuver,  in  which 
events  will  follow  with  too  little  intermission  to 
permit  the  emplacement  and  use  of  almost 
unlimited  masses  of  artillery  and  machine  guns. 
In  such  mobile  operations,  the  infantry  rifle, 
properly  used,  will  always  furnish  the  great 
majority  of  casualties,  and  is,  therefore,  the 
supreme  weapon  for  the  attainment  of  victory. 

The  effective  use  of  the  rifle  requires  that  the 
men  shall  individually  be  good  shots;  that,  in 
action,  ranges  shall  be  determined  with  consid- 
erable accuracy;  that  the  targets  shall  be  so 
clearly  designated  that  the  men  recognize  them 
and  aim  as  desired;  and  that  their  fire  is  so 
distributed  as  to  cause  all  parts  of  the  hostile 
line  to  suffer  therefrom.  In  other  words,  to 
produce  effective  results  in  the  aggregate,  the 
fire  of  good  shots  must  be  so  directed  and  con- 
trolled by  their  officers  that  all  will  act  together 
as  members  of  a  highly  trained  team  in  the 
application  of  fire  against  a  common  objective. 

The  work  of  our  Army  on  the  target  range 
produces  a  high  average  of  good  individual 
target  shots  and  fulfills,  accordingly,  the  first 
requisite  for  effective  fire.  But  the  methods 
used  in  training  for  direction  and  control  of 
the  collective  fire  of  organizations  differ  rather 
widely  in  the  several  regiments,  with  the  result 
that  our  companies  and  battalions  do  not  have 
the  uniformly  excellent  teamwork  that  is  neces- 
sary today  in  an  army  for  successful  action. 


Tin-  miisketrv  training  at  Galveston  in  1913 
produced  a  liigh  and  very  uniform  standard  in 
field  firing  in  tlie  organizations  of  the  5th 
Brigade.  The  autliors  have  put  in  this  book  a 
concise  description  of  the  methods  that  gave 
the  best  results  in  the  long  series  of  outdoor 
exercises  and  problems  of  the  5th  Brigade,  and 
have  made  the  text  readily  understood  by 
numerous  and  excellent  drawings.  They  have 
also  embodied  the  methods  for  indoor  instruc- 
tion that  have  given  excellent  results  with  a 
wide  variety  of  men  at  the  Fort  Leavenworth 
Disciplinary  Barracks.  In  the  chapters  on 
Determination  of  Ranges,  Target  Designation, 
Fire  Distribution,  Communications,  Signals, 
Fire  Discipline,  Application  of  Fire,  Supply 
of  Ammunition,  and  Conduct  of  Fire,  the  text 
describes  the  means  and  methods  that  should  be 
applied  on  the  battlefield,  and  then  gives 
di'tailed  suggestions  for  peace-time  training  in 
ill  of  these  important  musketry  functions. 
Finally,  the  text  describes  several  company  and 
battalion  problems  for  unknown  ground  that 
were  found  highly  satisfactory  in  the  work  of 
Hie  5th  Brigade,  and  that  will  frequently  bo 
easily  adapted  to  terrain  which  permits  any 
kind  of  ball  practice. 

The  musketry  training  of  the  Army  needs 
standardizing  to  produce  a  more  uniform  excel- 
lence. This  text  furnishes  a  clear  statement  of 
methods,  which  in  practical  application,  have 


proven   their   efficiency ;     it    should,   therefore, 
constitute  a  splendid  manual  of  musketry  train- 
ing for  the  attainment  of  the  desired  standard. 
H.  B.  FisKE, 

Major  of  Infantry 


CHAPTER  I 


MUSKETRY 


Musketry  is  understood  in  some  of  the  for- 
eign armies  to  embrace  any  instruction,  indi- 
vidual or  collective,  pertaining  to  the  use  of  the 
rifle.  In  our  service  the  term  "Musketry"  is 
looked  upon  as  embracing  the  principles  relat- 
ing to  cpllectivejire  and  it  is  so  treated  in  these 
pages. 

Perfecting  the  individual  in  rifle  shooting  is 
but  the  primary  step  in  our  instruction,  the 
next  and  final  is  the  binding  of  individuals  into 
a  flexible,  controlled,  and  ^e^endable  fire  unit 
in  which  each  individual  plays  his  own  part  in 
adding  strength  to  the  whole.  The  ability  to 
do  this  naturally  rests  on  the  degree  to  which 
a  man  has  been  trained  both  individually  and 
collectively. 

The  process  of  perfecting  the  units  of  a 
machine  is  but  the  first  stage,  to  be  followed 
by  the  perfect  assembling,  to  insure  the  func- 
tioning of  the  parts  as  a  whole.  An  automo- 
bile has  its  gears,  bearings,  and  parts  perfectly 
made,  but  without  an  intelligent  joining  of  the 
parts  and  careful  adjustment  of  all  oiAtshotur- 
ings  and  elements,  a  machine  results^ncapjible 
of  proper  functioning.  How  many  goals  would 
be  scored  by  a  football  team  in  wliich  each  unit 


2  Battle  Fire  Training 

represented  the  last  word  in  training  in  his  own 
particular  work  and  nothing  more?  A  tackle 
for  instance,  who  could  down  a  man  without 
failure,  a  man  who  could  punt  the  length  of 
the  field,  one  who  could  land  on  a  ball  from  the 
quarter  with  such  unerring  accuracy  as  to  ever 
preclude  his  missing?  What  would  happen  on 
the  day  of  contest,  when  for  the  first  time, 
these  perfectly  trained  parts  are  put  together 
to  perform  the  work  of  a  team?  Can  any  more 
results  be  expected  relatively  on  the  field  of 
battle  with  an  organization  trained  until  every 
man  is  an  individual  expert  but  not  trained  to 
act  as  a  part  of  an  harmonious  whole?  What 
about  the  rate  of  fire,  the  control,  the  centering 
of  fire  on  a  particular  target,  the  distribution 
of  fire,  and  the  many  other  elements  of  mus- 
ketry which  are  indisputably  necessary  to 
obtain  the  sine  qua  non  of  success  in  battle — 
fire  superiority? 

It  might  be  assumed  that  the  necessity  and 
value  of  musketry  training  are  admitted  by  all. 
Such,  unfortunately,  is  not  the  case.  This  is 
due  largely  to  the  fact  that  we  have  no  definite 
doctrine  of  musketry  throughout  the  service 
and,  also,  to  the  fact  that  the  unquestionable 
results  produced  by  the  School  of  Musketry 
have  not  become  generally  known.  When  the 
excellent  course  now  contemplated  at  the 
School  becomes  available  to  the  Army,  it  may 


Musketry  3 

be  confidently  lioped  that  such  benighted  con- 
ditions will  rapidly  disappear,  but  until  such 
time  wc  must  present  some  facts  to  sustain  our 
contentions  as  to  the  value  of  musketry  in 
general. 

If,  as  has  been  stated,  musketry  training 
produces  such  valuable  results,  why  has  it  been, 
until  quite  recently,  so  generally  neglected  in 
the  Army?  It  is  not  for  us  to  answer  this 
(juestion  bc3'ond  pointing  out  the  fact  that  cer- 
tainly it  is  not  because  writers  of  authority  in 
the  Service  have  failed  to  emphasize  the  neces- 
sity and  value  of  this  training.  Could  anything 
be  more  plain  than  General  Morrison's  Train- 
ing Infantry  in  this  regard.''  Does  not  Eames 
in  The  liifle  in  War  show  results  to  be 
expected  from  improperly  controlled  shots.'' 
And  finally,  among  many  others,  see  the  stress 
laid  by  Major  Fiske  and  the  iVIilitary  Art 
Department  of  Leavenworth  upon  control  and 
distribution  of  fire  in  the  officially  published 
Minor  Tactics,  1915,  and  Frohlcms  in  Troop 
Leading,  1916. 

So  much  for  the  authorities.  Now  examine 
the  results  of  one  or  two  problems  actually 
fired  on  the  target  range. 

A  company  of  Expert  Riflemen,  properly 
trained  to  fire  collectively  but  improperly  led 
as  to  fire  control,  shot  a  given  problem.  They 
were  immediately   followed  on  the  range  by  a 


4  Battle  Fire  Training 

company  composed  of  men  who,  while  they 
were  trained  on  the  gallery  range  in  individual 
fire,  had  never  fired  a  service  charge.  The 
third  phase  of  this  problem  was  the  firing  of 
the  company  of  Expert  Riflemen  properly  con- 
trolled and  directed.  The  results  are  tabulated 
below : 

Hits        Figures  Hit 
Company  of  Expert  Riflemen — 

1st  firing    7  7 

Untrained  Company,  1st  firing  ....   47  31 

Company  of  Expert  Riflemen — 

2d  firing  122  76 

Untrained  Company,  2nd  firing  ....   71  48 

This  problem  was  in  defense ;  the  main  points 
involved  were:  Correct  determination  of  the 
initial  range  and  its  transmission  to  the  firing 
line;  accurate  and  quick  sight  setting;  the 
maintenance  of  the  correct  range  during  the 
problem,  and  its  rapid  and  accurate  transmis- 
sion while  firing.  All  these  points  may  well  be 
considered  under  one  single  head  of  the  subject 
of  musketry  in  general,  i.  e..  Range.  A  system 
of  training,  one  phase  of  which  can  produce 
results  as  far-reaching  as  those  given  above,  is 
certainly  valuable,  to  say  the  least. 

Take  a  second  problem,  one  in  which  practi- 
cally the  whole  subject  of  musketry,  as  far  as 
it  pertains  to  a  company  acting  alone,  was 
covered. 


Musketry  5 

Problem:  To  advance  from  about  1,200 
yards  to  assaultin/^  position.  Time,  30  min- 
utes. Rounds,  90  per  man.  Rate  of  advance 
to  be  governed  by  hits  and  distribution  made 
each  minute.  Data  being  signaled  from  the 
pit  to  the  firing  line. 

In  this  problem  comparisons  will  be  made  of 
the  positions  at  the  end  of  thirty  minutes  of 
the  following:  a  company  of  selected  shots 
from  the  Militia;  a  company  of  selected  shots 
from  a  Regular  regiment;  and  the  average  of 
fort3'-eight  companies  of  Regular  Infantry. 
The  two  companies  of  selected  shots  had  not 
been  especially  trained  for  collective  firing, 
while  the  forty-eight  regular  companies  had 
completed  a  course  in  musketry.  About  thirty 
per  cent  of  each  of  the  latter  companies  were 
qualified  marksmen ;  many  contained  a  per- 
centage of  five  months'  recruits. 
Militia  company,  24%   reaches   1076  yds.;    76%   reaches 

976  yds. 
Selected  company,  U.  S.  A.,  100%  reaches  700  yds. 
Average  48  Co's,  U.  S.  A.,  100%  reaches  600  yds.  (with 
6  to  26  rounds  of  ammunition  in  each  belt). 

There  were  many  regular  companies  which 
in  from  twenty  to  twenty-five  minutes  pro- 
gressed to  about  300  yards  from  the  target  at 
which  point  they  were  stopped  by  an  impass- 
able stream.  These  companies  had  from  five  to 
ten  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man  remaining 


6  Battle  Fire  Training 

and  under  the  conditions  of  the  problem  could 
easily  have  advanced  to  the  target  itself.  Cer- 
tainly there  can  be  no  gainsaying  the  value  of 
training  which  can  produce  such  results  as 
these. 

The  opinion  is  so  often  expressed  that  in 
battle  any  system  of  fire  control,  target  desig- 
nation, and  musketry  in  general  will  fail  to 
produce  expected  results.  Undoubtedly  war 
will  furnish  many  instances  where  the  character 
of  the  engagement  or  tactical  requirements  will 
be  such  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  pre- 
liminary target  designation  ;  on  the  other  hand 
there  will  be  frequent  occasions  when  all  the 
details  of  designation  may  be  well  cared  for 
before  fire  is  opened.  So,  also,  with  all  the 
other  elements  of  musketry  there  will  be  times 
when  thpy  will  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  or  dis- 
appear altogether  and  times  when  they  may  be 
fully  applied.  However,  admitting  that  the 
principles  of  musketry  are  not  always  appli- 
cable on  the  field  of  battle  in  no  way  warrants 
the  omission  from  our  instruction  schedules  of 
a  thorough  training  in  these  principles,  for  a 
study  of  the  results  produced  in  peace  firing 
by  such  training  indicates  a  wonderful  increase 
in  fire  efficiency,  and  a  study  of  the  details  of 
military  history  will  disclose  many  instances 
where   the   full   effect   of   such   training  might 


Musketry  7 

have  been  reaped  in  battle.  We  state,  as  an 
indisputable  fact,  that  a  battle  uni^  untrained 
in  musketry  is  a  unit  in  name  only. 

The  phases  of  musketry  instruction  will  be 
treated  of  under  the  following  heads: — 

(1)  Determination  of  Ranges. 

(2)  Designation  of  Targets  and  Sectors. 

(3)  Distribution. 

(4)  Communication,    Signals,    and    Trans- 

mission  of  Fire  Data. 

(5)  Fire  Discipline. 

(6)  The  Application  of  Fire. 

(7)  The    Supply    of    Ammunition    to    the 

Firing  Line. 

(8)  Conduct  of  Fire. 

(9)  Combat  Practice.     . 

Determination  of  Ranges: — 

The  necessity  for  correct  sight  setting  and 
methods  for  determining  ranges  is  pointed  out 
in   the   authorized   manuals. 

Means  of  Determining  Ranges: — 

1.  Estimation  by  eye. 

2.  By  observation  of  fire  and  trial  volleys. 

3.  From  other  troops. 

4.  By  instruments. 

5.  From  maps. . 

6.  By  sound. 

7.  Measuring  distance  on  the  ground. 


8  Battle  Fire  Training 

Estimation  by  Eye: — 

While  estimation  bj  eye,  until  mechanical 
range  finders  are  more  liberally  issued,  will 
probably  be  the  method  most  generally  used,  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  many  thousands  of 
estimates  by  this  method  have  proved  that  it 
results  in  anayerage  error  of  12^  per  cent. 
Such  an  error  wiU  at  tlmeslBcTfatal  to  good  fire 
effect  (see  table)  ;  therefore,  no  opportunity 
should  be  neglected  to  apply  other  methods  in 
conjunction  with  estimation  by  eye.  There 
should  be  a  constant  and  never  failing  effort  to 
verify  and  correct  the  range. 

The  average  of  a  number  of  estimates  will, 
of  course,  give  more  nearly  correct  results  than 
an  individual  estimate.  Advantage  of  this  fact 
should  be  taken  whenever  possible,  in  the  com- 
pany, in  the  battalion,  and  even  at  times  in  the 
regiment.  Individual  estimates  in  the  company 
should  be  averaged  by  the  first  sergeant,  com- 
pany estimates  in  tlie  battalion  by  the  adju- 
tant, and  battalion  commanders  of  adjacent 
battalions  might  well  take  means  to  ascertain 
ranges  from  the  battalions  on  the  right  and 
left. 

In  addition  to  the  usual  method,  the  follow- 
ing, which  is  sometimes  called  the  over  and 
short  method,  will  be  found  to  give  good  results 
but  like  any  other  character  of  work  requires 


Musketry  9 

practice  to  produce  proficiency.  It  has  often 
been  known  to  result  in  errors  of  less  than  ten 
per  cent  and  within  a  time  limit  which  has  been 
set  at  about  thirty  seconds. 

Method: — 

Assuming  a  company  in  fire  position  with  tlie 
objective  announced  by  the  fire  director  (cap- 
tain). In  each  platoon  are  two  selected  range 
estimators,  one  having  been  trained  to  assume 
the  over  or  maximum  range  as,  for  example, 
the  objective  cannot  be  beyond  a  certain  num- 
ber of  yards ;  the  other,  the  shorter  or  minimum 
of  that  range;  in  other  words,  that  the  objec- 
tive cannot  be  under  a  certain  number  of  yards. 
When  they  have  decided  their  oum  estimates, 
either  one,  according  to  previous  designation, 
calls  on  the  otiicr  for  his  estimate,  which  he 
adds  to  his  own,  and  halves  the  sum ;  the  result 
he  gives  or  signals  to  his  platoon  leader,  who  in 
turn  gives  or  signals  it  to  the  first  sergeant 
The  latter  takes  the  estimate  of  all  the  range 
estimators,  averages  tlum  and  reports  the 
result  to  the  captain.  This  same  system  should 
be  used  when  each  estimator  simply  estimates 
the  range  without  the  over  and  short  method. 
It  may  be  advantageous  to  assemble  the  range 
finders  while  the  captain  is  absent  receiving  the 
attack  order,  then   upon   his   return   they   will 


10  Battle  Fire  Training 

be  immediately  available.  Whatever  method  is 
used  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  results 
sought  for  are  accuracy  and  speed. 

Estvmation  Exercises: — 

No.  1 :  An  officer,  accompanied  by  several 
markers,  may  be  sent  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
range  a  short  time  before  target  practice. 
When  he  arrives  at  a  point  previously  desig- 
nated he  sends  out  his  markers  in  different 
directions  with  instructions  to  move  toward 
selected  points  a  certain  number  of  yards,  to 
halt,  and  remain  under  cover  until  signaled  to 
kneel  or  rise. 

The  company  arrives  at  the  position  afad  is 
faced  in  the  direction  of  one  group  of  markers 
Avhich  is  signaled  to  make  itself  visible.  Each 
man  estimates  the  range  and  announces  it  to 
his  corporal.  In  similar  manner  the  estimates 
are  determined  to  the  other  markers;  the  true 
ranges  then  announced  to  each  group ;  com- 
parisons made;  the  men  given  time  to  figure 
their  errors ;  and  the  company  moved  on  to  the 
range  having  been  halted  about  fifteen  minutes. 
It  is,  of  course,  necessary  that  the  markers  be 
instructed  in  pacing  andjinderstand  there 
tjon3heir  paces  bear  to  100  yards.  Attention 
may  be  called  to  the  appearance  of  men, 
objects,  or  animals,  at  different  distances. 


Musketry  11 

No.  2 :  If  a  range-finding  instrument  is 
available,  considerable  practice  can  be  given  in 
a  limited  period  of  time;  as  many  as  twenty 
estimates  in  ten  minutes. 

(1)  A  company  can  estimate  ranges  to  mov- 
ing or  stationary  objects  and  within  a 
certain  time  limit  of,  say  thirty  sec- 
onds ;  range  is  announced  as  indicated 
by  instrument. 

(2)  After  several  drills,  of  about  twenty 
minutes  daily,  have  been  devoted  to  com- 
pany instruction  as  indicated  in  preced- 
ing paragraph,  the  company  should  be 
divided  into  squads,  the  ranges  esti- 
mated by  the  men,  recorded  by  their 
corporal,  and  compared  with  the  instru- 
mental finding. 

The  use  of  an  instrument  of  the  contained 
base  type  affords  the  utilization  of  any  object 
in  view  for  this  practice  and  records  distance 
with  so  small  an  error  and  in  so  brief  a  period 
of  time  that  interest — the  big  factor — can  be 
held  without  difficulty. 

Attack: — 

The  foregoing  exercises  and  discussion  refer 
mainly  to  the  determination  of  the  initial 
range.  The  question  of  the  maintenance  of 
the  range  throughout  an  action  must  now  be 


12  Battle  Fire  Training 

considered.  After  fire  has  been  opened,  the 
commander  of  the  attack  unit  which  first  estab- 
lishes a  new  firing  position  is  especially  charged 
with  the  duty  of  making  an  accurate  estimate 
of  the  distance  covered  by  his  rush.  This  he 
does  either  by  counting  his  own  paces,  dele- 
gating this  duty  to  an  assistant,  or  by  estima- 
tion. Each  unit  of  a  company,  as  it  arrives 
on  the  line,  takes  its  range  by  signal  from  the 
portion  already  established  in  the  new  position. 
The  captain,  also  by  signal,  must  after  each 
advance  assure  himself  that  the  ranges  used  by 
the  several  platoons  are  as  desired.  In  bat- 
talion, each  company  maintains  its  own  range. 
Reenforcing  companies  not  previously  partici- 
pating in  the  fire  fight  take  their  range  from 
the  nearest  unit.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  battalion 
commander  to  harmonize  the  ranges  of  the  sev- 
eral companies. 

It  is  necessary,  during  the  progress  of  the 
advance,  to  check  the  range  being  used  by  all 
of  the  several  methods  which  are  applicable  at 
the  time  and  to  use  the  system  of  check  out- 
lined above.  If  these  precautions  are  not  taken 
one  of  two  things  will  invariably  result,  either 
an  original  error  in  the  initial  range  will  be 
maintained  or  a.  correct  initial  range  will  be 
lost. 


Musketry  13 

Estimation  Exercise  No.  3 :  A  company  or 
larger  force  deployed  facing  a  similar  force  at 
as  great  a  range  up  to  1,600  yards,  as  the  ter- 
rain will  permit.  The  companies  to  be  invisible 
one  from  the  other  at  the  initial  deployment. 
At  a  signal,  cither  by  bugle  or  flag,  both  lines 
advance  simultaneously.  After  the  advance  is 
continued  for  a  short  distance  both  lines  are 
halted  and  thirty  to  forty-five  seconds  allowed 
for  an  estimate  of  the  distance  to  the  opposing 
line.  The  exercise  is  continued  by  a  simul- 
taneous advancing  and  halting  of  the  lines. 
The  exercise  will  run  smoothly  if  the  director 
takes  post  midway  between  the  two  lines  in  a 
conspicuous  position.  He  should  by  a  system 
of  preconcerted  signals  indicate  the  moment 
for  advancing  and  halting  but  the  actual  com- 
mands should  be  given  by  the  company  com- 
manders themselves.  Stakes  should  be  driven 
at  each  halt  for  subsequent  checking  of  the 
ranges.  This  exercise  may  be  varied  by  using 
only  company  commanders  and  range  estima- 
tors, or  any  part  of  a  unit  up  to  a  brigade. 
Part  of  the  advance  may  be  in  double  time  or 
the  regular  method  of  advance  by  rushes  may 
be  used.  The  results  produced  by  an  organi- 
zation on  its  first  attempt  at  this  kind  of  work 
will  he  amply  indicative  of  the  necessity  for 
further  training. 


14  Battle  Fire  Training 

Defense: — 

In  the  attack  each  platoon  will  probably 
cover  for  its  target  all  or  half  of  the  company 
objective,  depending  upon  the  size  of  the 
organization.  They  will,  consequently,  usually 
maintain  the  same  elevation.  On  the  defensive, 
however,  the  initial  distribution  will  be  quite 
different  due  to  the  necessity  for  covering  the 
various  fractions  of  the  enemy's  rushes.  Here 
the  platoon  objectives  will  usually  be  dependent 
upon  the  character  of  the  opposing  rushes. 
After  fire  has  once  been  opened  it  becomes  nec- 
essary, therefore,  for  each  fraction  of  a  com- 
pany having  a  separate  objective  to  maintain 
a  system  of  estimation  of  the  length  of  the 
enemy's  rushes  or  his  present  range.  This  is 
usually  accomplished  by  the  file  closers.  The 
captain  with  the  first  sergeant  and  the  com- 
pany buglers  maintains  a  check  and  harmonizes 
the  ranges.  In  the  battalion  the  major  must, 
as  far  as  practicable,  take  advantage  of  every 
opportunity  to  keep  his  battalion  working  as  a 
unit.  Variations  of  Exercise  No.  3,  to  cover 
the  defense,  will  produce  results  commensurate 
with  the  effort  expended. 

Observation  of  Fire: — 

Range  may  be  determined  by  observing  the 
simultaneous  strike  of  a  number  of  bullets,  i.  e., 


Musketry  15 

volleys;  by  observing  irregular  firing,  or  fire 
at  will;  and  by  observing  the  strike  of  sliots 
fired  by  several  expert  riflemen. 

The  volley  will  give,  under  similar  condi- 
tions, better  indications  than  will  the  same 
number  of  shots  which  are  not  fired  simul- 
taneously. It  is,  therefore,  desirable  when  pos- 
sible to  use  the  volley  for  ranging.  In  order 
that  this  method  may  produce  results  commen- 
surate Avith  the  effort  made  there  are  certain 
conditions  wliich  must  be  fulfilled : — 

1.  The  target  must  be  stationary. 

2.  The  ground  must  be  of  such  character 

that  the  strike  of  bullets  may  be  seen. 

3.  The  target  must  be  so  situated  that  the 

ground  in  its  vicinity  is  visible. 
The  application  of  this  method  is  usually  about 
as  follows: 
Having  estimated  the  range,  two  platoons 
are  selected  to  fire,  the  first  with  an  elevation 
about  200  yards  over  the  estimated  range ;  the 
second  with  one  about  200  yards  under.  The 
second  platoon  should  fire  a  few  seconds  after 
the  first.  The  target  should  be  included 
between  these  shot  groups  and  the  range  may 
be  estimated  from  the  relative  position  of  the 
three  points.  If  the  target  is  not  included 
within  the  shot  groups,  changes  in  elevation 
should  be  made  so  that  it  will  be  included,  bear- 


16  Battle  Fire  Training 

ing  in  mind  that  positive  changes  will  produce 
quicker  results  than  a  slight  shifting  of  the 
sight  leaves.  No  more  than  two  volleys  should 
usually  be  necessary  to  adjust  the  fire. 
(Selected  shots  give  a  smaller  shot  group  which 
is  more  easily  located.) 

In  order  that  the  strike  of  the  bullets  may 
be  properly  interpreted  it  is  necessary  that  the 
form  of  the  shot  group  on  various  kinds  of 
ground  be  thoroughly  understood,  so  that  the 
center  of  impact  may  be  quickly  recognized. 
On  horizontal  ground  the  form  of  the  shot 
group  is  somewhat  that  of  an  ellipse  with  its 
longer  axis  in  the  direction  of  the  line  of  fire. 
Ground  rising  at  the  target  shortens  the  ellipse. 
The  length  of  the  ellipse,  of  course,  varies  with 
the  different  ranges  from  300  yards  at  100 
yards  to  64  at  2,000  for  the  mean  or  fifty  per 
cent  zone,  that  is,  the  zone  in  which  half  the 
hits  will  be  found. 

The  table  of  dispersion  given  in  the  S.  A. 
F.  M.  should  be  studied  in  this  connection  so 
that  allowance  may  be  made  for  wild  and  scat- 
tered shots  which  will  always  occur. 

In  war  it  will  frequently  be  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  for  commanders  to  distinguish  indi- 
cation of  their  own  fire  from  that  of  other 
troops.  Tactical  situations  will  not  often 
admit  of  trial  volleys.     Troops  firing  volleys 


Musketry  17 

should  not  tlienisclvcs  be  under  fire.  For  these 
reasons  and  for  those  previously  given  it  is 
apparent  that  the  opportunities  for  the  use  of 
volleys  for  ranging  are  limited ;  however,  this 
fact  does  not  detract  from  the  value  of  the 
method  and  practice  in  it  should  be  given  in 
order  that,  when  applicable,  it  may  be  used. 
To  interpret  properly  the  range  from  a  group 
fired  at  will  is,  of  course,  more  difficult  than 
with  the  volley  and  it  is  from  the  former  class 
of  fire  that  we  will  in  battle  be  obliged  to  deduce 
our  fire  effect.  We  have,  however,  in  addition 
to  the  indications  given  by  the  strike  of  the 
bullets  the  effect  of  fire  upon  the  enemy  as  a 
l)a.sis  for  estimation.  Good  glasses,  training, 
and  constant,  keen  observation  for  indications 
which  may  be  interpreted  into  terms  of  range 
are  requisite  before  results  of  any  value  can 
be  obtained  from  observation  of  fire. 

Taking  into  consideration  that  hits  on  the 
target  will  pass  through  and  afford  indications 
in  rear,  it  may  be  taken  as  an  approximation 
that  fire  directed  at  a  stationary  target  is 
adjusted  properly  when  about  one-third  of  the 
shots  appear  to  strike  in  front  of  it. 

If  circumstances  will  permit,  perhaps  one  of 
the  most  favorable  methods  of  finding  the  range 
is  by  the  fire  of  expert  riflemen  who,  with  an 
estimated    range,    fire   at    a   prominent    object. 


Musketry  19 

The  fire  of  the  company  is  adjusted  from  tlu' 
strike  of  their  bullets. 

The  following  plates  give  an  approximation 
of  the  appearance  of  fire  when  viewed  from 
different  points  in  relation  to  the  firing  line: 

Plate  1.  Observing  fire  from  in  rear  of 
firing  point,  dust  will  appear  somewhat  above 
actual  point  of  impact. 

Plate  2.  If  observation  is  made  from  rear 
of  firing  point,  hits  appear  on  the  side  opposite 
to  the  direction  of  the  wind  (wind  from  the 
right).  The  best  position  from  which  to 
observe  fire  is  in  rear  of  and  above  the  firing 
point,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  from  this 
position  bullets  which  fall  short  will  be  more 
easily  *  seen  and  consequently  will  appear  to 
strike  further  from  the  objective  than  bullets 
which  strike  an  equal  distance  beyond. 

Plate  3.  If  observation  is  made  on  or 
beyond  the  flank,  shots  which  pass  over  the 
objective  will  appear  to  fall  toward  the  side  on 
which  posted  and  those  which  fall  short  toward 
the  opposite  side.  The  first  view  is  from  the 
position  of  the  firing  line,  the  second  view  from 
the  position  of  the  observer,  of  hits  over  and 
short  of  the  objective. 


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Musketry  21 

From  Other  Troops: — 

The  artillery  by  the  nature  of  its  fire  quickly 
(letcrmiiies  ranges  and  from  it,  at  times,  this 
valuable  information  can  be  obtained. 

By  Instruments : — 

The  use  of  the  "contained  base  instruments" 
will  largely  eliminate  difficulties  but  there  are 
two  points  to  be  borne  in  mind  in  this  connec- 
tion. First,  we  can  never  hope  to  supply  all 
units  with  the  mechanical  range  finders. 
Patrols,  subdivisions  of  covering  forces,  and 
individual  soldiers  will  frequently  be  called 
upon  to  estimate  ranges,  and  therefore,  the 
issue  of  instruments  should  not  be  the  signal 
for  omitting  instruction  in  the  other  methods. 
Second,  range  finders  make  errors  and  in  addi- 
tion the  distance  to  the  target  is  not  always  the 
best  elevation  to  use;  hence  we  must  not  cease 
to  correct  by  observation.  On  some  foreign 
ranges  the  range  for  the  day  is  announced  not 
from  the  reading  of  the  instruments  but  from 
the  results  obtained  by  specially  selected  shots. 
It  is  obvious  that  where  range  finders  are  issued 
for  only  a  portion  of  a  command  arrangements  • 
should  be  made  for  the  transmission  throughout 
the  unit  of  the  data  obtained  by  these  valuable 
adjuncts.  Considerable  practice  is  necessary 
even  with  the  simplest  form  of  range  finder  to 
obtain  accuracy  and  speed. 


22  Battle  Fire  Training 

Use  of  the  Mil  Scale  for  Range  Determinatiok 

(From  Infantry  Journal — Article  by  Capt.  H.  E.  Eames, 

28th  Infantry) 

„  W    X    1,000  T,  T,  -A 

R —^ ! R  — Range  in  yds. 


2. 

^^      RXM 

~    1,000 

W  =  Width   or   height   in  yds. 

3. 

^       W  X  1,000 
R 

M  =  Number    of    mils. 

The  following  examples  of  the  application 
of  these  formulae  indicate  their  practical  use: 
Example  1 :     (Estimation  of  range) 

A  certain  tree  is  estimated  to  be  45  feet  high 
(15  yds.).  It  covers  15  mils  of  the  scale.  It  is 
therefore   (estimated)    1,000  yards  away,  for: 

T,        W  X  1,000      15  yards  X  1,000     15,000       ,  ...  , 

R    = ! =  — £ 5 — I =  — I =  1,000  yards. 

M  15  mils  15  ^ 

The  telegraph  poles  seen  on  a  distant  rail- 
road are  known  (from  previous  measurement  of 
such  poles)  to  be  44  yards  apart;   the  distance 
f  between   two    adjacent   poles    is    40   mils;     the 
range  to  the  railroad  is  therefore  1,100  yards, 

for : 

„  W  X  1,000      44  yards  X  1,000      44,000        ,  ^„„      , 

^    =  TH •= ICK n — it; — ~    1,000  yds. 

M  40  mils  =40 


Mnskctrij  23 

Example  2:     (Estimation  of  fronts) 

A  line  of  skirmishers  at  about  one  man  per 
yard  of  front  covers  40  mils  of  the  scale ;  the 
range  is  known  to  be  800  yards.     How  many 

men  are  there  in  the  skirmish  line? 

_  R  X  M  800  yards  X  40  mils  32,000  \  32  yards 
^^~  1,000  "  40  mils  "  1,000  \  (or  men). 

A  column  of  infantry  in  "fours"  is  seen  by  a 
patrol  at  a  range  of  1,200  yards.  It  covers 
120  mils  from  head  to  rear  of  column.  How 
many  men  are  in  the  column.'' 

RXM     1,200  yards  X  120  mils     lt4,000      f  144.   yds. 


W-    1,000-  ■      1,000  1,000       1 288  men. 

Example  3:  (Determination  of  mils — in  dis- 
tributing fire) 
A  hostile  force  known  to  contain  about  100 
mtn  is  deployed  in  position  1,000  yards  away 
but  so  concealed  that  its  flanks  cannot  be  seen 
or  determined  definitely.  The  company  com- 
mander decides  to  cover  a  front  of  200  yards 
with  his  fire,  100  yards  each  side  of  a  visible 
group  of  heads  in  the  battle  line.     How  many 

mils  or  "sights"  should  be  covered.'' 
^  _  W  X  1,000_200  yards  X  1,000_2CO,000     (  200  mils  or 
R         ~  1,000  ~   1,000      I     4  sights. 

A  machine  gun  platoon  known  to  contain  two 
guns  is  concealed  at  a  range  of  900  yards  with 
one  of  its  guns  visible  through  glasses  near  a 
small  bush.  The  company  commander  decides 
to  cover  a  front  of  50  yards  on  each  side  of  the 


Musketry  25 

visible  gun.     How  many  mils  or  "sights"  should 
be  covered? 

_W  X  1,000  _  100  X  1,000      100,000  \  111    mils   or 

^~  R  "         900         "     900     "       [    2.2  sights. 

Hi/  Maps: — 

It  is  to  be  expected  tliat  the  use  of  maps  for 
range  finding  will  be  limited  by  the  very  nature 
of  campaign,  except  in  prolonged  engagements, 
or  when  time  and  opportunity  affords  the 
making  of  reliable  data,  as  in  defensive 
positions. 

If  time  permits  a  sketch,  which  is  always  a 
valuable  supplement  to  a  report  or  for  use  as 
a  fire  chart,  can  be  made.  Supposing  a  land- 
scape, as  Plate  4,  is  under  consideration;  rule 
off  on  a  paper  witji  a  mil  scale  horizontal  and 
vertical  lines  as  shown  in  Plate  5. 

Hold  the  mil  scale,  as  indicated  in  Plate  4,  a 
suitable  distance  from  the  eye  with  the  button 
on  the  string  held  in  the  mouth  and  obtain  the 
horizon,  the  location  of  prominent  landmarks 
and  features  of  terrain  covered  by  the  scale 
which  is  sketched  in  the  corresponding  squares 
on  the  ruled  paper;  proceed  along  the  width 
of  the  proposed  sketch  in  a  similar  manner. 
Then  hold  the  rule  vertically  and  locate  the 
boundaries  and  by  a  series  of  horizontal  and 
vertical  intercepts  data  is  obtained  for  filling 
out  the  sketch.     Thus  far  the  sketch,  as  shown 


Musketry  29 

in  Plati-  6,  lias  been  completed.  The  value  of  a 
transparent  material  for  a  mil  scale  is  apparent 
in  this  work. 

When  completed  the  skrtch  should  approxi- 
mate that  shown  in  Plate  7. 

On  the  completed  sketch,  as  in  Plate  7,  mark 
the  ranges  to  the  j)rominent  points  and  turn  it 
over. to  the  troops  occupying  the  position,  and 
the  matter  of  transmission  of  ranges  is  simpli- 
fied. If  opportunity  does  not  afford  time  for 
the  above  method,  a  valuable  range  card  can 
be  made  by  the  following  method  (applying  to 
landscape  of  Plate  7),  which  would  be  of  great 
value  in  defense  work. 

In  making  this  range  card,  first  locate  the 
position  of  observer,  then  a  reference  point, 
and  mark  them  plainly.  Any  one  using  such  a 
card,  sights  on  the  reference  point  and  orients 
the  card.  (Plate  8) 
By  Sound: — 

Sound  travels  at  the  rate  of  1,100  feet,  or 
366  yards,  per  second.  If  the  number  of  sec- 
onds between  the  flash  or  smoke  and  the  report 
is  taken  and  multiplied  by  366  the  result  will 
closely  approximate  the  range.  A  stop  watch 
is  the  best  means  for  determining  this  time 
interval,  but  a  little  practice  in  counting  will 
produce  very  good  results  by  adding  some  syl- 
lable  or   sound    that   will    about   make   up    the 


Musketry 


31 


difference   in   time   wlien   c()untin<r   inniilxi-s   as, 
1,  ah,  2,  ah,  3,  ah,  4,  ah,  5,  ah,  C,  ah,  etc. 
By  Mcasurh}g  Distance  on  the  Ground: — 

This  metliod  is  apph'cahle  on  the  defense 
onl}'.  Range  cards  shouhl  be  made  and  fur- 
nished to  all  company  commanders.  Distance 
should  be  measured  to  prominent  objects;  if 
there  are  none,  artificial  marks  should  be  con- 
structed. The  application  of  tliis  method  shouM 
not  be  left  until  the  battle  field  is  reached. 


From  Ml 

isketry 

Bulletin  :- 

— 

Table 

Illustrating  the  Influence  of 

AN 

Incourec't 

EsTIM 

ate 

The  Range 

Ranqe 

Error 

in  Yards 

Used 

0 

50 

JOO 

150 

200 

250 

300 

350 

.',00 

iOO  ... 

.    100 

96 

83 

67 

49 

32 

21 

12 

8 

i50  ... 

.  100 

95 

81 

62 

43 

27 

16 

9 

6 

.500  ... 

.  100 

93 

78 

57 

36 

21 

10 

6 

3 

550  ... 

.  100 

92 

74 

60 

30 

15 

7 

4 

1 

(iOO  .  .  . 

.  100 

91 

69 

43 

23 

9 

4 

2 

0 

650  ... 

.  100 

90 

64 

38 

18 

7 

3 

0 

700  ... 

.  IOO 

88 

59 

32 

13 

5 

1 

0 

750  ... 

.  100 

86 

55 

27 

10 

3 

0 

800  ... 

.  100 

84 

50 

22 

6 

1 

0 

850  ... 

.  100 

82 

46 

18 

5 

1 

0 

000  ... 

.  100 

80 

41 

13 

3 

0 

i)50  .  . . 

.  100 

78 

37 

11 

2 

0 

1,000  .  .  . 

.  100 

75 

32 

8 

1 

0 

1,0.50  .  .  . 

.  100 

73 

30 

7 

1 

0 

1,100  .  .. 

.  100 

70 

27 

5 

0 

1,1,50  ... 

.  100 

69 

24 

5 

0 

1 .200  .  .  . 

.  100 

67* 

20 

4 

0 

1,2.50  .  .  . 

.  100 

65 

18 

3 

0 

1,300  ... 

.  100 

63 

15 

2 

0 

1,3.50  .  .  . 

.  100 

59 

13 

1 

i,too  ... 

.  100 

55 

10 

1 

1,450  .;. 

.  100 

64 

9 

1 

32  Battle  Fire  Training 


1,500   

100 

53 

8 

1 

1,550    .... 

100 

51 

8 

1 

1,600   .... 

100 

49 

7 

0 

I,fi50    .... 

100 

47 

() 

0 

1,700    .  .  .  . 

100 

45 

5 

0 

1,750   .... 

100 

43 

4 

0 

1,800   .  .  .  . 

100 

40 

3 

0 

1,850    .  .  .  . 

100 

39 

3 

0 

1,900   .  .  .  . 

100 

38 

3 

1,950    

100 

37 

2 

2,000   .... 

100 

3() 

2 

Note 

:   Theab( 

3ve  ti 

able 

of  experimental  firing  at  the  School  of  Mus- 
ketry by  a  class  of  riflemen  who  were  regarded 
as  slightly  above  the  average  company  in  indi- 
vidual proficiency,  all  of  the  men  being  either 
expert  riflemen  or  sharpshooters. 

If  "good  marksmen"  shooting  at  ....  yards 
with  sights  set  correctly  make  100  hits  b}'^  firing 
a  certain  number  of  rounds,  then  the  same  men 
firing  at  the  same-target  and  range  and  the  same 
number  of  rounds  but  with  a  sight  setting  .... 
yards  in  error  will  make  ....  hits.  To  illus- 
trate "Good"  marksmen  at  800  yards  with  a 
correct  sight  setting  will  make  100  hits  (the 
number  of  rounds  necessary  to  make  the  100 
hits  is  immaterial),  but  if  the  sights  are  set  at 
900  yards,  or  100  yards  in  error,  they  will 
make  but  41  hits,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  table 
by  looking  along  the  "900  yard"  line  until  the 
100  yard  error  column  is  reached,  where  the 
figure  41  Avill  be  found. 


CHAPTER  II 

TARGET    DESIGNATION 

"Under  this  head  arc  inchidcd  the  ability  of 
commanders  to  describe  the  objectives  to  be 
attacked  or  the  sectors  to  be  defended  and  the 
ability  of  thv  individual  solditr  to  understand 
and  transmit  to  other  soldiers  such  descrip- 
tions. This  implies  a  uniformity  in  the  method 
of  designating  targets  throughout  those  units 
which  may  become  mixed  in  battle,  such  as 
liattalion,  regiment,  and  brigade." 

"Within  the  regiment,  it  implies  an  ability  on 
the  part  of  the  regimental  commander  to 
describe  an  objective  and  its  subdivisions  from 
the  map  as  well  as  from  the  ground,  and  such 
training  on  the  part  of  his  subordinates  as  will 
insure  a  correct  translation  of  his  map  desig- 
nation into  terms  of  actual  terrain." 

"Wifhiti  the  battalion,  it  implies  not  only  an 
ability  on  the  part  of  the  battalion  commander 
to  describe  an  objective  without  ambiguity  but, 
also,  a  uniformity  of  training  throughout  the 
battalion,  Avhich  will  enable  the  men  of  one  com- 
pany to  describe  intelligently  to  men  of  other 
companies  of  the  battalion  both  targets  and 
fronts  in  language  and  by  methods  with  which 
both  are  familiar." 


34  Battle  Fire  Training 

"Within  the  company,  it  implies  an  ability  on 
the  part  of  the  company  commander  to  describe 
the  objectives  for  his  platoons  within  the  limits 
assigned  to  the  company.  It  also  implies  an 
ability  to  cover  the  whole  target  of  the  com- 
pany during  a  forward  movement  of  part  of 
the  company.'' 

"Within  the  platoon,  it  implies  an  ability  on 
the  part  of  the  platoon  leaders  to' understand 
the  company  commander's  designation  of  the 
target  and  to  transmit  that  information  to 
their  platoons  in  such  a  manner  as  to  insure  an 
equal  distribution  of  their  fire  within  the  front 
assigned  them  as  objectives,  not  slighting  the 
less  visible  parts."    (MusKctry  Bulletin) 

Targets  in  the  field  will  be  either — 

(1)  Visible  throughout  entire  extent. 

(2)  Partly  visible. 

(3)  No  portion  visible. 

When  a  target  is  visible  throughout  its  entire 
extent,  or  partly  visible,  no  elaborate  system 
of  designation  is  necessary  for  its  location ; 
when  partly  visible  its  extent  may  te  estimated 
by  some  medium  of  intercept  measurement,  and 
when  no  portion  is  visible  its  location  may  be 
determined  as  described  in  the  following  pages. 

Before  taking  up  instruction  in  target 
designation,  men  should  become  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  following,  wherein  lies  the 
basis  of  all  description: 


Target  Designation  35 

1.  Familiarity  witli  military  and  topographical 

terms  so  as  to  rccognizL'  all  features  of 
military  importr.ncc. 

2.  Ability  to  point  out  on  a  landscape  target 

or  actual  terrain,  features,  as — 

sk^'line,  valley,  gentle  slope,  steep  slope, 
dense  cover,  crest,  military  crest,  ridge, 
hill,  peak,  saddle,  etc. 

3.  Ability  to  <leterniino  different  kinds  of  trees, 

tlieir  shape  and  size,  undergro\\i;h,  color 
of  crops,  etc. 

4.  Ability  to  approximate  size  of  objects — 

if  large  or  small 
if  of  moderate  size 
if  tall,  short,  wide,  or  narrow. 

5.  Ability   to   understand    changing   aspect    of 

terrain  during  an  advance  (Paragraph 
ir,7,  I.  D.  R.). 

In  action,  the  target,  as  a  rule,  will  not  be 
visible  to  the  in.iividual  soldier  and  there  must 
be  some  (juick  and  fairly  accurate  method  of 
conveying  to  every  man  on  the  firing  line  its 
location  and  extent. 

The  description  of  targits  in  such  mayner 
as  to  enable  the  quick  understanding  of  what 
is  intended,  can  be  appreci.ated  only  by  those 
who  on  the  firing  line  have  given  commands, 
entirely  satisfactory  and  apparently  clear  and 
simple  to  themselves,  but,  in  reality,  so  vague 


38  Battle  Fire  Training 

that  only  a  small  portion  of  their  organization 
seemed  to  understand. 

It  becomes  the  duty,  therefore,  of  unit  com- 
manders to  give  fire  orders  properly,  clearly, 
and  in  simple  language,  which  will  stand  the 
test — "do  the  men  understand?'' 

"It  has  been  reported  that  in  the  South 
African  War  at  least  75%  of  the  shots  fired 
were  wasted  owing  to  bad  indication  and  the 
men,  therefore,  had  no  recognition  of  targets." 
It  should  be  noted  here  that  in  giving  loca- 
tion, terms  should  be  used  which  describe  the 
appearance  of  a  Za/zJscape  witliout  glasses.  Use 
field  glasses  to  become  acquainted  with  all  the 
details-  of  terrain  and  target,  then  make  the 
description  as  it  appears  to  the  eye  unaided. 

The  top  portion  of  Plates  9-A  and  9-B  illus- 
trates the  appearance  of  a  landscape  to  unaided 
vision;     the   lower   portion,    how    a    particular 
section  appears  when  using  field  glasses. 
With  glasses — No.  1   shows  a  line  of  men  with 

supports  in  rear. 
With  glasses — No,  2  shows  a  small  house  to  the 

right  of  the  mill  with  a  small 

trench  in  its  front. 
With  glasses — No.  3  shows  a  line  of  intrench- 

ments. 
With  glasses — No.  4   shows   a  machine  gun   at 

fence  opening. 


Target  Designation 


39 


Details  are  iisuall}'  not  visible  to  the  naked 
eye;  therefore  all  target  descrijition  should  be 
so  given  as  to  afford  a  ready  understanding 
from  the  appearance  of  the  landscape  itself, 
based  upon  the  detail  as  shown  by  glasses. 


If  in  a  section  of  terrain,  as  shown  in  Plate 
10,    a    niacliine    gun    is    located    at    A,    or    a 

liostile  line  at  B C,  it  seems  perfectly  clear 

to  say : 

(1)  "A  machine  gun  to  the  right  of  that 
clump  of  trees" — (pointing  to  the  clump  of 
trees).  This  would  probably  give  sufficient 
data  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  there  are 
three  clumps  of  trees  and  such  command 
received  under  fire  might  easily  be  understood 
to  mean  any  of  the  three  clumps  of  trees;   or — 

(2)  "A  hostile  line  on  ridge  from  that 
clump  of  trees  to  the  road."  Again  the  same 
objections.  Such  description  will  fit  any  one 
of  the  clumps  of  trees. 


40 


Battle  Fire  Training 


If  some  system  is  used  that  permits  of  the 
designation  of  a  reference  point,  if  possible 
before  the  time  for  action  arrives,  when  all  are 
more  receptive  for  instruction,  a  point  may  be 
established  from  which  positions  may  be  located 
with  reasonable  accuracy  as  they  develop.  In 
the  above  case,  before  or  after  arrival  on  the 
firing  line  the  high  peak  is  impressed  on  all — 
"That  is  Reference  Point."  With  this  start,  a 
simple  command  given  later : 

(1)  "At  10  o'clock,  near  side,  of  clump  of 
trees,  machine  gun,"  conveys  the  idea  of  the 
proper  clump  of  trees,  and  no  other  clump  of 
trees  fits  this  description. 

(2)  "Hostile  line,  on  ridge,  extends  1  sight 
right." 

It  will  be  noted  that  according  to  the  various 
systems  used,  a  reference  point  in  one  case 
means  a  point ;  in  another,  a  point  through 
which  a  line  to  the  observer  is  imagined,  and 


Target  Designation  41 

targets  arc  then  located  to  the  'riglit  or  left 
of  this  iinaginar}'^  line. 

On  a  hindscape  the  difficulty  of  locating  a 
target  might  be  further  appreciated  when  we 
look  at  Plate  11  and  are  told  that  machine  guns 
are  located  at  A,  or  a  hostile  line  extended  from 
B  to  C. 

Of  tin-  imthods  of  target  designation  given 
herein,  each  has  its  limitations,  defects,  and 
advantages  under  various  conditions  of  terrain, 
fire,  etc.,  hut  a  wise  selection  of  one,  modified 
hy  part  of  another,  or  a  combination  of  two  or 
more  will  prove  a  material  factor  in  efl^cicncy. 

Units  ok  Measure 

A  common  term  should  be  applied  to  mil, 
finger,  and  sight  leaf,  such  as  "sight,"  and 
throughout  our  service  such  a  term  should 
convey  one  meaning;  for  example,  a  sector 
1/20  of  the  range  =  50  mils  =  1  sight  leaf 
=  1  finger  measurement. 

A  MIL  is  an  angular  measurement  (approxi- 
mately 3  minutes  of  arc)  whose  tangent  is 
1/1000  of  the  radius.  In  other  words,  1  mil 
will  cover  at  1,000  yards  1  yard  intercept; 
50  mils  will  cover  50  yards  or  1/20  of  range. 
If  a  50  yard  trench  is  placed  perpenrlicular  to 
a  position  at  a  point  of  1,000  yards  away  and 
a  mil  scale  held  U]),  50  mils  will  just  cover  the 
trench.      A   mil    scale    can    easily    be    made   by 


42  Battle  Fire  Training 

reproducing  the  graduations  of  a  ruler,  show- 
ing inches  divided  into  tenths  and  held  20 
inches  from  the  eye. 

THE  SIGHT  LEAF  equals  the  intercept  of 
1/20  of  range,  as  50  yards  at  1,000  yards 
(when  eye  is  held  13%  inches  from  sight  leaf 
or  about  one  inch  in  rear  of  small  of  stock) . 
The  position  of  the  eye  relative  to  the  stock 
can  be  temporarily  marked  with  a  pencil  or 
permanently  with  a  file.  If  intercept  is  made 
with  lowered  sight  leaf,  the  notch  of  open  sight 
affords  a  means  of  obtaining  half  "sights." 

A  FINGER  so  held  as  to  intercept  1/20  of 
the  range  or  50  yards  at  1,000  yards.  Finger 
widths  differ  in  individuals,  hence  the  distance 
from  the  eye  to  the  finger  must  be  ascertained 
in  each  case.  The  finger  position  can  be  deter- 
mined by  holding  a  mil  scale  as  indicated  above, 
on  an  object,  wall,  or  landscape,  noting  the 
intercept  and  adjusting  the  finger  to  cover  such 
intercept ;  or  take  a  sight  leaf  intercept  with  a 
rifle  on  the  landscape  or  wall  and  adjust  the 
finger  position  so  as  to  cover  the  intercept ;  or 
measure  one  foot  on  an  object,  move  twenty 
feet  away,  and  cover  the  measurement  by  a 
finger. 

In  using  the  finger  measurement,  teach  men 
to  cover  a  sector  as  indicated  in  the  foregoing, 
and  when  accurately  covered  to  swing  the  arm, 


Target  Designation 


18 


50  mils 

Sipht   Leaf   11/16' 

Finper  Width 


Distance  from  Eye 

20" 
15" 
10" 


20 


20 


7/.siii,g  oiilji  the  .shoulder  joint,  until  the  hand 
rcaclu's  the  side  of  the  body  and  note  posiHon 
of  hand  rclativu  to  holt,  packet,  etc.  Re(|iiirt' 
Miem,  after  a  few  moments,  to  trv  this  niethod 
'^f  obtaining  arm  position. 

To  improvise  a  rule  quickly,  a  pencil  or  stick 
can  be  notched  at  intervals  to  obtain  the  pro- 
portions of  1/20  as  indicated  below: 

Width  of  Measuring      _..  ,  ,         „ 

,,'  ,.  •'      Distance  from  Eye 

:  20" 

133//' 
:    (to  1)0  detcniiiiiefl) 

Notched  Pencil  or 
Stick 

1" 

%" 

Vs" 

With  the  alove,  there  are  three  methods  of 
measuring.  "Why  three  methods.''"  A  man 
has  his  rifle  and  the  sight  leaf  is  naturally 
the  normal  measuring  medium  for  him  to 
use,  as  he  can  use  it  while  in  a  prone  position 
with  only  a  slight  change  in  the  position  of  his 
head,  or  he  can  use  the  finger  measurement. 
A  fire  director  has  only  his  rule  with  which  he 
sy)eaks  in  the  same  terms  as  the  man  with  the 
sight  leaf.  Suppose  the  rule  is  lost,  he  can  at 
once  I'esort  to  the  finger  measurement.  All 
officers  from  battalion  commanders  down  should 
be  supplied  with  some  means  for  measuring 
sectors. 


Target  Designation  45 

In  announcing  a  reference  point  a  good  plan 
during  practice,  if  conditions  warrant  the 
exposed  position,  is  to  stand  as  illustrated  in 
Plate  12,  looking  directly  towards  the  reference 
f)oint,  with  the  arms  in  a  plane  perpendicular 
to  the  line  of  the  reference  point.  Reference 
point  (control  or  initial  point)  may  be  defined 
as  some  prominent,  very  distinct  object  on  the 
landscape,  near  the  target  or  where  the  target 
is  expected  to  be,  easily  described  and  quickly 
seen,  upon  which  the  atte;ntion  of  the  men  can 
be  centered,  and  from  which  targets  are  located 
by  some  means  of  measurement. 

Abbreviations  sometimes  used  in  explaining 
the  following  systems : — 

Horizontal  Clock  Face H.  C.  F. 

\'crtical  Clock  Face ^^  C.  F. 

Right  Angle  System R.  A.  S. 

Sight  System S.  S. 

In  announcing  reference  points  the  use  of  the 
horizontal  clock  system  will  1  e  an  aid  when  first 
establishing  its  direction.     In  Plate  12  A — 

1.  First   establish   direction    of    12   o'clock — as   high 

trees  on  ridge  to  our  front   (pointing). 

2.  Using  the  following  o'clock  lines — 
at  10  o'clock     1.  left  edge  of  mill. 

2.  west  end  of  fence  enclosing  mill. 
11  o'clock     3.  distant  peak   y^  sight  west. 

4.  ridge,  east  of  mill. 

5.  road. 


46  Battle  Fire  Tr aiming 

12  o'clock    6.  road. 

7.  trees,  near  road 

8.  top  of  ridge. 

9.  distant  peak  %  sight  west. 

1  o'clock  10.  road. 

11.  line  of  trees. 

12.  ridge. 

2  o'clock  13.  road. 

14.  house. 

An  advance  moving  forward  from  a  position 
indicated  by  the  clock  in  Plate  12  A,  would 
have  the  trees  on  the  ridge  to  their  front  as  a 
reference  point;  if  moving  in  the  direction  of 
10  o'clock,  as  appears  from  the  picture,  the 
mill ;  towards  1  o'clock,  the  end  of  the  ridge ; 
towards  2  o'clock,  a  house. 

The  distant  horizon  in  this  case  is  so  uniform 
that  to  give  any  one  of  the  small  peaks  as  a 
reference  point  Avould  very  likely  result  in  a 
misunderstanding.  Again,  during  an  advance 
towards  12  o'clock,  the  small  ridge  would  com- 
pletely obscure  the  horizon  as  soon  as  the  foot 
of  the  hill  was  reached. 

Measuring  with  Mil  Scale: —  (Plate  13) 

Reference  point — end  of  road. 

3  "sights"  right — that  house. 

Measuring  xcith  Sight  Leaf: —   (Plate  14) 

Reference  point — same. 

3  "sights"  right — that  house. 

Measuring  with  Finger: —    (Plate  15) 


50  Battle  Fire  Training 

Reference  point — same.      (Some  men  prefer  to 
turn  back  of  hand  towards 
object.) 
3  "sights"  right — that  house. 
Exercise : — 

Purpose: — To  accustom  men  to  take  mea- 
surements properly  from  a  reference  point. 
A  target  such  as  Plate  30  is  of  great  value 
for  this  exercise  or,  in  its  absence,  a  wall, 
side  of  tent,  or  an}'  surface  will  answer  the 
purpose. 

Situation:-' — Men  step  to  the  testing  point 
when  called.  Position  for  the  testing  point 
should  be  determined  by  the  sector  widths. 
If  a  twelve  inch  sector  is  intended  on  the  tar- 
get the  position  should  be  twenty  feet  awa}'. 
After  a  reference  point  is  indicated  the  man 
is  told  to  take  one,  two,  or  any  number 
(including  halves)  of  sights — right  or  left. 
The  estimate  is  indicated  and  corrections 
made. 

This  exercise  may  be  adapted  to  the  terrain 
in  the  following  manner: — (A)  Select  any 
prominent  object  on  or  near  the  horizon.  Call 
the  men  to  tlic  testing  point  one  at  a  time  and 
require  each  individual  to  apply  his  sight  any 
given  number  of  times  to  the  right  or  left  of 
the  selected  object  and  describe  accurately  the 
point  upon  which  the  last  intercept  falls.     (B) 


Target  Designation  51 

Select,  two  proiiiiiicnt  objects  and  require  each 
man  to  state  the  number  of  sight  widths 
between   them. 

In  the  use  of  the  siglit  leaf  during  the  first 
exercises,  considerable  variance  will  be  noted  by 
reason  of  the  inability  of  the  men  to  determine 
where  the  leaf  width  ends  when  moving  the  rifle 
and  to  know  where  to  begin  the  next  measure- 
ment. Often  no  object  affords  a  tie-in  point 
for  the  successive  leaf  measurements  and  a  little 
practice  will  be  necessary  to  correct  this  error. 
Some  men  are  able  to  get  a  better  and  more 
accurate  reading  by  sighting  along  the  top  of 
the  leaf. 


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Target  Designation 


Q5 


Trench  D;ita : — -It  is  to  be  noted  in  this  con- 
nect ion  that  our  target  reguhvtions  provide  no 
course  of  training  in  firing  standing  from  a 
trench  or  from  loop  holes.  Such  training,  in 
view  of  the  developments  in  the  European  War, 
is  deemed  most  necessary. 

To  further  facilitate  the  assignment  of  com- 
pany sectors  in  each  trench  a  small  board  may 
be  placed  similar  to  Plate  3  showing  ranges. 
In  front  of  each  company  trench,  stakes  ma}' 
be  driven  which  from  a  common  point  of  obser- 
vation serve  to  give  a  definite  apportionment 
of  sectors  to  the  men,  as  shown  in  Plate  24<. 


A  machine  gun  commander  must   reach   his 
gun    pointers    onlv    with    fire    data.       l*late    25 


PLATE.   2S. 


66  Battle  Fire  Training 

illustrates  a  small  strip  of  paper  which  the 
machine  gun  commander  makes  to  conform  to 
the  reading  of  his  mil  scale,  with  sectors  and 
targets  marked,  passes  it  on  to  each  gun,  and 
from  it  sectors  are  easily  obtained.  This  can 
be  applied  in  a  limited  way,  in  defense,  to  the 
transmission  of  fire  data  to  platoon  comanders. 
Plate  25  applies  to  Example  B  in  Plate  19. 

The  following  exercises  are  offered  as  sugges- 
tions   for   training   in   target   designation    and 
range  finding.     As  will  be  seen,  they  are  also 
adapted  to  training  in  distribution. 
Exercise  1. 

Purpose: — To  train  officers  and  noncom- 
missioned officers  in  concise,  accurate,  and 
clear  description  of  targets,  and  to  train  men 
to  interpret  such  descriptions  quickly  and 
correctly. 

Situation: — The  squad  is  deployed  facing 
to  the  rear.  The  corporal  is  at  the  firing 
point,  where  rests  have  been  provided  for 
seven  rifles. 

Action: — At  a  signal  from  the  instructor 
the  target  is  outlined  by  the  display  of  a  flag 
at  each  flank.  When  the  corporal  states  he 
understands  the  position  of  the  target,  th< 
flags  are  withdrawn.  The  squad  is  thf/i 
brought  to  the  firing  point,  placed  in  a  proxie 
position,  and  each  man  required  to  estimute 


Target  Designation  67 

the  Ffinge,  set  his  sight,  and  to  sight  his  rifle 
on  tlie  target  as  he  understands  it  from  the 
description  of  the  corporal.     The  corporal's 
errors  may  be  checked  from  the  actual  ter- 
rain.    Those  of  the  men  are  pointed  out  by 
requiring  each  man  to  rise  and  leave  his  rifle, 
properly  pointed,  on  the  rest  provided. 
In  this  exercise  the  time  allowed  the  corporal 
to  locate  his  target  should  be  reduced  as  profi- 
ciency is  acquired.     The  time  allowed  the  men 
should    also    be    reduced    as    instruction    pro- 
gresses.     The  period   required   to  balance   the 
rifle  accurately   on   the  sand  bag   rest  will  be 
found  to  vary  to  such  an  extent  with  the  difi'er- 
ent  rests  that  it  is  hardly  practicable  to  make 
this  exercise  competitive  as  far  as  time  is  con- 
cerned.     The    exercise    is    suitable    for    larger 
units  than  the  squad.     The  width  of  the  target 
and  the  distance  thereto  should  vary  with  the 
size  of  the  unit  undergoing  instruction. 

Exercise  2. 

Purpose: — To  train  officers  and  noncom- 
missioned ofl'icers  as  in  Exercise  1,  and  to 
train  the  individual  soldier  to  locate  a  target 
solely  from  a  description  thereof. 

iSituntion: — The  men  are  placed  so  as  not 
to  be  able  to  see  the  target.  Rests  are  pro- 
vided as  in  the  preceding  exercise.  For  indi- 
viduals the  target  should  be  a  rock,  a  bush,  or 


68  Battle  Fire  Traming 

some  other  suitable  feature  of  the  landscape ; 
for  a  unit,  a  line  whose  flanks,  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  instruction,  should  be  clearly 
defined. 

Action: — The  instructor  indicates  the  tar- 
get to  the  commander  who,  having  described 
it,  causes  the  unit  or  individual  to  move  so 
as  to  see  the  target,  locate  it,  estimate  the 
range,  set  sight,  and  place  the  rifle  on  the 
rest  properly  directed. 

After  some  instruction  with  plainly  dis- 
cernable  targets,  more  indistinct  ones  should 
be  selected. 

Illustration:    Reference  point,  rocky  hill  top 
at  10  o'clock. 
Target,     right,     three     sights, 
dark  green  bush. 


CHAPTER  III 


FIRE    DISTRIBUTION 


"III  a  decisive  battle  success  depends  upon  gaining 
and  maintaining  fire  superiority." — I.  D.  R. 

To  gain  and  hold  this  fire  superiority  certain 
things  are  necessary,*  among  wliich  is  a  proper 
distribution  of  fire  upon  the  target.  What  is 
meant  by  a  proper  distribution  of  fire  will  be 
explained  later.  It  is  apparent,  however,  that 
no  regular  distribution  of  any  kind  can  be 
expected  unless  the  objective  is  divided  into  sec- 
tors and  these  sectors  assigned  to  the  various 
units  taking  part  in  the  action.  In  this  connec- 
tion a  pamphlet  issued  by  the  School  of  Mus- 
ketry says :  "Commanders  of  all  degrees  assign 
that  part  of  the  general  objective  given  them  to 
their  commands  in  such  manner  that  there  will 
be  none  of  the  target  that  is  not  receiving  its 
proportional  part  of  the  fire."  The  pamphlet 
then  continues,  showing  the  evil  results  which 
follow  a  disregard  of  this  principle,  which,  of 
ceurse,  are  in  addition  to  the  loss  of  a  proper 
distribution  of  fire:  "The  division  of  the  objec- 
tive into  parts  and  the  assignment  to  units  must 
be  made  with  great  care.  If  the  adjacent  flanks 
of  two  organizations  advancing  from  slightly 
different  directions  guide  on  the  same  point  in 

•(Balk's  Infantry  Tactics,  370.) 


70  Battle  Fire  Training 

the  enemy's  line  during  the  advance,  they  will 
arrive  in  a  continuous  line  upon  its  front.  If 
the  point  is  in  advance  of  the  line  there  will  be 
crowding  or  overlapping.  This  is  objec- 
tionable as  it  causes  confusion  and  may  subject 
a  portion  of  one  line  to  the  fire  of  the  other. 
Casualties  during  the  advance  may  tend  to 
reduce  the  difficulty.  If  the  guiding  point  is 
in  rear  of  the  enemy's  lino,  there  may  be  a  gap 
between  the  two  organizations,  which,  however, 
may  be  filled  if  that  is  desirable."    .... 

Maps  for  the  purpose  of  subdividing  the 
objective  will  not  always  be  available,  nor,  if 
available,  will  their  use  always  be  desirable.  In 
the  absence  of  maps  the  methods  by  which  com- 
manders may  accomplish  this  subdivision  are 
explained  in  the  chapter  on  Target  Designation. 
While  the  text  refers  mainly  to  the  company 
and  the  subdivisions  thereof,  the  principles  are 
applicable  to  larger  units,  and  should  bo 
applied.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  while 
the  brigade  and  regiment  may  be  able  to  include 
the  divisions  of  the  objective  in  their  initial 
order,  such  will  rarely  be  the  case  in  the  bat- 
talion. The  battalion  commander  must  usually 
pass  through  the  zone  of  artillery  fire  for  a  mile 
or  more  before  he  can  pick  out  his  first  firing 
position  and  assign  objectives.  If  possible  the 
company  reference  point  should  not  be  selected 


Fire  Distribution  71 

until  one  can  be  picked  up  in  the  enemy's  line. 
The  necessity  for  as  early  an  assignment  of 
objectives  as  is  expedient  is  discussed  under 
the  battalion  attack  problem  in  Chapter  8. 

The  critiques  which  follow  were  given  by  the 
Musketry  Board  of  the  Fifth  Brigade  in  con- 
nection with  the  problems  in  target  designation 
on  the  defense  and  in  the  attack.  They  indi- 
cate not  only  the  errors  which  occur  through 
improper  methods  of  division  but  also  empha 
size  the  necessity  for  a  uniform  system  of  angu- 
lar measurement  such  as  the  "Sight." 

The  Defense 

(a)  The  front  was  described  as  extending 
"200  yards  north  from  the  reference  point." 

(b)  As  extending  4  (5  or  6)  fingers  north 
from  the  reference  point. 

(c)  As  extending  from  the  reference  point 
northward  for  a  definite  distance  "to  that  tall 
windmill." 

"The  first  is  objectionable  as  being  indefi- 
nite. In  practice  it  leads  to  misunderstandings 
as  to  the  width  of  the  front,  to  the  adoption  of 
a  front  narrower  than  that  ordered  by  the 
colonel,  and  gaps  in  the  center  of  the  line  which 
were  assumed  by  no  company,  or  an  excessive 
overlapping  at  that  point  with  a  consequent 
loss    of    fire    effect    on    each    front.      Had    the 


72  Battle  Fire  Training 

company  commanders  been  versed  in  readily 
translating  the  yard  measure  into  some  known 
standard,  as  a  mil  scale,  or  had  it  been  given 
in  mils,  it  would  have  been  satisfactory." 

"The  second  is  objectionable  unless  the 
expression  'finger^  is  a  definite  width,  known 
and  recognized  by  all,  or,  if  the  men  are  trained 
to  use  the  rear  sight  leaf  as  a  measure  of  width, 
it  should  be  so  used  in  designating  targets." 

"The  third  is  considered  the  best  method  of 
the  three  because  it  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the 
target's  width,  indicates  a  definite  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  battalion  commander,  but 
it  presumes  an  ability  on  the  part  of  the  bat- 
talion commander  to  recognize  his  front  from' 
the  colonel's  order  and  to  transform  that  order 
into  terms  appropriate  to  the  concrete  prob- 
lems presented  to  the  battalion." 

"It  is  to  be  understood  that  rarely  will  two 
physical  points  be  present." 

The  Attack 

"In  apportioning  the  battalion  target  to  the 
companies  on  the  firing  line,  the  difference 
between  the  battalion  in  defense  and  in  attack 
should  be  noted.  In  defense,  the  division  of  the 
battalion  sector  should  be  made  by  a  reference 
to  physical  objects  as  has  been  stated  in  a 
previous   critique. 


Fire  Distribution  73 

In  the  attack,  however,  this  will  often  not  be 
practicable  and  seldom  desirable  because  of  the 
chan^inf^f  aspect  of  the  sector  or  target  as  the 
battalion  advances. 

Generally  it  will  be  sufficient  with  trained 
troops  to  acquaint  them  with  the  width  of  the 
battalion  sector  or  part  of  the  target,  the 
direction  line,  and  the  apportionment  of  this 
wjiole  line  which  the  battalion  commander 
wishes  to  make,  assuming  that  he  desires  to 
depart  from  some  prearranged  and  obvious 
system  of  apportionment,  such  as  where  each 
company  takes  its  proportion  of  the  whole 
target  depending  upon  the  number  of  com- 
panies in  the  line." 

It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  without 
a  uniform  system  of  angular  measurement  a 
clear  designation  of  targets  is  a  difficult  mattei". 
In  training,  therefore,  great  stress  should  be 
laid  upon  the  exercises  and  principles  given 
under  Target  Designation. 

The  assignment  of  sectors  is  usually  made 
from  a  central  point  where  the  commanders. of 
the  subdivisi^s  are  assembled  for  orders. 

In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  noted  by  all 
commanders  that  a  target  once  assigned  must 
be  kept  under  observation  when  changing  posi- 
tion. This  is  to  guard  against  the  apparent 
shifting    of    the    objective    when    viewed    from 


74  Battle  Fire  Travning 

different  angles.  For  example,  the  battalion 
sector  and  the  subdivision  thereof  will  appear 
different  when  viewed  from  the  position  of  the 
major  and  when  viewed  from  the  positions  of 
the  several  companies. 

Referring  to  a  proper  distribution  of  fire, 
spoken  of  above,  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations 
states:  "The  purpose  of  fire  superiority  is  to 
get  hits  whenever  possible,  but  at  all  events  to 
keep  down  the  enemy's  fire  and  render  it  harm- 
less. To  accomplish  this,  the  target  must  he 
covered  with  fire  throughout  its  whole  extent. 
....    No  part  of  the  target  is  neglected " 

By  covering  all  parts  of  the  target  with  fire 
and  only  by  covering  all  parts,  is  proper  dis- 
tribution obtained.  The  methods  by  which  the 
companies  in  the  battalion  and  the  platoons  in 
the  company  are  assigned  sectors  so  as  to 
accomplish  this,  will  be  explained  in  the  chapter 
on  Application  of  Fire. 


In  Plate  26  a  position  appears  apparently 
occupied  at  intervals.  The  tendency  among 
untrained  troops  is  to  fire  at  prominent  objects 
or  toward  the  center  of  a  hostile  line.  It  is  to 
be   expected,  therefore,  that  under  the  condi- 


Fire  Distribution 


75 


tions  shown  in  tlie  plate,  the  visible  targets  will 
be  hit.  If,  however,  the  concealment  afforded 
by  the  brush  is  by  some  means  removed,  a  line 
miffht  be  confronted,  as  in  Plate  27,  of  which 


"•-'^•"'yfrr'-l'r 


I  ■t^liiiSYff^fSri^. 


a  large  portion  is  receiving  no  hits.  The  neces- 
sity for  covering  all  parts  of  the  line  with  fire 
thus  becomes  apparent,  for,  from  the  portions 
not  covered  a  deadly,  uninterrupted,  and 
undisturbed  fire  is  beinff  delivered. 


>^ 


TO-:*r9^TO''r'o^^W^^^>^^^^^^-' 


4 


^^"^uM^^cl-K  -' 


'   ■  ^ 


^"^ 


-^gg>- 


PUATd     2  A 


Fire  Distribution  77 

When  first  instructing  men  in  collective  dis- 
inbution  a  large  extent  of  target  or  landscape 
should  be  presented  for  division.  Figure  A, 
Plate  28,  indicates  a  landscape  divided  by  a 
squad  in  such  a  manner  that  the  centers  of 
impact  are  equally  distributed  along  the  entire 
front.  Such  distribution  over  a  large  front  in 
the  first  stages  of  instruction  permits  of  the 
correction  of  errors.  After  the  idea  of  appor- 
tioiunent  of  a  target  is  learned,  then  practice 
siiould  be  given  on  smaller  fronts  until  such  as 
Figure  B  can  be  properly  divided,  for  it  must 
be  understood  that  a  company  might  have  a 
target  of  apparently  less  extent  than  in 
I'Mgure  C. 

In  some  field  problems,  when  the  flanks  of  a 
target  are  located,  the  methods  of  closing  the 
center  of  impact  of  the  flank  fire  unit  as  in 
Figure  D,  d'  may  be  adopted.  For  a  fire  prob- 
lem, it  no  doubt  adds  a  trifle  to  the  number  of 
hits  as  compared  to  d'',  where  a  certain  portion 
of  a  shot  group  falls  without  the  target. 

In  action  the  advantage  of  covering  thor- 
oughly the  apparent  flank  and  a  little  more 
extent  as  in  d",  seems  the  better  plan,  for  the 
fianks  are  favorable  positions  for  observers  and 
others  aiding  in  fire  direction,  and  their  exact 
location  is  difficult  to  determine.  * 

Plate  29  shows  a  target  which,  or  something 
similar   to   serve   the   purpose,   may   be   easily 


78  Battle  Fire  Training 

drawn  on  a  card  and  a  duplicate,  Figure  29  A, 
of  same  placed  underneath  and  used  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner : 

With    a   pin    or   other    sharp    instrument, 
make  a  hole  in  the  target  to  indicate  your 
point  of  aim,  assuming  for  example  the  fol- 
lowing pj-oblem :    "Your  squad  will  cover  a 
hostile   skirmish   line   extending   on   the    top 
(or  other)   target,  from  right  to  left.     You 
are  No.  4  (or  1,  2,  3,  5,  6,  7,  8)." 
The  extent  of  the  target  can  be   changed  to 
cover  half  or  a  small  portion  of  target,  or  the 
problem  can  embrace  the  following: 

"Your  company  of  8  squads  cover,  on  top 
(or  other)  target  from  ....  to Indi- 
cate the  center  of  impact  of  the  7th  squad, 
of  the  5th  squad,  of  the  3d  squad,  etc." 
Variations  of  the  above  will  suggest  themselves 
as  the  target  is  used. 

A  landscape  target  of  about  the  size  36" 
X  14'  placed  indoors  or  in  the  company  street 
in  camp  will  afford  an  excellent  means  for  not 
only  teaching  distribution  but  many  of  the 
principles  of  musketry.  Plate  30  represents 
such  a  landscape,  and  at  about  30  feet  from  it 
are  lined  a  number  of  sand  bags.  Any  other 
kind  of  suitable  rests  may  be  improvised  for 
rifles  or  sighting  bars  for  the  following  exer- 


Fire  Distribution 


79 


^EiXiE^ 


A*/./i7"£-  JO. 


lat  iijjuerciiie — muiviauaUy  (woinvut  rip-es) 

A  hostile  line  begins  at  .  .  .  and  ends  at  .... 
You  arc  the  3d  man  from  the  right  in  your 
squad;  indicate  your  point  of  aim  and  say 
"hold"  when  I  move  this  small  bull's  eye  along 
target  to  the  point  you  determine. 
2d  Exercise — In  Distribution  (for  a  squad) 

A  hostile  line  begins  at  .  .  .  and  ends  at  .... 
Each  man  is  instructed  to  align  his  rifle  on 
the  target  at  a  point  he  understands  to  be  his 
point  of  aim.  Each  rifle  is  verified  and  errors 
pointed  out. 
3d  Exercise — For  squad  leaders 

Each  corporal  with  two  rifles,  sight  and 
indicate  the  limits  of  your  scjuad  sectors.  Your 
platoon  of  4  squads  covers  the  target  from 
to 


80 


Battle  Fire  Training 


Jfth  Exercise — For  platoon  leaders  (in  similar 
manner  as  for  corporals) 
After  the  principles  of  distribution  are  thor- 
oughly learned  a  practical  application  can  be 
given  with  gallery  rifles  on  a  target  similar  to 


Plate  31,  which  consists  of  two  frames,  with 
the  same  landscape  on  each.  The  one  in  rear 
has  the  sector  lines  drawn  as  shown  in  Plate  32. 


/^JLA7-£:    3Z 


Plate  32  shows  the  result  of  three  problems 
fired  by  a  squad  with  gallery  rifles  at  a  distance 


Fire  Distribution  81 

of  60  feet,  target  aimed  at  similar  to  31 — and 
recorded  by  target  32. 

At  top  target  (following  fire  commands  were 
given)  : 

1.  A  hostile  line  extends  across  entire 

target. 

2.  Fire  5  rounds. 
At  middle  target 

1.  Reference  point,  right  edge  of  frame. 

2.  1  sight  left. 

3.  A  hostile  machine  gun. 

At  lozver  target 

1.  Reference  point — same. 

2.  A  hostile  line. 

3.  Extends  1  sight  left.* 

7^he  following  problem  may  be  worked  out  on 
a  landscape  target  such  as  is  shown  in  Figure 
33.  Its  use  requires  a  system  of  recording- 
somewhat  different  from  tlie  small  gallery  target 


*Note:  a  target  such  as  is  described  in  Plates  31 
and  32  can  be  made  in  the  followinp  manner: — Two 
frames  made  of  ^''xiy,"  material  about  4'x2V2';  the 
roar  frame  just  small  enough  to  fit  in  the  other,  or,  the 
two  frames  can  l)e  made  the  same  size. 

The  frames  are  covered  with  larfrct  clotli  on  whicli 
is  pasted  ordinary  wrapping  paper.  If  the  ability  is 
not  at  hand  to  make  the  necessary  landscapes,  three 
heavy,  roTigh  lines  will  answer  the  same  purpose.  The 
rear  target  should  have  the  sector  lines  drawn  upon  it. 


82 


Battle  Fire  Training 


- — Jib 


just  described.  The  rear  side  is  marked  with 
squares  and  numbered.  When  a  problem  is 
given,  a  small  frame  with  a  strip  of  ■  paper 
tacked  upon  it,  is  hung  on  the  rear  side  cover- 
ing the  section  that  will  be  fired  upon  as  indi- 
cated by  the  squares.  By  placing  a  new  strip 
of  paper  on  the  rear  frame  for  each  problem 
an  accurate  record  may  be  kept  of  the  firing 
and  the  front  target  can  be  almost  cut  to 
pieces  with  shots  before  it  need  be  replaced 

Example  of  the  use  of  target,  Plate  33 : — 
A  patrol  was  formed,  inspected,  deployed,  and 
moved  along  a  road  at  the  side  of  which  was 
placed  this  target  in  such  manner  that  the 
point  would  come  upon  it  unexpectedly.  The 
patrol  was  given  the  usual  orders  and  in  addi- 
tion was  instructed  to  return  any  fire. 

When  the  point  reached  the  target  he  was 

told  "You  are  being  fired  upon  from  there" — 

(indicating  target  90  feet  distant). 

Reference  point — Cross  roads. 

Hostile  line  extends  along  road,  1  sight  left 

(which  extended  target  near  the  house). 


Fire  Distribution  •    83 

The  point  signaled  "Enemy,"  the  patrol 
assembled,  the  fire  data  was  transmitted  by 
him  to  the  corporal  when  he  arrived,  and  by 
the  corporal  to  the  remainder  of  the  patrol. 
Fire  was  opened  with  the  results  as  indicated 
on  Plate  33. 

The  second  problem  was  conducted  in  a 
similar  manner,  except  that  the  target  was 
indicated. 

"Extends  1  sight  right"   (which  extended 
target  to  stone  fence). 

As  fire  opened  it  was  desired  to  swing  to  a 
new  target.  Several  men  had  fired,  each  one 
shot  when  the  signal  was  given. 

1.   "Machine  gun  1  sight  riglit." 

The  results  of  both  problems  are  indicated 
on  the  target. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  patrol 

1.  Went  through  the  initial  steps  of 

patrolling. 

2.  Fire    opened    on    it    requiring    its 

assembly. 

3.  Fire  data  transmitted. 

4.  Fire  was  controlled. 

Such  problems  ma}'  be  conducted  indoors  by 
eliminating  the  patrol  dispositions  and  many 
valuable  principles  learned  equally  as  well  as 
on  the  actual  terrain. 

The  following  problem,  while  given  here  pri- 
marily   as    an    exercise    in  J.arget    designation 


84     '  Battle  Fire  Training 

and  distribution,  contains  many  other  valuable 
features  of  musketry  training.  Many  of  the 
possibilities  are  pointed  out  at  this  time  both 
to  avoid  repetition  later  and  to  illustrate  the 
practicability  of  combining  several  of  the 
principles  of  musketry  training  in  a  single 
problem,  thus  saving  much  time  and  labor  in 
arranging  for  this  form  of  exercise. 

Company  Problem  on  Terrain: — 

Object:  To  train  company  commanders 
and  all  other  company  officers  in  target 
designation  and  target  distribution  and  the 
company  estimators  in  estimating  the  range. 

If  troops  are  used  the  other  elements  of 
fire  control  and  direction  and  fire  discipline 
are  included. 

Situation:  The  enemy  is  in  a  defensive 
position,  visible  in  part.  Two  rifles  with 
rests  are  provided  for  the  company  com- 
mander and  set  up  a  distance  apart  equal 
to  the  front  of  the  company  when  deployed. 

Similarly,  rifles  are  provided  for  each  pla- 
toon leader  and  set  up  opposite  the  points 
where  the  flanks  of  their  platoons  would  rest 
upon  the  company  front. 

Action:  The  company  commander,  the 
platoon  leaders,  and  the  estimators  are  called 
up  and  assigned  their  appropriate  positions. 


Fire  Distribution  85 

A  problem  is  then  given  the  company  com- 
manders along  these  lines : 

A  hostile  company  has  just  deployed  with 
its  right  opposite  ....  (some  suitable  land- 
mark), about  200  yards  in  front  of  .... 
(some  suitable  landmark).  Cover  it  with 
the  fire  of  your  company. 

The  company  commander  locates  the  posi- 
tion of  the  target,  calls  upon  the  estimators 
for  the  distance,  determines  the  width  of  the 
target,  and  gives  the  appropriate  commands 
to  his  platoon  leaders. 

He  then  directs  the  rifles  assigned  him 
upon  what  he  believes  to  be  the  flanks  of  the 
target,  sights  properly  set. 

The  platoon  leaders  in  a  like  manner  direct 
their  rifles  upon  the  flanks  of  their  targets 
with  the  sights  correctly  set.  If  auxiliary 
aiming  points  are  used  the  platoon  rifles 
should  be  directed  at  these  points  opposite 
the  flanks  of  the  platoon  target,  and  the 
platoon  leaders  required  to  describe  the  aim- 
ing points  as  they  would  to  their  platoons. 

If  combined  sights  arc  used,  one  sight 
should  be  set  at  each  range. 

The  target  may  vary  from  one  wholly 
visible  to  one  wholly  invisible ;  the  latter 
should  be  located  by  reference  to  features 
of  the  terrain. 


86  Battle  Fire  Training 

Concealed  markers,  provided  with  flags, 
should  be  stationed  at  each  flaYik  of  the  com- 
pany target.  When  all  rifles  are  laid,  the 
flags  should  be  signalled  into  a  visible  posi- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  checking  and  point- 
ing out  errors. 

This  exercise  may  also  be  given  to  the  pla- 
toons of  the  company  only,  or  simultaneously 
to  the  four  companies  of  a  battalion.  In  the 
latter  case  the  distance  between  rifles  may  be 
reduced  to  facilitate  supervision. 

The  director  should  assure  himself  of  the 
following : 

(a)  Were  the  rifles  of  the  company  com- 
mander laid  on  the  correct  target  with  sights 
properly  set.'' 

(b)  Were  the  platoon  commanders'  rifles 
laid  as  directed  and  with  the  ordered  eleva- 
tions.'' 

(c)  Was  the  target  properly  covered.'' 

(d)  Did  the  company  commander  calculate 
the  front  of  the  hostile  unit  correctly.'' 

(e)  Were  the  platoon  rifles  covering  the 
proper  portion  of  the  target  as  ordered  or 
according  to  a  prearranged  method  in  the 
company.'' 

(f)  Was  the  range  correct.'' 

(g)  Was  the  proper  sight  used,  \.  e.,  single 
elevation  or  combined  sights.'' 


Fire  Distribution  87 

(h)  Was  the  time  consumed  in  giving  orders, 
etc.,  satisfactory? 

(i)  Should  auxiliary  aiming  points  have 
been  given  by  the  platoon  commanders  and,  if 
so,  were  they  properly  selected  and  properly 
described? 

(j)  If  the  target  was  indistinct  or  invisible 
was  the  zone  beaten  by  fire,  wider  and  deeper 
than  the  target,  so  as  to  assuredly  cover  it? 

(k)    Were  all  commands  properly  given? 

The  training  of  troops  may  be  included  in 
this  exercise  by  having  the  units  actually 
present  in  strength  and  checking  the  targets, 
aiming  points,  and  ranges  used  by  the  men. 
This  may  be  done  by  providing  a  number  of 
rests  scattered  along  the  company  front  or  by 
an  inspection  of  the  rifles  of  the  men  while  they 
are  in  the  act  of  simulating  fire. 

If  troops  are  used  in  this  problem  the  direc- 
tor should  assure  himself  of  the  following,  in 
addition  to  the  points  given  above: 

(a)  Did  the  platoon  guides  watch  the  firing 
line  and  assist  in  fire  control? 

(b)  Did  squad  leaders  transmit  commands 
and  properly  supervise  their  squads? 

(c)  Were  sights  set  as  ordered? 

(d)  Did  the  men  fire  as  ordered? 

(e)  Was  prompt  attention  given  to  orders? 

(f)  Was  the  rate  of  fire  correct? 


88  Battle  Fire  Training 

The  following  example  of  commands  and 
action  is  given  as  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the 
problem.  The  example  departs  from  the  exact 
forms  given  under  Target  Designation  to 
emphasize  the  fact  that  there  is  no  set  rule 
which  is  applicable  to  all  problems,  but  a  sys- 
tem which  must  be  adapted  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  the  case  in  hand.  Every  problem  has 
several  solutions  which  would  be  satisfactory 
and  the  example  is  but  one  of  these.  The 
details  of  the  landscape  which  are  used  in  the 
following  example  to  describe  the  target  are 
taken  from  an  actual  solution  of  the  problem 
on  the  terrain. 

The  Company  Commander : — 

On  receiving  his  instructions  from  the  direc- 
tor the  company  commander  returns  to  his 
company,  keeping  track  of  the  changing  aspect 
of  the  target  as  he  does  so.  Arriving  at  the 
center  of  his  company,  he  is  met  by  his  platoon 
leaders  and  range  estimators  who  have  assem- 
bled in  his  absence,  and  says: 

Target:  The  target  is  a  line  of  skirmishers 
visible  in  part.  It  may  be  seen  between  us  and 
that  long  line  of  green  bushes  which  begins  one 
finger  to  the  right  of  that  red  water  tower  at 
11  o'clock,  and  it  extends  well  beyond  the 
bushes  to  the  right  and  left. 


Fire  Distribution  89 

(At  this  point  the  range  estimators  begin 
their  estimations  and  the  captain  pauses  until 
the  first  sergeant  or  other  designated  person 
automatically  announces  the  average  estimate 
of  the  range,  saying,  "Range  1100."  The 
captain  calculates  mentally  1/20  of  1100 
equals  55,  therefore  each  "sight"  is  55  yards. 
My  target  is  a  company  or  150  yards,  3  sights 
will  cover  it.) 

The  captain  then  resumes,  saying:  The  sec- 
tor assigned  to  this  company  is  three  fingers 
long  and  extends  from  that  group  one  finger 
to  the  right  of  the  water  tank  to  a  point  four 
fingers  to  the  right  of  the  water  tank.  Range 
1050  and  1150.  Fire  at  will  at  my  signal. 
Posts. 

Platoon  Leaders: — 

The  platoon  leaders  then  hasten  to  the  center 
of  their  platoons  and  "Put  into  execution  the 
commands  and  directions  of  the  captain,  having 
first  taken  such  precautions  to  insure  a  correct 
sight  setting  and  clear  description  of  the  aim- 
ing point  as  the  situation  permits  or  requires." 
(Par.  251,  I.  D.  R.)  by  saying: 

"Range  1050  and  1150. 

Target:  The  target  is  a  line  of  skinnislicrs 
about  1100  yards  to  our  front,  only  part  of 
which  is  visible. 


90  Battle  Fire  Training 

Reference  Point:  That  long  line  of  bushes 
about  1300  yards  to  left  front.  The  company 
sector  is  three  fingers  long  and  lies  between  us 
and  that  reference  point,  extending  one-half 
finger  beyond  each  end  of  the  bushes. 

Aiming  Point:  The  bottom  of  the  line  of 
bushes." 

As  soon  as  the  range  is  announced  each 
front  rank  man  sets  his  sight  at  1050  and  each 
rear  rank  man  at  1150.  Squad  leaders,  from 
their  position  in  rear  of  their  squads,  assure 
themselves  that  sights  are  set  and  that  the  men 
of  their  squads  understand  the  aiming  point 
and  sector  and  then  signal  "I  am  ready." 
Similarly  the  platoon  leaders  signal  "I  am 
ready."  When  the  captain  sees  that  all  of  his 
platoons  are  ready  he  gives  the  signal  to  com- 
mence firing.  At  the  captain's  signal,  each 
platoon  leader  commands :    Fire  at  will. 

Firing  then  begins  at  a  rate  of  about  three 
shots  per  minute.     (Par.  147,  I.  D.  R.) 


CHAPTER  IV 

COMMUNICATION,  SIGNALS,  AND  TRANSMISSION   OF 
FIRE    DATA 

The  subject  of  communication  is  of  such 
importance  that  a  brief  review  of  tlie  general 
scheme  is  desirable  in  order  to  grasp  the  rela- 
tion of  the  whole  service  to  that  which  relates 
particularly  to  the  transmission  of  firing  data. 

When  the  Signal  Corps  with  its  means  of 
electrical  communication  and  its  special  equip- 
ment has  properly  fulfilled  its  functions,  the 
units  of  an  army  are  linked  together  by  lines 
of  communication  down  to  and  including 
brigade  headquarters.*  Between  the  regiments 
of  a  brigade  and  between  the  subdivisions  of 
these  regiments  (except  artillery  which  is  pro- 
vided with  equipment  for  electrical  lines)  visual 
communication  must  be  maintained.  This  is 
accomplished  by  a  personnel  detailed  directly 
from  the  combatant  troops. 

Ample  provisions  are  made  in  the  regulations 
for  training  signal  men  with  both  the  signal 
and     semaphore     flags.        Specific     provisions 


•Note:  The  so-called  "Outpost  Company,"  proposed 
l)y  tlie  Signal  Corj)s  but  not  y«t  organized,  is  intended 
to  furnish  wire  communication  down  to  and  including 
regimental    headquarters. 


92  Battle  Fire  Training 

exist  also  for  the  detail  at  brigade  headquarters 
of  mounted  orderlies  from  each  regiment,  and 
these  orderlies,  under  existing  orders,  must  be 
trained  as  signalists.  In  a  similar  manner 
signal  men  are  detailed  at  regimental,  battalion, 
and  squadron  headquarters.  Companies  and 
troops  furnish  their  own  trained  personnel. 

This  network  of  visual  signalists,  which 
spreads  over  an  army  from  brigade  headquar- 
ters to  its  smallest  tactical  unit,  is  charged  with 
the  maintenance  of  communication  between  the 
units  to  which  it  is  assigned  under  all  condi- 
tions of  field  service.  On  the  march  and  in 
bivouac  it  supplements  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation established  by  the  Signal  Corps  between 
the  main  body  and  its  covering  detachments 
and  between  parts  of  these  units.  In  battle  it 
opens  communication  throughout  the  command 
in  the  initial  stages  and  continues  it  to  the 
conclusion  of  the  action. 

The  Tables  of  Organization  provide  for  the 
several   headquarters   the   following   personnel, 
which  may  be  used  as   agents   of  communica- 
tions and  which  should  be  trained  as  signalists. 
Brigade  Headquarters: 

Two  mounted  orderlies  from  each  regi- 
ment. 


Communications,  Signals,  Fire  Data      93 

Regimental  Headquarters : 

Regimental    adjutant,    sergeant   major, 
trumpeter     sergeant,     and     six     mounted 
orderlies. 
Battalion  Headquarters : 

Battalion    adjutant,    sergeant    major, 
and  two  mounted  orderlies. 
Company  Headquarters : 

First  Sergeant  (when  not  commanding 
a  platoon). 

Platoon  guides   (when  not  commanding 
a  platoon). 

Company  huglers. 
It  is  obvious  that  some  of  these  men  must  at 
times  be  used  as  horse  holders,  but  tlie  greater 
number  will  usually  be  available. 

Conmiunication  on  the  march  is  usually  con- 
fined to  the  use  of  flags  and  the  drill  signals. 
In  battle  the  flags  are  used  in  the  earlier  stages 
and  in  those  localities  where  protecti(Tn  from 
the  enemy's  fire  and  observation  may  be 
obtained.  As  the  action  progresses,  to  avoid 
undue  losses,  the  use  of  the  flag  must  be  dis 
continued.  In  the  latter  stages  of  an  engage 
ment  while  the  maneuvering  of  troops  is  usually 
reduced  to  advances  and  retreats  there  yet 
remains  much  control  which  must  be  exercised 
and  which  necessitates  the  transmission  of 
information  and  orders.     The  use  of  messengers 


94  Battle  Fire  Training 

and  staff  officers  carrying  verbal  messages  is 
impossible,  for  no  matter  what  their  qualifica- 
tions they  will  be  unable  to  move  in  the  fire 
swept  zone  with  any  reasonable  degree  of  assur- 
ance that  they  will  arrive  at  their  destination. 

The  means  now  used  are  the  arm  signals  and 
the  letter  codes  prescribed  in  the  drill  regula- 
tions of  the  several  arms,  the  bugle,  the  whistle, 
and  the  voice.  The  noise  accompanying  an 
action  precludes  the  possibility  of  using  the 
voice  except  by  squad  leaders  to  the  individuals 
of  their  units.  The  whistle  may  be  used  to 
attract  attention,  but  its  principal  function  is 
to  cause  a  cessation  of  fire.  Its  use  for  any 
other  purpose  should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum ; 
if  this  is  not  done  the  soldier  will  rapidly 
become  indifferent  to  its  note.  If  the  system 
of  communication  is  properly  established  there 
should  be  little  occasion  for  the  use  of  the  whis- 
tle to  attract  attention  except  by  the  platoon 
leader  to  his  squad  leaders.  The  bugle,  like 
the  whistle,  is  limited  by  regulations  to  certain 
specific  signals.  Bugle  signals  ordinarily  will 
be  ordered  only  by  regimental  and  higher 
commanders. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  units  in  battle  are 
necessarily  deprived  of  any  means  of  communi- 
cation except  with  the  hands  and  arms.  By  a 
proper  use  of  agents  of  communication  at  each 


Communications,  Signals,  Fire  Data       95 

headquarters  and  by  thorough  instruction  and 
training,  these  signals  may  be  made  to  supply 
means  of  communication  which,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, will  be  equalled  only  by  electrical 
equipment. 

After  drill  and  training,  the  next  most 
important  requisite  to  perfect  this  means  of 
communication  is  constant  observation  under  all 
conditions  of  action.  As  before  stated,  neither 
the  whistle  nor  the  bugle  should  he  used  to 
attract  attention;  the  voice  is  often  impossible; 
therefore,  in  order  that  information  and  orders 
may  pass  rapidly  through  the  necessary  chan- 
nels, observers  must  be  detailed  with  each  head- 
quarters to  insure  a  constant  lookout  for  sig- 
nals. As  the  lines  of  communication  run  both 
to  and  from  each  headquarters,  observation  of 
both  higher  and  lower  units  is  necessary ;  nor 
must  adjoining  units  on  the  line  be  neglected. 
By  such  a  system  only,  can  free  and  prompt 
communication  along  its  prescribed  channels  be 
assured.  In  the  absence  of  continuous  observa- 
tion no  *fissurance  exists  that  in  the  roar  and 
confusion  of  battle  information  or  orders  can 
be  either  obtained  or  transmitted  when  desired, 
and  therefore  complete  failure  of  the  system 
at  the  most  critical  stage  will  most  certainly 
result. 

In  this  connection  the  following  authorities 
are  quoted: 


96  Battle  Fire  Training 

I.  D.  R. :  "The  voice  is  generally  inadequate 
for  giving  commands  during  fire  and  must  b-e 
replaced  by  signals  of  such  character  that 
proper  fire  direction  and  control  is  assured." 

"Officers  and  men  behind  the  firing  line  can- 
not ordinarily  move  freely  along  the  line,  but 
must  depend  upon  mutual  watchfulness  and  the 
proper  use  of  the  prescribed  signals." 

General  Morrison  in  his  Training  Infantry 
speaking  of  communication  in  battle  says: 
"The  method  by  signals  given  in  our  I.  D.  R. 
answers  the  requirements.  The  text  of  it  can 
be  learned  in  a  few  minutes  but  to  train  a  bat- 
talion so  that  it  will  fully  respond  under  danger 
requires  hours  of  practice." 

The  arrangements  of  the  agents  of  communi- 
cation at  the  several  headquarters  will,  of 
course,  vary  with  different  tactical  situations, 
but  the  following  may  be  taken  as  a  guide  to 
be  adjusted  to  suit  the  particular  requirements 
of  each  occasion. 

Regimental  Headquarters : 

Sergeant  major  in  immediate  cliarge  of 
the  details  of  communication.  Orderlies, 
dismounted,  to  watch  each  battalion  head- 
quarters and  brigade  headquarters,  one 
for  each  unit.  Two  orderlies,  dismounted, 
to  carry  verbal  or  written  messages.  Two 
orderlies,  mounted,  near  at  hand,  to  carry 


Communications,  Signals,  Fire  Data      97 

messages  where  mounted  delivery  is  prac- 
ticable. 
Battalion  Headquarters: 

The  adjutant  to  observe  the  enemy  and 
the  companies  on  the  firing  line.  The  ser- 
geant major  to  observe  regimental  head- 
quarters. An  orderly,  dismounted,  observ- 
ing the  support  or  flanking  patrols. 
Company  Headquarters : 

The  first  sergeant  observing  the  enemy 
and  the  company.     One  bugler  observing 
battalion  headquarters.  One  bugler  observ- 
ing the  platoon  leaders. 
Platoon  Headquarters : 

The  platoon  guide  or  a  private  taken 
from     the    line     observing    the     company 
headquarters. 
In  attack,  these  agents  of  communication  are 
usually  deployed  at  each  headquarters  (on  one 
line).    In  defense  their  positions  will,  of  course, 
be  regulated  by  the  requirements  of  the  situ'i- 
tion.     The  privates  sometimes  taken  from  the 
firing  line  in  lieu  of  the  platoon  guides  may  be 
returned  to  their  proper  places  in  ranks  during 
the  latter  stages  of  the  action.     It  is  believed 
that  the  first  sergeant  should  act  as  the  cap- 
tain's adjutant,  so  to  speak.     In  this  position 
he  will  be  able  to  render  more  valuable  service 
than  while  commaifding  a  platoon. 


98  Battle  Fire  Training 

There  is  one  point  vital  in  the  whole  system 
of  communication  by  visual  signaling  which 
must  be  touched  upon  with  emphasis,  and  that 
is  the  absolute  necessity  for  all  agents  of  com- 
munication not  only  to  be  proficient  in  the 
several  codes  but  to  be  experts  therein.  While 
certain  agents  of  communication  have  been  spe- 
cially mentioned  it  is  not  intended  to  convey 
the  idea  that  they  are  all  the  individuals  in  a 
company  who  should  be  proficient  in  signaling; 
indeed,  those  mentioned  are  but  a  small  part  of 
the  number  who  should  be  so  equipped  in  a  well 
trained  organization.  Officers  below  the  grade 
of  lieutenant  colonel  should  be  expert  in  the 
semaphore  code  and  hand  and  arm  signals. 
Exercise  1. 

Purpose:   To  acquaint  men  with  the  use  of 

signals. 

Situation:   A  company  in  line,  during  rest 

period    when    waiting    for    assembly    before 

formation,  or  any  time  when  a  few  minutes 

are  available. 

Procedure :  The  captain,  platoon  or  squad 

leaders  give  a  signal  and  call  on  a  man  for 

the  interpretation  of  it.     The  entire  list  of 

signals    can    be    given    and    interpretation-^ 

made  within  two  minutes. 

Example  1 :     The  captain  signals — 
Range  900  yards, 
or. 


Communications,  Signals,  Fire  Data       99 

Change  50  yards, 

or, 
As  skirmishers  guide  center, 

or. 
Suspend  firing, 

or, 
What  range  are  von  using?,  etc. 
"Jones   (or  the  man  indicated),  what  did 
that  signal  mean?" 
Example  '2:     The  captain  by  command  gives 
examples  as  above,  and  says — 
"Smith,  give   the   proper   signal   for   that 
command." 

It  is  better  first  to  have  the  squad,  then  the 
platoon  leaders  work  with  their  men,  when  all 
are  reported  proficient,  the  above  exercises. 
A  failure  by  a  man,  in  front  of  his  company, 
to  call  a  signal  properly  after  reasonable 
instruction,  is  not  so  likely  to  be  repeated,  for 
squad  and  platoon  pride  will  take  a  hand  to 
correct  the  deficiency.  No  opportunity  should 
be  lost  during  extended  order  drills  for  prac- 
tice in  signalling  with  hand  and  arm. 

The  exercises  outlined  below  may  all  be 
ordered  by  means  of  the  signals  now  in  use, 
adding  one  signal  for  "Company."  The  fol- 
lowing signal  has  been  used  over  an  extended 
period  of  time  and  has  been  found  satisfactory ; 
palms  of  the  hands  held  towards  the  person  to 


100  Battle  Fire  Training 

receive  the  signal,  fingers  extended  and  joined, 
and  pointing  upward,  thumbs  interlocked,  arms 
elevated  sufficiently  to  insure  clear  observation. 

Exercise  2. 

Purpose:  To  train  officers  and  units  to 
observe  and  execute  quickly  and  correctly 
all  signals. 

Situation:  Company  or  battalion  at  drill. 
Example  1 :  Company  deployed,  advancing, 
captain  signals — 
To  first  and  fourth  platoons ;  halt  and  assemble. 
To  second  and  third  platoons ;  platoon  columns. 
To  first  platoon;  squads  left. 
To  fourth  platoon;    squads  right. 

When  heads  of  platoons  about  to  meet. 
To  first  platoon ;  squads  right,  platoon  column. 
To  fourth  platoon ;  squads  left,  platoon  column. 
To  all  platoons ;   as  skirmishers. 
To  first  platoon ;   reenforce  right  of  line. 
To  fourth  platoon ;   reenforce  in  intervals. 
Example  2:     Battalion  in  column  at  route 
step,     major  signals — 
Squads  left. 

To  first  and  fourth  companies ;   halt. 
To  second  and  third  companies;    platoon  col- 
umns. 
When  some  distance  has  been  gained: 
To  second  and  third  companies;  as  skirmishers. 
To  first  and  fourth  companies ;  squad  columns. 


Communications,  Signals,  Fire  Data    101 

To  second  and  third  companies ;   halt,  lie  down, 
rant^e  800,   commence   firing,      (captains   to 
designate  targets,  etc.) 
To  first  and  fourth  companies ;    as  skirmishers, 

halt,  lie  down. 
To  second  and  third  companies ;    elevate  100, 

shift  fire  two  sights  to  right,  fire  faster. 
To  fourth  company ;    change  direction  to  left, 
double  time,  fix  bayonets,  battle  sight,  com- 
mence firing. 
To  first  company;    rcenforce j-iglit  of  line. 
To  fourth  company ;    cease  firing,  reenforce  in 

intervals. 
To  battalion,  with  interval  between  signals ;   fix 
bayonets,   fire    faster,   cease   firing,    forward 
double   time,  charge,  halt,  assemble,  squads 
right. 

While  these  combinations  of  movements  or 
others  like  them  have  no  direct  application  on 
the  battle  field,  it  has  been  found  that  drill  and 
training  in  them  does  much  to  cause  the  unit 
while  deployed  to  act  quickly  in  obedience  to 
the  will  of  the  commander.  As  General  Morri- 
son has  pointed  out,  a  large  amount  of  training 
is  necessary  to  produce  the  desired  effect,  and 
this  is  particularly  true  in  the  battalion  where 
so  often  tlie  command  for  deployment  creates 
four  units  where  there  should  be  but  one. 


102  Battle  Fire  Training 

Company  commanders  in  giving  signals  to 
the  entire  company,  as  range,  change  to  range, 
etc.,  must  swing  the  arm  in  a  horizontal  arc  to 
enable  its  interpretation  by  the  flank  platoon 
leaders,  as  Plate  34  A. 


Battalion  commanders  must  particularly 
observe  this  when  giving  signals.  If  they 
occupy  a  position  about  150  yards  or  greater 
in  rear  of  a  battalion  with  three  companies  in 
the  line,  the  distance  is  sufficient  to  make  the 
understanding  of  signals  difficult  unless  prop- 
erly given.  When  in  a  prone  position,  depend- 
ing upon  the  background,  sometimes  the  hand 
must  be  held  above  the  head  to  be  readily 
understood. 

The  system  of  company  communication  is 
illustrated  in  Plate  34  B.* 

Transmission  of  Fire  Data: 

I.  D.  R. : — "In  the  training  of  men  in  the 
mechanism    of   the   firing   line,   they   should   be 


*Note:  Better  control  results  if  the  squad  leaders 
remain  in  rear  of  their  squads  until  the  latter  stages  of 
an  action  or  until  their  fire  is  needed. 


104  Battle  Fire  Training 

practiced  in  repeating  to  one  another,  target 
and  aiming  point  designation." 

Men  should  be  trained  in  the  transmission  of 
fire  data  without  it  appreciably  affecting  the 
rate  of  fire. 

Exercise: 

Purpose:  To  accustom  men  to  properly 
transmit  and  receive  fire  data. 

Situation:  A  company  in  prone  position 
facing  a  landscape  which  affords  suitable 
targets  for  designation,  or  a  number  of 
men  facing  a  target  indoors,  as  illustrated 
in  Plate  30. 

Procedure:  Give  certain  elevation  or 
deflection;  certain  apportionment  of  tar- 
get; certain  rate  of  fire ;  or  certain  target 
data  and  make  a  change  in  same,  known  to 
one  or  a  few  men,  which  requires  transmis- 
sion by  them  to  the  remainder  of  the  men 
not  so  informed. 

Example  1 :  A  unit  having  been  given  a 
certain  aiming  point  on  which  with  a  certain 
range  they  are  simulating  fire — Reenforce- 
ments  are  sent  forward  and  deployed  in  the 
intervals  on  the  line.  The  original  line  is  with- 
drawn after  thirty  seconds.  The  men  who 
joined  as  reenforcements  are  inspected  as  to 
sight     setting     and     target     designation.       In 


Communications,  Signals,  Fire  Data    105 

obtaining  sight  setting,  men  will  be  aided  in 
addition  to  the  signal  by  looking  at  leaf  of  man 
nearest  him.  Data  which  requires  transmis- 
sion by  voice  should  be  obtained  by  each  man 
placing  his  ear  as  near  as  possible  to  the  mouth 
of  the  man  giving  the  data. 

In  similar  manner,  exercises  covering  the 
apportionment  of  sectors,  rate  of  fire,  etc.,  can 
be  given. 

Example  2:  A  unit  in  position  having 
received  and  put  into  effect  certain  fire  data — 
A  change  of  same  is  given  the  flank  man  requir- 
ing transmission  along  the  entire  front.  After 
a  minute,  in  case  of  a  squad,  verify  the  result. 

Verification  is  facilitated  if  the  problem  is  so 
arranged  that  a  rest  is  provided  for  each  rifle 
and  the  men  are  caused  to  withdraw,  leaving 
their  rifles  in  position  to  indicate  their  point  of 
aim,  sight  setting,  sectors,  etc. 

Rests  of  this  character  should  not  be  of  a 
permanent  nature  or  variations  in  the  terrain 
which  are  necessary  to  proper  training  will  not 
be  possible.  Temporary  rests  may  be  provided 
by  placing  sacks  of  earth  on  the  tripods  used 
for  pyramidal  tents  or  more  easily  by  carrying 
empty  sacks  to  the  drill  ground  and  there  filling 
them  with  earth,  using  the  company  intrench- 
ing tools  for  this  purpose. 


100  Battle  Fire  Training 


Example  3:     On  landscape,  as  Plate  34,  or 

terrain,  is  given  a  target  sector,  A B.     The 

right  and  left  being  covered  by  other  troops. 
As  the  reenforcements  move  forward  as  in 
Example  No.  1,  above  cited,  to  the  line,  a  signal 
causes  a  body  of  troops  at  C  to  advance  into 
view  in  another  company's  sector.  In  the  first 
exercise  of  this  nature  it  will  be  safe  to  say  the 
rifles  of  the  reenforcements  will  be  on  line  at  C, 
instead  of  their  own  sector,  A B. 

It  must  be  remembered  in  this  connection 
that,  imless  under  very  exceptional  circum- 
stances, neither  an  individual  nor  a  unit  should 
direct  its  fire  outside  of  the  assigned  sector 
without  orders  from  the  immediate  commander. 

Example  J^:  A  unit  in  position  as  in  Exam- 
ple 2 — Changes  in  firing  data  given  to  the 
corporal  and  transmitted  as  outlined  in  Exer- 
cise No.  1  under  sight  setting  in  chapter  Firk 
Discipline. 


CHAPTER  V 


KIR-K   DISCIPLINE 


Fire  discipline  may  be  defined  as  that  condi- 
tion of  tlie  personnel  of  a  fire  unit,  resulting 
from  training  and  practice,  which  enables  the 
commander  to  obtain  an  orderly  and  efficient 
delivery  of  fire. 

That  the  individual  obeys  is  not  sufficient; 
together  with  obedience  must  be  the  ability  to 
use  initiative  for  the  accomplishment  of  a  com- 
mon end,  all  of  which  embraces — 

1.  Constant  attention  to  orders.  Care  as 
to  position  and  extent  of  target,  sight  set- 
ting, and  delivery  of  fire, 

2.  Economy  of  ammunition. 

3.  Use  of  ground  to  advantage. 

4.  Ability  of  men  to  command  units  whose 
leaders  are  lost  in  action. 

5.  Observation  of  enemy. 

(y.   That  if  separated  from  leaders — 

(a)  Men  will  direct  effective  fire  on  target. 

(b)  Men   will   increase   fire  when    target   is 

favorable. 

(c)  Men  will  cease  fire  when  enemy  disappears. 
7.   Thorough     knowledge     of     ca])abilities, 

noiiu  lU'hiturc,    and     liimtation     of    the     rifle. 
Jams    or    failure    in    loading    should    be    cor- 


108  Battle  Fire  Training 

rectcd  without  removing  the  eyes   from  the 
target. 

1 — Attention  to  Orders: — 

The  various  exercises  outlined  under  "Com- 
munications" will  be  an  aid  in  instilling  the 
habit  of  attention  in  our  men,  without  which 
success  is  impossible. 

2 — Care  in  Sight  Setting: — 
Exercise  1 : 

Purpose:  To  train  men  to  set  sights 
quickly  and  accurately. 

Situation:  The  company  is  formed  in 
single  rank,  at  the  ready,  with  the  rear 
sight  set  at  zero. 

How  Executed:  The  range  is  announced 
by  command  or  signal,  sights  are  set,  and 
each  man  comes  to  port  arms  or  steps  four 
paces  to  the  front,  upon  completion  of 
operation. 

Time:   Is  taken  from  last  word  of  com- 
mand or  signal  and  should  be  within   15 
seconds. 
Example  1 :     Bij    Command :     Range    500 ; 
sight  setting,  verified. 

2:  By  Command:  Range  500,  2 
points  left  windage ;  verification  of 
sight  settirrg. 

3 :  By  Signal :  Range  500,  verifi- 
cation. 


Fire  Discipline 


109 


4:    By  Command  or  Signal  to  pla- 
toon  commanders ;    by   them   to   cor- 
porals ;     by    corporals    to    men ;     the 
verification. 
Interest  may  be  held  in   these  exercises  by 
making  them  competitive  in  the  squad  and  pla- 
toon.     Time  may   be   recorded   cither   for   the 
period  consumed  by  the  entire  unit  or  for  the 
sum  of  the  individual  requirements.   The  former 
method    is    much    the    quicker,    but    the    latter 
stimulates  individual  eiTort.    Penalties,  in  terms 
of  seconds,  should  be  added  for  errors. 


An    aid    to    sight   setting   is    to    operate    tlie 
thumb  screw  with  the  thumb  and  forefinger  of 


110  Battle  Fire  Training 

the  right  hand  wliile  the  slide  is  moved  by  the 
thumb  of  the  left  hand  by  slight  pressure 
against  the  side  of  slide,  as  Plate  35  A. 

One  of  the  requisites  of  effective  fire  is  that 
its  volume  should  be  uniform ;  that  is,  the  rate 
of  fire  should  not  rise  or  fall  except  by  will  of 
the  commander.  With  this  in  mind,  it  will  be 
seen  that  training  in  some  system  of  sight  set- 
ting is  necessary,  or  a  marked  decrease,  even  a 
cessation  of  fire,  will  occur  when  changes  of  ele- 
vation are  made  during  the  fire  fight. 

There  are  several  methods  of  accomplishing 
this  end — 

(a)  At  command,  first  odd  numbers,  then 
even  numbers ;  or,  first  front  rank  and  then 
rear  rank,  fix  the  sights. 

(b)  Beginning  with  two  men  on  each  side 
of  the  corporal,  sights  are  set  by  pairs  work- 
ing towards  the  flank  in  each  squad. 
Under   (a)   half  the  unit  ceases  fire  at  one 

time  and  sights  are  set  by  alternate  men.  This 
is  the  more  rapid  method  of  the  two,  but  causes 
a  marked  decrease  in  the  volume  of  fire  and 
increases  the  difficulties  in  the  transmission  of 
data.  Under  (b)  the  time  required  to  accom- 
plish the  change  is  increased,  but  only  two  men 
per  squad  cease  firing  at  once  and  the  transmis- 
sion of  data  is  facilitated,  easily  supervised  by 


Fire  Discipline  111 

the  corporal.  Both  methods  have  their  appli- 
cation. At  times,  it  may  even  be  advantageous 
to  suspend  firing  altogether,  while  sights  are 
changed.  By  this  latter  method  fire  at  the  new 
range  can  be  opened  more  quickly  than  by  any 
other  means  but  the  loss  of  fire  effect  is  a  factor 
which  must  be  given  consideration.  Whether 
it  is  advisable  to  change  sights  quickly  with  the 
attendant  loss  of  fire,  or  more  slowly  while  the 
vohnne  of  fire  is  maintained,  is  a  matter  which 
rests  not  with  the  individual  soldier  but  witli 
the  company  commander.  The  latter  should 
decide  the  question,  basing  his  decision  upon 
the  tactical  situation,  the  size  and  actions  of 
the  target,  and  the  effectiveness  of  tlie  enemy's 
fire. 

The     following    exercise     and     modifications 
tiiereof  are  recommended — 
Exercise   1 : 

Purpose:  To  train  nu-n  to  set  sights 
quickly  and  accurately  witiiout  cessation 
of  fire. 

Situation:  The  squad  or  platoon  de- 
ployed, lying  down,  firing. 

Horv  Kxccnted :  Range  is  announced  by 
command  or  signal.  Kacli  corporal  causes 
sights  to  be  set  beginning  with  the  men  on 
his  right  and  left  and  working  towards 
the    flank    in    each    squad.      As    each    man 


112  Battle  Fire  Training 

finishes  setting  his  sight,  he  holds  his  rifle 
upright,  butt  resting  on  the  ground. 

Time:  From  last  word  of  command,  or 
from  signal  until  all  sights  are  changed. 
Additions  in  seconds  should  be  added  to  the 
total  time  for  errors  in  elevation. 

Rate  of  Fire: — 

Effective  rifle  fire  in  battle  is  gauged  by  the 
number  of  men  disabled  in  a  unit  of  time  and 
is  dependent  upon — 

1.  Percentage  of  hits,  which  depends  upon 
dispersion,  which  in  turn  depends  upon — 

(a)  Precision  of  arm. 

(b)  Designation  of  target. 

(c)  Estimation  of  range. 

(d)  Distance  of  target. 

(e)  Visibility  of  target. 

(f)  Prevailing  atmospheric  conditions. 

(g)  Fire  discipline,  training  and  in- 
structions of  troops,  their  physical 
and  normal  state  at  the  time. 

2.  Number  of  targets  hit. 

3.  Time  of  execution. 

4.  Number  of  rifles  employed. 

5.  Number  of  shots  fired. 

6.  Rate  of  fire. 

The  question  of  rate  of  battle  fire  has 
received  considerable  discussion  and  it  is  neces- 


Fire  Discipline  113 

sary  to  consider  many  factors  before  arriving 
at  a  conclusion.  It  is  well  to  note  here  that  a 
high  rate  of  fire  resulting  from  excitement  is 
not  the  high  rate  developed  by  systematic 
training,  or  as  a  direct  result  of  control  and 
discipline. 

I.  D.  R. : — "Men  are  taught  that  the  rate  of 
fire  will  depend  upon  the  visibility,  proximity, 
and  size  of  tlie  target  and  that  the  proper  rate 
will  ordinaril}'  suggest  itself  to  each  trained 
man,  usually  rendering  cautions  and  commands 
unnecessary." 

Practice  in  peace  time  inculcates  habits  which 
are  prominent  in  action.  Men  might  then  be 
accustomed  to  look  upon  each  round  of  ammuni- 
tion in  such  manner  as  to  scarcely  admit  of  any 
monetary  comparison,  and  it  should  be  a  cardi- 
nal principle  that  one  of  the  first  things  all 
must  appreciate  upon  entering  into  action  is 
"To  weigh  the  value  of  each  round  of  ammuni- 
tion they  fire." 

When  the  situation  will  admit,  the  suspension 
of  fire,  by  units  for  brief  periods  during  an 
advance  is  one  of  the  best  ways  of  retaining 
fire   control. 

Our  Firing  Regulations  give  the  following 
on  the  rate  of  fire : — 

"The  time  of  execution  is  important  in  that 
the  gaining  of  fire  superiority  is  dependent  less 


114  Battle  Fire  Training 

upon  obtaining  high  percentage  of  hits  than 
upon  making  an  absolutely  large  number  of 
hits  in  a  unit  of  time.  There  is  necessarily  a 
limit  to  the  rapidity  of  fire  which,  if  exceeded, 
will  result  in  some  loss  of  accuracy.  With  tar- 
gets of  a  fair  degree  of  visibility,  the  following 
may  be  taken  as  standard  rates  of  fire  for 
troops  who  have  been  given  suitable  training  in 
target  practice — 

200  yards] 

300  yards  ^.  .  .  .10  shots  per  minute. 

400  yards] 

500  yards] 

600  yards  [►.  .  .  .7.5  shots  per  minute. 

TOO  yardsj 

800  yards] 

900  yards  ^ ....  5  shots  per  minute. 
1000  yardsj 

Greater  ranges — 3  shots  per  minute. 
The  rates  given  should  not  exclude  higher  rates 
of  fire  in  case  of  large  and  conspicuous  targets. 
On  the  other  hand,  Avhen  objectives,  or  marks 
used  as  aiming  points,  are  very  indistinct,  the 
requirement  of  correct  aiming  imposes  rates  of 
fire  somewhat  lower  than  the  standard  rates 
given,  even  for  well-instructed  men." 


Fire  Discipline 


115 


The  following  is  a  tabic  showing  the  results 
of  a  firing  experiment  at  the  musketry  school, 
and  will  give  a  comparison  of  hits  in  different 
units  of  time. 


}; 

U3 

■; 

c 

f    1 1 

o 

tn 

3 
tJU 

t° 

c  |; 

3 

2g 

Z  I 

£ 

s 

c 

c  1 
.2  !'■ 

■  ^  : 
.2' 

.S 

— o 

O    3 

O       1 

11 

O 

u 

V 

1 
3 

o 

3 

-  c 

-2 

tC3 

a 

/^ 

z 

<J 

Q|l 

K 

ClH 

3 

2,500 

330 

98 

13.2 

78 

39 

11.7 

5 

2,500 

394 

99 

15.7 

78 

79 

19.8 

7>/. 

2,300 

290 

98 

11.6 

78 

87 

28.4 

10 

2,500 

257 

84 

10.2 

67 

102 

33.6 

From  which  it  is  found  that  the  time  neces- 
sary to  obtain  the  above  hits  i.s — 

8  shot  rate 8  1/3  minutes 

5  shot  rate 5  minutes 

7Y2  shot  rate 3   1/3  minutes 

10  shot  rate 2   1/2  minutes 

Make  a  comparison,  with  this  as  a  basis,  of 
four  different  organizations  beginning  fire  at 
the  same  moment,  firing  with  the  same  compara- 
tive results  and  each  at  the  different  rates  men- 
tioned, with  25  rounds  per  man.  At  the  end  of 
214  minutes  we  have — 


116 


Battle  Fire  Training 


Rate 

Shots  Fired 

Hits 

Figures  Hit 

Remaining 
Ammunition 

3 

750 

97 

29 

1,750 

5 

1,250 

197 

49 

1,250 

'iVz 

1,875 

217 

71 

625 

10 

2,500 

255 

84 

0 

To  which  apply  the  probability  of  hits  under 
battle  conditions  by  arbitrarily  assuming  the 
loss  to  be  9/10  of  peace  time  results  and  we 
have — 

Rate  per  Minute  Figures  Hit 

3 2.9 

5 4.9 

71/2 ^-^ 

10 8.4 

If  these  different  organizations  had  started 
an  advance  against  the  enemy  from  a  common 
fire  point  it  may  be  assumed,  considering  no 
other  factors,  that  the  effective  fire  directed 
against  them  was  reduced  an  amount  equal  to 
the  above  losses.  The  organization  using  the 
low  rate  of  fire  has  reduced  the  enemy's  effec- 
tiveness three  men,  with  an  expenditure  of  750 
rounds  and  in  the  same  time,  the  one  employing 
the  high  rate,  8  men,  with  an  expenditure  of 
2,500  rounds. 

In  defense  the  question  of  the  supply  of 
ammunition  is  ordinarily  not  serious,  but  it  is 


Fire  Discipline  117 

clurinfT  an  advance,  when  the  firing  line  pushes 
forward  to  successive  fire  positions,  that  the 
consideration  of  supply  affecting  the  rate  of 
fire  becomes  a  big  factor. 

Fighting,  such  as  might  be  expected  judging 
from  the  past,  will  cover  a  period  of  from  a  few 
hours  to  several  days  for  the  determination  of 
tlie  outcome  of  nu  advance.  I^et  it  be  assumed 
for  discussion  an  engagement  covering  ten 
hours,  from  the  initial  advance  at  a  range  of 
under  1.000  yards  to  where  the  bayonet  takes 
the  place  of  the  bullet  for  decision.  In  that 
ten  hours  it  is  placing  rather  a  low  estimate  to 
consider,  say,  an  hour  of  continuous  firing 
wliich  will  result  in  the  following  expenditure 
of  anmiunition  : — 

Hate  Rounds 

3    180 

5    300 

71/j 450 

10    600 

Where  arc  we  to  get  the  ammunition  and  how, 
if  we  have  it,  are  we  to  get  it  to  the  firing  line.'' 
I'A'en  at  the  slow  rate  one  belt  100  rounds, 
anfl  one  and  one-third  bandoleers  have  been 
expended.  It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  the 
(juestion  of  ammunition  supply  is  one  which 
must  receive  serious  consideration  by  all  com- 
manders.    It  would  seem  that  in  the  absence  of 


118  Battle  Fire  Training 

some  means  of  readily  supplying  the  firing  line 
with  ammunition  the  only  other  alternative  is 
to  push  the  line  much  further  forward  before 
opening  fire  than  is  now  contemplated  by  the 
drill  regulations,  say  four  or  five  hundred  yards. 

If  ammunition  is  plentiful  and  can  be  sup- 
plied to  the  firing  line,  then,  without  question, 
the  highest  rate  of  fire  consistent  with  good 
shooting  should  be  employed.  If  an  attack 
appears  to  have  the  possibilities  of  a  drawn  out 
affair  and  ammunition  is  not  over  plentiful  and 
difficult  to  supply  to  the  firing  line,  a  rate  of 
fire  somewhat  more  conserved  must  be  adopted. 
It  appears  that  the  rate  of  fire  is  largely  depen- 
dent, as  are  so  many  military  problems,  on  local 
conditions. 

Exercise   1 : 

Purpose:  To  accustom  men  to  aimed 
fire  and  proper  rate  of  fire. 

Situation:  A  company  in  prone  position 
at  "ready." 

How  Executed:  By  command — the  ob- 
jective and  number  of  shots  (to  be  simu- 
lated) is  given.  When  each  man  completes 
the  designated  number  he  indicates  the 
fact  by  holding  the  rifle  upright,  butt  rest- 
ing on  the  ground. 

Time:  Is  kept  by  a  stop  watch  or  ordi- 
nary watcli. 


120  Battle  Fire  Training 

Example: 

Range  800. 

That  house. 

Fire  10  rounds. 
If  the  rate  of  fire  is  proper  according  to  the 
table  given  in  our  Firing  Regulations  the  time 
for  execution  should  be  two  minutes.  The  ten- 
dency of  untrained  men  even  in  peace  time  is 
to  fire  much  too  rapidly.  Impress  on  the  men 
the  fact  that  aimed  iire  is  necessary,  that  they 
must  aim  on  the  objective  as  if  they  were  firing 
to  get  a  bull's  eye. 

2 — Taking   Advantage   of   Ground  Advancing 
upon  a  Position: — 

1.  Make  use  of  all  cover. 

2.  Seek  hidden  lines  of  approach. 

3.  If  possible,   avoid   ground   upon    which 
projectiles  are  seen  to  fall. 

4.  Make  use  of  pack  as  cover  when  neces- 
sary to  halt  on  exposed  ground. 
Anything  which  distorts  or  partly  eliminates 

the  familiar  outlines  of  an  object  in  the  field 
tends  to  add  to  its  concealment  from  view.  A 
small  bush  or  bunch  of  grass  might,  as  in  Plate 
35  B,  give  ik)  concealment  at  about  100  yards, 
hut  beyond  that  distance  concealment  is 
complete. 

Points     to     be     considered     in     making     an 
advance — 


Firv  Discipline  121 

Plate  36 : 

1.   Group  of  men  on  the  sky  line. 

*2,  Group  of  imn  iicai-cr  hut  having-  darker 
background. 

li.  (iroup  of  men  scarcely  visikle  by  reason 
of  dark  background. 

4,  Group  of  men  ])artially  visibK-  by  rea- 
son of  background. 

5.  Group  of  men  apparently  at  closer 
ranges  by  reason  of  light  background. 

Making  a  trench  during  advance  under  fire. 
"Thei/  dig  because  forced  to  hcdt." 

One  squad  or  platoon  suspends  fire  and 
makes  advance,  under  protection  of  the  fire  of 
aiu)tlier  scjuad  or  platoon,  in  the  following 
manner: 

By  crawling  a  man  works  forward  to  a 
favorable  position,  where  he  makes  a  small, 
shallow  trench  on  his  right,  being  ])rotected  by 
his  pack  and  the  earth  obtained  from  the  trench. 
If  in  ]iairs,  the  one  continues  firing  while  the 
other  digs,  as  in  Plate  37  A.  The  remainder 
of  the  s(juad  crawls  forward  and  enlarges  the 
trench  until  cover  is  ])rovided.  As  soon  as  the 
advanced  squad  is  able  to  })rovidi'  sufficient  fire, 
the  rear  s(juads  begin  their  advanci-  to  the  new 
))osition  ( Plat^  37  B)  until  cover  is  provided 
for  the  entire  ormmization. 


f'l.ATEi  37- 


Fire  DiscijiUne  123 

',i     To  Prox'idc-for  Leaders: — 

K;ich  company,  })l;it()on,  or  s<|u;i(l  slioulcl 
have  a  number  of  substitutes  to  take  the  phicc 
of  the  reguhir  leaders. 

Exercises:  For  a  company,  platoon,  or  squad. 

Purpose:  To  accustom  men  to  step  in 
and  fill  the  places  of  leaders  killed  or 
wounded  in  action. 

Situdtion :  A  company  in  skirniisji  order. 
Thi-  captain  })laces  tiie  command  under  a 
subaltern  and  constitutes  himself  an  obser- 
ver or  uiiij)ire.  Assuming  that  an  advance 
is  about  to  be  made  and  the  preparatory 
connnands  given.  The  umpire  causes  the 
squad  leader,  platoon  or  company  com- 
mander, to  "pl(nj  dead"  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  attract  the  least  attention. 

The  next  in  command  of  the  unit  or 
units  should  immediate] u  note  the  fact, 
take  command,  carry  out  the  orders,  push 
on  the  advance,  and  contiinie  in  such 
cap/icity  until  the  completion  of  the  prob- 
lem. This  procedure  is  carried  out  during 
an  advance  until  each  unit  has  had  sev- 
eral changes  in  leaders, 

A  scjuad  shoidd  have,  at  least,  three  sub- 
stitute leaders  ;  a  ]ilatoon  would  naturally 
have  its  guide  and,  say,  four  corporals. 
For  practice  it  might  be  well  to  work  a  few 


124  Battle  Fire  Training 

privates  up  to  the  point  wbere  they  could 
lead  platoons. 
Example:  Compan}',  platoon,  and  squad 
leaders  are  instructed  that  when  the 
crowns  of  their  hats  are  touched  by  a  mes- 
senger of  the  umpire  it  is  indicative  of 
immediate  incapacitation  and  they  should 
at  once  assume  a  position  indicating  that 
fact  by  falling  prone  and  making  no  fur- 
ther movement  (any  other  system  will 
answer  but  it  has  been  found  that  this 
method  works  well  without  attracting 
attention). 

S'ltuaHon:    The  company  had  begun  an 

advance  by  squad  rushes  from  the  right. 

As  the  third  squad  corporal  was  about  to 

spring  through  the  line  he  received  a  touch 

on  the  crown  of  his  hat.     The  appointed 

substitute  must  note  the  fact  of  his  leader's 

incapacitation     without     being     told     and 

immediately  advance  the  squad. 

Success  depends  largely  upon  the  ability  of 

the  umpire  to,  first,  select  or  by  his  messengers 

designate  men   so   as  to   attract   no   attention ; 

otherwise  it  becomes  an  eas}^  matter  fbr  each 

substitute   to  note  the  position  of  the  umpire 

and  expect  the  usual  results.     Second,  a  leader 

should  be  put  out  of  action  just  before  he  gives 


Fire  Discipline  125 

a  command  or  just  after  he  has  given  one.  He 
may  also  be  directed  to  drop  out  after  covering 
50  yardi?  of  the  next  rush,  etc.  The  different 
leaders,  during  the  critical  phases  of  the 
advance,  are  eliminated  and  other  men  imme- 
diately take  their  places  and  carry  out  the 
movement. 
Fixing  Bayonets: — 

What  has  been  said  regarding  simultaneous 
sight  setting  is  also  largely  applicable  to  fixing 
bayonets.  It  should  be  remembered,  however, 
that  the  moment  for  fixing  bayonets  will  usually 
arrive  at  the  height  of  the  fire  fight  when  a 
marked  cessation  of  fire  might  have  serious 
consequences,  hence  the  method  recommended 
under  (b)  above  should  be  used  for  this  pur- 
pose. Competitive  exercises  by  squad  and  pla- 
toon will  facilitate  training  in  this  particular. 
The  Rush: — 

It  is  not  always  possible  to  wholly  separate 
fire  and  battle  tactics.  Such  is  the  case 
with  regard  to  the  rush.  Recollecting  that  the 
volume  of  fire  should  be  uniform  it  is  apparent 
that  the  cessation  of  fire  by  a  fraction  of  the 
line  preparatory  to  and  during  a  rush  is,  no 
matter  how  necessary,  a  positive  disadvantage. 
U  liile  a  fraction  of  the  line  is  rushing  forward 
something  of  value  is  actually  being  accom- 
plished by  gaining  ground  to  the  front.     True, 


126  Battle  Fire  Training 

the  all  important  fire  effect  suffers  a  loss  but 
that  is  a  necessary  evil.  The  same  is  not  true, 
however,  of  the  period  from  the  suspension  of 
fire  preparatory  to  a  rush  until  the  rush,  or  of 
the  time  that  elapses  from  the  instant  the  rush- 
ing fraction  reaches  the  new  position  until  fire 
is  opened.  It  is  upon  these  periods,  when  the 
unit  is  neither  gaining  ground  to  the  front  nor 
firing,  that  training  must  be  concentrated  in 
order  to  reduce  them  to  the  minimum. 

Rushing  units  should  be  trained  to  suspend 
firing  and  move  forward  in  a  minimum  of  time; 
to  halt  instantly  and  simultaneously  at  signal ; 
and  to  open  fire  without  loss  of  time.  Proper 
rushes  cannot  be  made  without  a  great  amount 
of  drill  in  which  painstaking  care  is  given  to 
details. 

Our  regulations  recognize  another  expedient 
also  for  minimizing  the  effect  of  the  loss  of  the 
fire  of  the  rushing  unit. 

This  plan  calls  for  an  increase  in  the  rate  of 
fire  of  those  portions  of  the  line  not  moving 
forward  which  are  covering  the  same  target  as 
the  rushing  unit.  It  has  been  stated  that  the 
rush  should  halt  simultaneously.  While  a  dis- 
cussion of  this  point  might  not  be  considered 
to  lie  within  tlic  purview  of  "musketry,"  it  is  so 
intimately  related  to  training  in  rushes  that  it 
is  taken  up  here.     A  straggling  halt  in  which 


Fire  Discijdine  127 

the  mon  arrive  one  at  a  time  upon  tlie  new  line 
serves  to  accentuate  tliat  line  to  tlie  enemy  and 
so  increase  his  fire  effect.  A  line  which  disap- 
pears quickly  and  simultaneously  into  cover 
offers  the  minimum  of  opportunity  for  target 
designation.  A  few  practical  exercises  with  this 
point  in  view  will  be  convincing.  The  rush 
should  be  at  top  speed,  consistent  with  the  ter- 
rain and  distance  covered.  As  the  rusli  leader 
throws  himself  upon  the  ground  the  entire  frac- 
tion does  likewise,  inequalities  in  the  line  being 
rectified  by  those  in  rear  of  the  line  crawling 
to  their  proper  places.  It  requires  time, 
patience,  and  good  judgment  to  properly  train 
men  in  this  particular. 


CHAPTER  VI 


APPLICATION    OF    FIRE 


Our  system  of  individual  target  practice, 
while  not  perfect,  results  in  producing  a  large 
number  of  excellent  shots.  To  gain  the  full 
effect  in  battle  of  the  great  amount  of  time  and 
effort  we  expend  annually  on  this  class  of  train- 
ing, the  men  must  not  only  be  taught  to  fire 
collectively  but  officers  must  ]iave  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  proper  application  of  this 
fire  and  of  the  means  of  applying  it  under  the 
varying  conditions  of  service. 

Fire  superiority  is  the  goal ;  for  without  it, 
success  is  beyond  reach.  Fire  superiority  does 
not  mean  the  killing  or  disabling  of  all  the 
enemy,  but  that  fire  is  so  accurate  the  enemy's 
morale  is  shaken  and  he  is  shooting  wildly. 
With  the  knowledge  of  peace  firing,  this,  at  first 
glance,  looks  easy ;  but  when  it  is  remembered 
that  fire  efficiency  in  battle  is  estimated  to  be 
reduced  from  1/10  to  1/80  of  that  expected 
under  peace  conditions,  the  difficulty  of  reach- 
ing the  goal  is  apparent.  There  will  be  times 
in  battle  when  the  firing  of  a  unit  will  closely 
approach  peace  time  accuracy  and  others  when 
it  will  differ  widely  therefrom.  After  passing 
a  certain  point,   the  variance   from  the  peace 


Application  of  Fire  129 

standard  will  he  in  direct  proportion  to  the 
training  of  the  unit.  The  excuse  for  these 
remarks  lies  in  the  desire  to  emphasize,  as 
strongly  as  possihlc,  the  necessity  for  thorough, 
intelligent,  and  uniform  training  ill  all  features 
of  battle  fire  which  we  are  liable  to  be  called 
upon  to  use  in  the  face  of  the  enemy. 

Under  the  head  of  Application  of  Fire  the 
following  will  be  discussed: — 

Adjustmejit  of  Fire. 

Effect  of  Ground. 

Employment  of  Fire  Units. 

Kinds  of  Fire. 

Time  of  Opening  Fire. 

Combined  Sights. 

Night  Firing. 

Indirect  F'ire. 

Fire  of  Position. 

Vulnerability. 

Adju.stincnt  of  Fire: — 

Stationary  Targets:  The  ever  present  ])rob- 
lem  in  combat  firing  and  in  service  is  to  place 
the  center  of  impact  of  the  collective  group  on 
the  center  of  the  target,  thus  insuring  the 
greatest  possible  number  of  hits.  Two  elements 
enter  into  this;  (a)  the  troops,  (b)  tlu'  com- 
inanrler. 

Troops:  When  troops  have  aimed  correctly 
at   the   indicated   target   with   distribution    and 


130  Battle  Fire  Training 

elevation  as  ordered  and  have  fired  steadily  and 
at  the  proper  rate,  they  have  solved  their  share 
of  the  problem.  These  requirements  are  mat- 
ters of  training. 

Commander :  The  commander,  assuming  that 
he  has  chosen  the  proper  target,  given  the 
proper  distribution  and  rate  of  fire,  and  seen 
to  the  assignments  of  aiming  points,  must  bring 
the  shot  group  upon  the  center  of  the  target. 
This  is  primarily  a  matter  of  determination 
of  range.  Battle  ranges,  except  in  prepared 
defensive  positions  will  usually  be  in  error. 
The  degree  of  error  depends  upon  the  ability  to 
estimate  range  and  the  range  finding  appliance 
furnished.  With  a  modern  "contained  base" 
range  finder,  with  which  our  troops  should 
be  furnished,  the  error  is  reduced  to  a  minimum. 
By  estimation  it  often  approaches  a  maximum. 
In  either  case  we  are  quite  safe  in  assuming 
that  some  error  will  exist.  As  the  shot  group 
grows  smaller  with  the  degree  of  perfection  of 
the  individuals  in  the  group,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  better  the  shots  the  greater  the  effect  pro- 
duced by  errors  in  elevation.  Therefore,  no 
degree  of  perfection  in  individuals  will  compen- 
sate for  errors  in  adjustment;  on  the  contrary 
it  but  magnifies  them.  In  instances  of  mis- 
placement poor  shots  with  great  dispersion  will 
many    times    get   hits    where    good    shots    with 


Application  of  Fire  131 

small  dispersion  will  get  none.  It  is  thus  made 
plain  how  important  the  correct  placement  of 
the  center  of  impact  becomes  and  how  depen- 
dent it  is  on  the  ability  of  the  commander  to 
determine  the  range. 

If,  as  is  probable,  instruments  and  estima- 
tion result  in  initial  errors,  some  other  means 
must  be  used  in  conjunction  with  them.  These 
are  found  in  "observation  of  fire"  and  "obser- 
vation of  the  enemy."  Peace  offers  no  examples 
of  the  latter,  but  a  little  thought  will  show 
what  actions  indicate  a  well-placed  center  of 
impact.  No  opportunity  should  be  lost  to 
i)ec()mc  familiar  with  the  appearance  of  shot 
groups  under  different  conditions  of  ground, 
light,  and  range. 

It  must  be  constantly  borne  in  mind  that  a 
simple  error  in  range,  and  frequently  a  small 
one,  will  utterly  waste  the  effect  of  years  of 
excellent  training  in  the  individual.  With  the 
captain,  and  with  him  alone,  rests  the  burden 
of  this  responsibility. 

Moving  Targets:  A  correct  placement  of 
the  center  of  impact  is  just  as  important  with 
moving  targets  as  with  stationary  ones,  but, 
unfortunately,  it  is  much  more  difficult  to 
obtain.  Changes  in  the  position  of  the  target, 
of  course,  make  it  impossible  to  maintain  a 
correct  placement   with   a   single  sight   setting. 


132  Battle  Fire  Training 

Changes  in  sight  setting  cause  a  loss  of  time 
and  multiply  the  opportunities  of  error.  Here 
two  conflicting  conditions  are  confronted.  The 
answer  is,  of  course,  a  compromise.  A  change 
of  sight  setting  is  necessary,  but  the  number  of 
these  changes  is  reduced  to  the  minimum  con- 
sistent with  effective  fire.  Against  a  steadily 
advancing  target  (not  one  that  advances  by 
leaps  as  do  the  simulated  advances  on  the 
target  range)  an  initial  setting  must  be  selected 
well  within  the  estimated  range,  fire  opened, 
and  continued  while  the  target  moves  into  the 
center  of  impact.  As  the  target  approaches 
and  leaves  this  center  the  fire  effect  will  be  less 
than  when  exactly  in  it,  and,  of  course,  dimin- 
ishes as  the  distance  becomes  greater.  Outside 
the  75%  zone  (reference  to  table  S.  A.  F.  M., 
page  123)  the  effect  falls  off  to  such  an  extent 
that  a  change  in  elevation  is  necessary.  The 
change  must  be  large  enough  to  obviate  the 
necessity  of  frequent  sight  manipulation  and 
not  so  large  as  to  remove  fire  effect  completely 
from  the  target.  Experience  and  a  study  of 
dispersion  have  shown  that  a  change  of  about 
200  yards  is  satisfactory.  This  change  should 
be  made  while  the  target  is  stationary  and 
offers  its  least  area.  When  it  Is  in  motion  and 
presents  its  greatest  front  and  when  in  the 
center   of  impact,   the   firing  should   reach   its 


Application  of  Fire  133 

maximum  volume.  Against  rapidly  approach- 
ing targets,  as  cavalry,  the  battle  sight  should 
be  used  at  all  ranges.  Against  retreating  tar- 
gets fire  should  be  opened  at  the  estimated 
range  and  sight  settings  of  200  yards  differ- 
ence, set  off  as  the  distance  is  increased. 
Against  targets  moving  perpendicular  to  the 
line  of  fire  some  allowance  must  be  made  for 
their  rate  of  advance.  Fire  upon  the  head  of 
a  column  produces  a  greater  effect  than  at  any 
other  point. 

Training    along   these   lines    should    be    con- 
ducted accordingly. 
Effect  of  Ground: — 

A  method  which  proves  valuable  in  illus- 
trating the  effects  of  a  cone  of  shots  on  different 
slopes  of  ground  is  to  take  a  hand  mirror  and 
throw  the  sun's  rays  on  a  surface  held  at  differ- 
ent angles.  A  small  hand  electric  lamp  with  a 
cylindrical  roll  of  paper,  such  as  a  rolled  call- 
ing card,  pushed  over  the  bulb  to  center  the 
rays  of  light  and  prevent  diffusion,  will  work 
equally  as  well. 

If,  in  the  foregoing  experiment,  it  is  assumed 
the  sun's  rays,  as  they  are  received  on  the  sur- 
face held  at  different  angles,  to  be  the  zone 
beaten  by  a  cone  of  fire,  it  is  seen  at  once  that 
the  depth  of  this  zone  is  decreased  when  the 
surface    of    reception    inclines    upward    and    is 


increased  when  the  surface  inclines  downward. 
So  also  does  the  ground  rising  and  falling  with 
respect  to  the  line  of  sight  increase  and  decrease 
the  width  of  a  fire  beaten  zone.  If,  therefore, 
the  space  in  rear  of  a  firing  line  is  considered 
which  is  swept  by  fire,  from  practically  the 
same  level  as  the  line,  it  is  found  that  where 
this  space  slopes  upward  the  beaten  zone  is 
decreased  and  where  it  slopes  downward  the 
beaten  zone  is  increased.  The  practical  appli- 
cation of  this  knowledge  lies  in  the  ability  to 
use  it  in  reference  to  the  positions  of  the  sup- 
ports and  reserves.  Upon  ground  rising  in 
rear  of  the  firing  line  and  in  respect  to  the  line 
of  sight,  the  supports  may  be  brought  much 
closer  to  the  firing  line  than  upon  ground  which 
slopes  away  from  the  firing  line  and  from  the 
line  of  sight.  Defiladed  spaces  in  rear  of  the 
line  are,  of  course,  not  considered.  For  those 
who  care  to  pursue  this  subject  further  a  refer- 
ence to  the  table  on  page  128,  S.  A.  F.  M.,  is 
made.  This  table  gives  the  effects  upon  the 
beaten  zone  of  different  degrees  of  slope  at 
various    ranges. 

There  is  another  effect  of  sloping  ground 
which  must  be  considered  and  that  is  its  effect 
upon  the  position  of  the  target.  A  column  on 
ground  rising  in  rear  of  the  firing  line  is,  so  to 
speak,  tipped  up  to  receive  the  fire ;  that  is,  the 
rear  of  the  column  is  elevated  and  thus  offers 


'■/K.f'f/cal 


136  Battle  Fire  Training 

a  vertical  target  which  will  not  be  present  upon 
level  or  falling  ground.  A  reference  to  Plate 
38,  in  which  is  shown  a  cone  of  fire  directed 
upon  a  column  target,  both  on  rising  and  fall- 
ing ground,  will  make  this  clear.  It  is  plain 
that  a  line  on  rising  ground  will  offer  no 
increase  in  vertical  target  over  one  on  level  or. 
falling  ground. 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  seen  that  upon 
rising  ground  line  formations  and  not  column 
should  be  taken.  Ground  which  falls  with  ref- 
erence to  the  line  of  sight,  lowers,  so  to  speak, 
the  rear  of  the  column  and  presents  as  a  target 
the  front  and  not  the  depth.  Columns  present 
less  front  than  lines  and  are  desirable  forma- 
tions for  falling  ground.  The  practical  appli- 
cation of  this  second  effect  of  ground  is  found 
in  the  formations  for  supports  and  reserves. 
Upon  ground  rising  in  rear  of  the  firing  line 
and  in  respect  to  the  line  of  sight,  line  forma- 
tions should  be  adopted.  Upon  ground  falling 
in  roar  of  the  firing  line  and  in  respect  to  the 
line  of  sight,  small  column  formations  should 
obtain. 
*  Employment  of  Fire  Units: — 

In  Defense,  sectors  are  assigned.  The  proper 
employment  of  a  unit  is  accomplished  when  the 

*Note:  a  section  is  a  portion  of  the  line  occupied 
by  defending  troops  and  sector  an  area  over  which  they 
fire.  These  terms  are  frequently  taken  as  inter- 
changeable but  not  properly  so. 


/=>LAT£:    3  9. 


l'S8  Battle  Fire  Training 

entire  target  is  covered  by  the  fire  of  that  unit  as 
sliown  in  A  (Plate  39).  Each  man  fires  at  that 
part  of  the  target  directly  opposite  him.  Any 
of  the  following  assignments  of  platoons  will 
work  equally  as  well,  but  the  necessity  therefor 
in  defense  is  not  so  apparent. 

In  Attack,  objectives  are  assigned.  Differing 
from  defense  where  a  unit  remains  in  position 
and  delivers  fire,  in  attack  either  individuals, 
squads,  platoons,  or  entire  companies,  push 
forward  to  successive  fire  positions.  If  a  com- 
pany covers  a  section  of  the  enemy's  line  from 
which  a  fire  is  being  delivered  capable  of  making 
a  certain  number  of  hits,  then  when  the  fire 
ceases  on  that  portion  of  the  enemy's  line  their 
fire  increases  in  quality  and  volume,  resulting 
in  more  hits  on  the  attacking  lines. 

A  force  advancing  against  a  hostile  position 
thoroughly  covered  by  its  own  fire,  moves  for- 
ward with  the  best  possible  protection.  If  a 
unit  depends  upon  its  own  fire  for  protection 
then  some  method  must  be  adopted  which  will 
permit  of  an  advance  of  a  portion  of  the  unit, 
at  the  same  time  keeping  up,  if  possible,  a  fire 
along  the  entire  position  of  the  enemy. 

1.  Switch  Method:  Figure  B.  A  target 
assigned  to  a  four  platoon  company  is  divided 
into  three  parts  and  assigned  to  three  platoons. 


Application  of  Fire  139 

the  fourtli  ucting  Jis  a  switch  to  cover  the  por- 
tion of  tlie  target  on  whicli  fire  has  been  tem- 
porarily suspended  by  reason  of  an  element 
making  an  advance. 

A  disadvantage:  This  requires  a  higli  degree 
of  training  and  control  on  the  part  of  the 
switch  platoon  to  cover  properly  in  turn  each 
vacated  part  of  the  objective. 

2.  By  assigning  two  adjoining  platoons  to 
each  half  of  the  target,  Figure  C.  This  method 
permits  of  the  advance  of  a  platoon  while  the 
fire  on  that  half  of  the  target  is  reduced  one- 
half  in  volume.  In  Plate  40  it  will  be  noticed 
in  the  lower  illustration  that  the  fire  on  the  left 
clement,  4th  squad,  3d  platoon,  crosses  the  line 
of  advance  of  the  4th  platoon  and  would 
endanger  the  flank  of  that  platoon  during  an 
advance.  The  fire  of  the  right  element  paral- 
lels tijc  advance  of  the  2d  platoon. 

To  provide  against  this  either: 

(1)  A  squad  or  portion  of  squad  must 
temporarily  suspend  fire  or  shift  their  fire, 
as  4th  squad  on  1st  squad  target,  1st  squad 
on  4th  squad  target.  The  advisability  of 
such  shifting  is  questionable.     Or 

(2)  Intervals  must  be  kipt  between 
platoons  of  about  6  yards,  or 

(3)  Platoons  must,  during  advance, 
slightly  incline  to  the  flank. 


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Application  of  Fire  141 

Considering  tlie  fire  of  the  3d  platoon  during 
.ulvaiifc  of  the  Mil,  the  suspension  of  fire  of  the 
■ith  squad  causes  tlie  fire  of  the  3d  squad  to 
cross  Ihe  line  of  advance  at  about  250  yards. 
If  the  3d  squad's  fire  is  suspended,  the  fire  of 
the  2d  squad  meets  the  line  of  advance  of  4th 
platoon  at  the  target. 

3.  Assignment  of  each  platoon  to  the  entire 
target,  Figure  C.  The  advantages  appearing 
with  this  assignment  are: 

(1)  Easier  for  the  elements  to  dis- 
tribute their  fire. 

(2)  If,  as  often  happens,  some  platoons 
contain  a  greater  number  of  good  shots, 
the  distribution^over  the  whole  target  is 
improved. 

(3)  Dui-ing  an  advance  of  a  platoon 
the"  entire  target  remains  under  fire, 
reduced  only  in  volume  by  the  suspended 
fire  of  the  platoon  making  the  advance, 
plus  a  slight  addition  explained  later. 

(4)  No  change  of  target  results  during 
the  advance  and  fire  should  possess  greater 
eflficiency. 

(5)  If,  during  an  advance,  it  should  on 
rare  occasions  become  necessary  to  cover 
with  fire,  a  portion  not  in  the  assigned 
sector,  a  flank  platoon  is  always  available 
without  affecting  the  fire  of  the  unit  except 
its  reduction  in  volume. 


142 


Battle  Fire  Training 


Disadvantages : 

(1)  When  a  hostile  Hne  is  located  on 
rolling  ground  it  will  be  often  impossible 
for  the  interior  element  of  a  flank  platoon 
to  see  its  portion  of  the  target,  as  exam- 
ple— Plate  40,  4th  squad  1st  platoon  on 
section  of  4th  squad  target. 

(2)  In  the  initial  advance  no  doubt  this 
disposition  will  work  satisfactorily.  As 
the  advance  closes  with  the  enemy  the  ten- 
dency will  be  to  switch  to  the  method  shown 
in  A,  Plate  39,  in  which  each  man  fires  at 
the  target  directly  to  his  front. 

(3)  Top  illustration,  Plate  40:  Consid- 
ering the  left  element  of  a  platoon's  fire 
together  with  the  danger  to  the  advance 
of  adjoining  platoon  we  have  the  fol- 
lowing : — 


Platoon 
Firing 

Crosses  near  flank  of  advancing  platoon 

4 

3 

2 

1 

1 

525  yards 
415  yards 
nr.  f  g.  point 

270  yards 
nr.  f  g.  point 

nr.  fg.  point 

2 

nr.  fg.  point 
415  yards 
525  yards 

3 

nr.  fg.  point 
270  yards 

4 

nr.  f g.  point 

The  greatest  danger  of  hits  from  our  own 
fire  shows  up  in  this  formation,  when  a  flank 
platoon  is  still  in  rear  the  remainder  having 
made  their  advance  to  the  new  position. 
Assuming  that  the  1st,  2nd,  and  3d  platoons 
have  advanced  100  yards,  the  right  of  the  4th 


Application  of  Fire  143 

platoon's  fire  at  100  yards  crosses  a  point 
about  10  yards  in  from  the  left  flank  of  the 
.'3d  platoon;  the  right  of  the  3d  squad,  4th 
platoon,  1  yard  from  the  left  flank  of  the  3d 
platoon;  the  right  of  the  2d  squad,  4th  pla- 
toon, crosses  the  left  flank  of  the  3d  platoon's 
line  of  advance  at  250  yards.  This  is  the  maxi- 
mum cross  fire  resulting  from  this  formation. 
When  no  intervals  exist  between  platoons  and 
when  they  advance  straight  to  the  front  and 
not  slightly  to  the  flank,  the  flank  platoons 
firing  from  a  position  in  rear  must  suspend  the 
fire  of  two  squads.  However,  this  suspension 
takes  place  for  a  brief  period,  for  the  4th  pla- 
toon will  start  its  advance  as  soon  as  the  3d 
reaches  its  position  and  begins  fire. 

Another  method  is  to  cause  the  flank  pla- 
toons to  move  ahead  of  the  line  to  be  established 
l)y  the  other  platoons.  This  results  in  an  echelon 
formation  and  reduces  the  danger  of  our  own 
Hre  as  above  explained.  For  example,  an 
advance  of  about  60  yards  is  about  to  be  made 
bc'giiuiing  on  the  right.  The  1st  platoon 
advances  about  90  yards,  the  2d  and  3d — GO 
yards,  and  the  4th — 90  yards.  This  resulting 
echelon  formation  affords  in  a  small  degree  a 
poorer  target  to  the  hostile  fire,  but  is  more 
difficult  to  control. 

Wiiatever  the  methml  used,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  platoon  leaders  to  see  that  proper  steps  are 


144  Battle  Fire  Training 

taken   to  prevent   their   fire   from   endangering 
their  comrades. 

The  initial  assignment  of  the  companies  of 
a  battalion  and  the  battalions  of  a  regiment  to 
sectors  in  defense  and  targets  in  attack  has 
been  mentioned  in  the  chapter  on  Distribution 
of  Fire.  In  defense  as  well  as  in  attack  the 
cardinal  principle  is  that  the  whole  target  must 
be  covered  with  fire.  In  attack  it  is  usually 
not  advisable  or  practicable  to  assign  the  same 
target  to  different  companies  in  a  battalion. 
In  the  regiment  the  case  would  be  rare  indeed 
where  different  battalions  were  given  the  same 
objective.  We  may  assume,  therefore,  that  the 
target  both  in  the  battalion  arid  regiment  will 
be  subdivided  into  parts ;  the  number  of  which 
will  depend  upon  the  number  of  units  placed  in 
the  firing  line  upon  the  initial  deployment.  In 
the  regiment  the  oxder  for  attack  should  always 
include  the  assignment  of  objectives  to  the  bat- 
talions. In  the  battalion  a  prearranged  method 
of  distribution  is  recommended.  This  obviates 
the  necessity  for  including  it  in  the  battalion 
commander's  order,  saves  time  and  assures  that 
in  an  emergency,  without  orders,  the  target  will 
be  properly  covered.  Each  company  in  the 
firing  line,  upon  initial  deployment,  takes  its 
proportionate  share  of  the  battalion  target; 
that  is,  if  there  are  two  companies  they  share 


AppUcat'wn  of  Fire  146 

the  target  ociuaily,  if  three  each  takes  one-third, 
and  so  on.  Supporting  companies  if  deployed 
ill  the  intervals  between  skirmishers  take  the 
target  of  the  company  which  they  support. 
If  they  are  deployed  on  the  flank  they  should 
cover  that  portion  of  the  target  which,  in  the 
judgment  of  their  captains,  is  the  most  dan- 
gerous; or  orders  must  be  issued  to  them.  In 
this  connection  it  may  be  arranged  in  the  bat- 
talion that  companies  recnforcing  on  the  flanks 
take  the  same  target  as  the  company  with  which 
they  connect. 

By  this  method  the  battalion  commander  is 
able  without  verbal  orders  to  distribute  the  fire 
of  supporting  companies  over  the  \\h()]e  target 
or  place  it  on  either  flank,  as  he  may  desire. 

The  following  abbreviations  have  been  found 
to  work  well  and  to  he  easily  memorized  :— 

11  R  A — Rcenforce  right  of  "A"  company. 

R  L  B— Reenforce  left  of  "1?"  company. 

R  A — Rcenforce  "A"  c()mj)any  intervals. 

R  W  L—   Reenforce  ^\h()]e  line  in  intei-^'als. 

h'liuls  of  Fire: — 

There  are  three  classes  of  fire  used  in  our  ser- 
vice;   Volley,  At  Will,  and  Clip. 

VoUeif  Firing  should  be  used  for  i-anging; 
it  also  has  a  limited  application  in  Fire  of 
Position. 


146  Battle  Fire  Training 

At  Will  is  the  only  class  of  fire  which  need 
be  given  much  consideration.  It  is  this  class 
of  fire  which  will  usuall}^  be  applied  in  battle. 
It  is  the  fire  for  almost  every  situation.  To 
reap  its  full  effects,  however,  there  must  be  a 
high  state  of  fire  discipline  and  fire  control 
which  results  only  from  thorough  training. 

Clip  Fire  is  an  expedient  resorted  to  with  the 
idea  of  limiting  the  number  of  rounds  fired 
without  a  pause  in  the  firing. 

With  proper  fire  discipline  clip  fire  is  not 
necessary;  without  proper  fire  discipline  it 
cannot  be  delivered  with  success. 

There  is  another  class  of  fire,  which,  while  it 
is  not  advocated  in  our  army,  has  been  recom- 
mended abroad;  that  is.  Rolling  Fire.  This 
fire  is  executed  about  as  follows ;  the  front  rank 
runs  forward  about  fifteen  paces  and  opens  fire, 
the  rear  rank  in  the  meantime  advancing  at 
quick  time.  As  the  rear  rank  passes  the  front 
rank  the  latter  ceases  firing  while  the  former 
takes  up  the  double  time  for  about  fifteen  paces, 
when  it  halts  and  opens  fire.  The  advance  thus 
continues  without  pauses  and  fire  is  continuous. 
It  requires  much  training  to  execute  this  class 
of  fire  even  in  peace  time.  Its  application  in 
war  will  probably  be  limited  to  occasions  upon 
which  the  enemy  is  completely  demoralized. 
This  class  of  fire,  it  is  reported,  has  been  fre- 


Application  of  Fire  li 

(jiKiitly    used   on    the   Frt'iich    I'loiit   during'    the 
past  Iwo  years. 

Time  of  Opening  Fire: — 

In  the  attack  the  firing  lines  must  be  pushed 
close  to  the  enemy's  position  before  fire  is 
opened.  The  attack  which  halts  to  fire  at  long 
ranges  is  lost.  On  the  defense,  however,  wliere 
ammunition  is  very  easily  supplied,  ranges  more 
nearly  correct,  and  the  target  larger,  fire  may 
be  opened  at  greater  range  with  chance  of  suc- 
cess. In  attack,  fire  should  not  be  opened 
i)eyond  800  yards  unless  absolutely  necessary. 
Reports  from  the  present  war  indicate  that 
attacks  have  frequently  been  pushed  to  within 
four  or  five  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion before  fire  was  opened.  In  defense,  unless 
particularly  favorable  targets  are  presented, 
fire  should  not  be  opened  until  heavy  losses  can 
be  inflicted.  This  will  as  a  rule  be  between 
1 ,200  and  800  yards. 

Long  range  fire  usually  fails  to  produce  hits 
ill  proportion  to  the  amnnuiition  exjx'nck'd  ;  it 
uses  the  strength  of  the  firers  without  coninuii- 
surate  results;  and  it  increases  the  morale  of 
the  enemy  and  decreases  that  of  the  firers,  the 
one  breeding  a  contcm])t  for  the  ability  of  the 
defenders,  the  other  by  raising  doubts  as  to  the 
possibility  of  stopping  the  attack. 


148  Battle  Fire  Training 

Long  range  fire  is  permissible  in  pursuits  and 
should  be  resorted  to  in  holding  and  delaying 
actions  which  are  not  intended  to  be  fought  to- 
a  finish. 

Fire  to  be  effective  must  be  so  from  its  begin- 
ning. A  ragged,  scattered  opening  will  almost 
certainly  insure  a  grave  loss  of  effect.  Men 
will  fire  before  they  have  their  sights  set,  before 
they  have  the  target,  will  fire  nervously  and 
excitedly,  if  fire  is  not  opened  simultaneously 
throughout  a  unit.  In  the  problems  given 
herein  attention  has  been  called  to  the  methods 
by  which  fire  may  be  so  opened.  Throughout 
instruction  and  training  care  and  attention 
must  be  given  to  this  point. 
Combined  Sights: — 

When  the  exact  detennination  of  ranges  is 
not  possible,  and  other  means  fail  in  giving  cor- 
rect data  for  fire  adjustment,  an  expedient 
known  as  combined  sights  may  be  used.  A 
greater  depth  of  beaten  zone  is  created  and  a 
loss  of  concentration  results.  Our  regulations 
prescribe  that  "this  expedient  will  not  usually 
be  employed  by  bodies  of  les«  strength  than  a 
battalion." 

Error  in  range  estimation  varies  greatly. 
The  average  error  is  121^%.  Assuming  an 
error  of  10%,  then  at  1,000  yards  a  sight  set- 
ting might  be  900  or  1,100  yards.     How  near 


A'pplicat'wn  of  Fire  149 

to  tliL'  target  will  a  beaten  zone  fall  in  either 

case?      ]\y   reference  to  the   following  table: — 

Table  of  Dispebsion 

a\'£baoe  shots 

Range  Longitudinal  75%  Zone 

500  yards   373  yards 

()00  yards   315  yaj-ds 

700  yards   2G(i  yards 

800  yards   229  yards 

900  yards  201  yards 

1,000  yards   180  yards 

1,100  yards   163  yards 

1,200  yards   152  yards 

1,300  yards   143  yards 

1,400  yards   13G  yards 

1,500  yards  129  yards 

It  is  seen  the  beaten  zone  is  180  yards,  or  if 
the  estimate  is  900  yards,  extending  from  range 
810  to  990  yards;  if  1,100  yards,  from  1,010 
to  1,190  yards.  The  target,  therefore,  suffers 
from  nothing  but  a  few  ricochets  if  the  estima- 
tion is  short  and  if  over  the  fire  is  very  poorly 
centered.  "If  the  prohahJc  error  of  estimation 
does  not  exceed  one  half  of  the  zone  considered 
(75%  of  zone)  the.n  the  objective  must  he  some- 
where •mthin  that  zone."  Our  error  is  100 
yards  and  one  half  of  the  75%  zone  (180)  is  90. 
This  does  not  fulfill  the  above  requirement  and 
it  is  apparent  we  require  another  sight  setting 
to  bring  the  shots  on  the  target.  (The  heavy 
black  lines  in  Plate  41  indicate  the  limits  of  the 
beaten  zone.)  Two  sight  settings  differing 
from  each  other  by  the  width  of  the  beaten  zone 


150 


Battle  Fire  Training 


(180  yards),  with  an  estimate  of  900  yards, 
result  in  the  elevations  810  and  990  creating 
a  beaten  zone  extending  from  720  to  1,080 
yards. 


I 


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At  i,5u0  yards  tlirce  settings  are  necessary, 
one  setting  at  the  estimated  range,  one  over, 
and  one  under,  the  difference  being  the  depth 
of  the  zone  at  that  range. 

In  practice  the  two  points  which  arise  with 
respect  to  combined  sights  are:  At  what  range 
should  these  sights  first  be  used?  What  sliould 
be  the  difference  between  the  elevations  set  off? 


ApiMcation  of  Fire  151 

'J'lu'  fii"st  (juc'stion  can  be  decided  only  after  a 
consideration  of  the  combined  effect  of  probable 
errors  in  range,  the  size  of  the  cone  of  disper- 
sion produced  by  the  various  classes  of  marks- 
men, and  the  width  of  the  zone  beaten  by  one 
sight  and  that  by  two.  Without  going  into 
the  details  by  which  a  conclusion  is  reached,  it 
may  be  stated  that  with  our  present  methods  of 
range  estimation  the  average  company  should 
use  combined  sights  at  ranges  of  1,000  yards 
and  over  on  level  ground.  On  ground  rising 
with  respect  to  the  line  of  sight  combined  sights 
should  be  used  at  800  yards  and  over.  The 
second  question  is  answered  by  statilig  that  In 
practice  it  has  been  found  satisfactory  to  set 
the  sights  fifty  yards  over  and  fifty  yards  under 
the  estimated  range.  Do  not  use  combined 
s'ujltts  if  the  range  is  knoxcn. 

Considering  (uiuler)  estimation  (  range  1,500) 

Range  Avould  be 1,.*J50 

Beaten  zone  at  1,500  y/irds.  .     1,'JO  yards 

Sight  settings 1,225 

1 ,350 
1,480 
Xi(jh  f  Fi  ring : — 

In  the  attack  recourse  should  be  iiad  to  tlie 
l)ayonet.  In  the  defense,  where  rests  or  other 
expedients  are  constructed  so  that  aimed  fire 
may  sweep  the  front  of  a  position,  night  firing 


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Application  of  Fire  153 

may  be  resorted  to  with  good  results.  Artificial 
illumination  also  will  afford  opportunities  for 
this  kind  of  fire,  \ight  firing  will  be  effective 
Old}'  at  short  ranges. 

Indirect  Fire: — 

By  this  is  meant  fire  which  is  directed  over 
an  intervening  obstacle  which  screens  the  target 
from  the  firers.  It  will  require  a  particularly 
fortuitous  combination  of  circumstances  to 
render  such  fire  possible.  If  such  a  combina- 
tion exists  this  kind  of  fire  may  be  delivered  by 
the  use  of  auxiliary  aiming  points.     Plate  20. 

Fire  of  Position: — 

In  the  attjick,  selected  bodies  of  troops  may 
be  posted  on  the  flanks  or  on  high  ground  from 
which  they  can  fire  over  the  firing  line  to  assist 
in  its  advance.  Fire  delivered  by  such  troops  is 
known  as  "fire  of  position"  and  sometimes  as 
"covering  fire." 

As  the  range  remains  the  same,  the  troops 
stationary  and  outside  the  zone  of  the  enemy's 
fire,  the  effect  produced  by  this  fire  will  usually 
be  sufficient  to  warrant  its  application  when 
circumstances  permit.  In  the  application  of 
fire  of  position  and  indirect  fire  it  must  be 
remembered  that  infantry  must  not  attempt 
to  usurp  the  functions  of  machine  guns  and 
artillery. 


oiTveaC  yV/^g. 


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Concentrated  jfffC: 


-45. 


Application  of  Fire  155 

Vulnernbiliti/  of  Formations: — 

The  vulnerability  to  fire  of  any  formation  is 
(IcpeiuKnt  upon: — 

1.  The  kind  of  fire  directed  against  it. 

2.  The  formation. 

3.  The  character  of  ground. 

In  top  portion  of  Plate  43  is  shown  a  firing 
line  "A"  and  in  rear  the  supports  or  reenforce- 
ments  "B."  Fire  directed  at  "A"  will  be  ^limed 
and  the  centers  of  impact  closely  located  along 
the  target  line  as  shown  by  the  shaded  lines  "A" 
(lower  portion  Plate  43).  When  the  shots  reach 
the  point  occupied  by  troops  at  "B"  (top), 
dispersion  results  creating  a  shot  group  more 
or  less  uniformly  distributed  as  shown  by  "B" 
(lower),  which  might  be  called  sweeping  or 
unaimed  fire.  Another  kind  of  fire  to  be  con- 
sidered is  concentrated  fire  as  shown  in  "C" 
where  a  numl)er  of  rifles  are  directed  against 
a  connnon  point. 
Unaimed  Fire: 

Unaimed,  or  sweeping,  fire  is  met  with  in 
rear  of  a  firing  line,  which  misses  it  and  hits 
objects  beyond.  Assuming  that  this  fire  is 
uniformly  distributed  over  a  given  area,  then  it 
appears  that  objects  will  receive  hits  in  pro- 
portion to  the  square  area  of  target  surface 
presented. 

Plate  44  sjiows  relative  vertical  targets 
afl'orded,    considering   only    the    target   fronts. 


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Application  of  Fire  157 

of  a  line  of  skirmishers,  squad  columns,  platoon 
columns,  and  a  column  of  squads.  If  a  man 
presents  6/10  of  a  square  yard  of  target  sur- 
face, then  in  the  following  formations  we  have 
the  following  sized  targets  (not  considering 
column  leaders  and  file  closers  in  column  of 
squads) : 

Targets    Men  Fronts 
Line  of  skirmishers..       96  96  57.6  sq.  yds. 

Squad   column    12  12  7.2  sq.  yds. 

Platoon  column   4  8  4.8  sq.  yds. 

Column   of   squads ...         1  4  2.4  sq.  yds. 

To  which  must  be  added  the  danger  space 
occurring  in  targets  having  depth,  as  columns. 
Without  going  into  the  mathematics  of  the  fac- 
tors involved  it  may  be  safely  concluded  that 
under  the  assumptions  made,  formations  are  the 
hast  vulnerable  in  the  following  order:* 

1.  Column  of  squads. 

2.  Platoon  colunins. 

3.  Squad  columns. 

4.  Line  of  skirmishers. 
Under  Aimed  Fire. 

Assuming  that  the  fire  is  not  directed  against 
the  heads  of  columns,  but  equally  distributed 
along  the  whole  line,  as  lower  A,  Plate  43,  a 
slightly  different  result  is  obtained.  Here  fire 
is  laterally  distrilnited,  l)ut  vertically  the  sliots 
arc  clustered  around  the  line  running  through 
the  centers  of  impact.     A  column  of  sufficient 

*Note:  Consider  the  targets  as  shown  in  Plate  44 
as  applied  to  lower  A  and  B,  Plate  43. 


158  Battle  Fire  Training 

depth  to  lie  wholly  within  this  portion  of  the 
shot  group  will  receive  proportionately  more 
hits  than  when  the  formation  against  unaimed 
fire  is  considered.  The  order  of  vulnerability 
of  formations  under  these  conditions  appears 
below,  beginning  with  the  least  vulnerable  :* 

1.  Platoon  column. 

2.  Squad  column. 

3.  Column  of  squads. 

4.  Line  of  skirmishers. 
Concentrated  Fire.     Plate  C-43. 

The  full  effects  of  concentrated  fire  can  only 
be  expected  at  the  shorter  ranges,  under  600 
yards,  or  against  machine  guns.  Assuming  the 
fire  is  efficient  and  concentrated  the  following 
comparisons  may  be  made : — 

Fire  capable  of  a  hit  per  yard,  per  unit  of 
time,  on  a  lineal  target  100  yards  long,  when 
distributed,  would  expose  100  men  to  60%  of 
hits.  The  same  fire  effectively  concentrated  on 
12  squad  columns  would  result  in  8  1/3  hits 
per  yard  of  target  front  per  minute,  or  five  hits 
per  man  front. 

On  platoon  columns  the  result  would  be  15 
hits  per  head  of  each  platoon,  121/4  per  yard, 
or  7l/r>  per  man  front. 

On  column  of  squads,  60  hits  per  head  of 
column,  25  per  yard,  or  15  per  man  front. 


*Note:     Consider  the  targets  as  shown   in   Plate  44 
as  applied  to  lower  A  and  B,  Plate  43. 


CHAPTER  VII 


SUPPLY  OF  AMMUNITION 


How  often  liiis  the  word  from  the  firing  Hne 
been  sent  to  the  rear — "Out  of  Ammunition," 
and  how  often  has  the  supply  of  ammunition 
determined  the  result  of  an  engagement? 

Usually  a  man  enters  into  an  engagement 
with  100  rounds  in  his  belt  (of  which  30  is  for 
emergency  and  never  fired  without  an  officer's 
order)  ;  120  or  180  rounds  in  two  or  three 
bandoleers;    total  of  220  or  280  rounds. 

Provided  for  each  man  in  tiie  field  is  the 
following: — 

Base  or  intermediate  station.  .  .  .    680 
Ammunition  Column  at  or  near 

advance  depot 340 

Ammunition  I'raiii 120 

Com})(it  Tr(tin 120 

In  the  Belt 100 

making  a  total  of  1,360  rounds. 

The  number  of  rounds  carried  into  action 
depends  on  local  supply,  nature  of  engagement, 
and  carrying  capacity.  One  round  of  ammuni- 
tion weighs  approximately  9  10  of  an  ounce. 
Considering  the  ammunition  alone,  the  weight 
of  280  rounds  is  about  16  pounds.  We  might 
at  this  point,  consider  the*  firing  capacity  of  a 


160  Battle  Fire  Training 

man.  Although  the  "kick"  of  our  present 
"springfield"  is  not  the  vicious  one  of  the  old 
"45,"  yet  few  can  fire  any  number  of  rounds 
beyond  50  without  it  leaving  a  noticeable  effect 
on  their  muscles  and  nervous  system.  True,  the 
excitement  of  battle  will  postpone  the  realiza- 
tion of  this  fact,  but  beyond  the  50  round  point 
firing  will  begin  to  show  loss  in  accuracy.  As 
to  the  limit  of  the  number  of  rounds  which  the 
average  man  can  fire  with  reasonable  effect,  it 
might  be  placed  between  two  and  three  hundred. 

It  has  been  frequently  noticed  that  after  an 
engagement  lasting  part  of  a  day  in  which  men 
fired  approximately  this  number  of  rounds, 
without  any  great  amount  of  fatigue  before  the 
engagement,  complete  exhaustion  was  evident, 
due  not  only  to  the  strain  incident  to  battle, 
but  in  a  large  measure  to  the  shock  of  gun 
recoil. 

Taking  220  rounds  as  an  average  amount  to 
carry  into  action  as  previously  noted,  consider- 
ing the  three  round  per  minute  rate  there 
results  1  and  1/5  hours  of  potential  firing,  that 
more  ammunition  will  be  needed  can  be  put 
down  as  a  certainty  in  nearly  every  case,  and 
the  question  naturally  arises  how  will  the  firing 
line  be  supplied  after  it  is  once  launched  into 
action  and  separated  from  the  ammunition 
supply  by  a  fire  swept  zone. 


Supply  of  Ammunition  161 

In  a  battalion  the  supply  is  governed  by  the 
major.      'V\w  ways  afforded   for  replenishment 

1.  From  wounded. 

2.  From  reenforcements. 

3.  From  improvised  means,  in  limited  cases. 
We  should  look  upon  the  following  rules  gov- 
erning ammunition   as   of  the  greatest   impor- 
tance : — 

1.  Appreciation  of  the  value  of  each  round 
of  ammunition. 

2.  That  reenforcements  are  always  sent 
forward  with  an  extra  amount  of  ammunition. 

3.  That  ammunition  should  be  sent,  if  pos- 
sible, to  an  indicated  unit  so  as  to  provide 
for  its  proper  distribution. 

4.  That  if  ammunition  is  delivered  to  a 
unit,  the  commander  himself  will  provide  for 
proper  distribution  in  that  unit. 

(a)  In  a  platoon  or  company,  several  men 
crawling  or  rolling  along  in  rear  of  the  line 
giving  out  ammunition  results  in  better  dis- 
tribution than  j)assing  or  throwing  it  along 
the  line,  which  affects  the  rate  and  volume  of 
fire  and  poor  distribution  of  ammunition. 

(b)  That  if  occasion  arises  where  ammu- 
nition can  be  delivered  only  at  one  point  on 
an  extended  line,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  innne- 
diate  commanders  to  see  that  a  proper  por- 


162  Battle  Fire  Training 

tion  thereof  is  passed  on  to  the  next  organi- 
zation. 

5.  Squad,  platoon,  and  company  comman- 
ders should  provide  for  the  utilization  of  the 
ammunition  of  the  wounded  and  dead. 
Orders  to  the  commander  of  a  line  of  reen- 
forcements  should  clearly  point  out  the  portion 
of  the  line  needing  ammunition  and  reenforce- 
ments,  and  instructions  should  clearly  state — 
"Reenforce  that  portion  of  the  line  beginning 
and  ending  there."  Before  starting  forward, 
several  men  of  the  line  of  reenforcements  should 
be  selected  and  instructed  "upon  arrival  on  the 
firing  line  to  collect  extra  ammunition  carried 
forward  by  reenforcements  and  distribute  to  the 
men  low  in  ammunition."  This,  of  course,  under 
direction  of  the  unit  commander  already  on  the 
line. 

In  cases  where  the  supporting  units  are  to  be 
placed  in  intervals  between  units  of  the  firing 
line,  men  should  be  detailed  as  ammunition  car- 
riers and  deployed  on  the  flanks  of  the  support 
in  rear  of  the  troops  they  are  to  supply.  This 
does  away  with  the  necessity  of  moving  along 
the  firing  line,  which  creates  confusion  and  is 
both  difficult  and  dangerous. 

Whatever  the  method  of  absorbing  the  sup- 
ports or  reenforcements  in  the  firing  line, 
whether  by  intervals  between  men  or  intervals 


Supply  of  Ammunition  163 

between  groups,  the  distribution  of  .unmunition 
is  better  accomplished  as  before  mentioned  by 
men  crawling  or  rolling  along  in  rear  of  the  line 
than  by  passing  or  throwing  it  along  the  line. 
Ammunition  should  be  distributed  without 
aflfecting  the  rate  of  fire  delivery.  As  before 
stated  one  solution  of  this  question  lies  in  with- 
holding firq  until  a  position  close  to  the  enemy 
is  reached. 
Exercise : 

Object:  Training  in  the  supply  of 
ammunition  to  the  firing  line. 

Situation:  Two  companies  of  the  bat- 
talion deployed,  firing;  two  companies 
some  distance  to  the  rear  in  support. 

Action:     Orders  are  issued,  by  signal, 
for  one  .supporting  company  to  reenforce 
the  left  company  in  the  intervals  between 
skirmishers    and    the    second    supporting 
company  to  reenforce  the  left  of  the  line. 
The  supporting  companies  should  be  sup- 
plied with  at  least  two  bandoleers  per  man. 
Firing  may  be  simulated. 
The  Field  Serxnce  liegulations  under  the  head 
of  Ammunition  Service  and  the  Infantry  Drill 
Regulations    under    the    head    of    Ammunition 
Supply  cover  the  proper  use  of  the  divisional 
ammunition  train  and  the  combat  trains.   These 
instructions   make    it   mandatory    for   the   bat- 


164  Battle  Fire  Training 

talion  commander,  unless  he  himself  be  the  com- 
mander, to  direct  the  issue  of  ammunition  from 
the  battalion  combat  train  "upon  separating 
from  it  to  enter  an  engagement."  If  the  regi- 
mental commander  or  higher  commander  does 
not  desire  an  issue  of  ammunition  from  the 
trains  he  must  so  order.  In  making  his  decision 
upon  this  point  he  will  take  into  consideration 
the  following: 

(a)  Probable  duration  of  impending 
action. 

(b)  Probable  amount  of  ammunition 
which  will  be  expended. 

(c)  Whether  or  not  he  is  able  to  imme- 
diately replace  ammunition  expended. 

In  this  connection  the  Military  Art  Depart- 
ment of  the  Army  Service  Schools  says  that  in 
making  his  decision  the  higher  commander  will 
be  assisted  by  a  consideration  of  the  following: 

(a)  "If  ammunition  is  plentiful,  better 
lose  a  wagon  load  than  that  a  single  company 
on  the  firing  line  should  lack  a  bandoleer." 

(b)  "Marching  with  extra  bandoleers  on 
the  person  is  much  slower  and  more 
fatiguing." 

(c)  "Ammunition  discarded  maybe  recov- 
ered in  an  advance  but  not  so  readily  in 
retreat." 

(d)  "Resupplying  is  easier  in  a  retreat 
(not   a   route)    than   in   an   advance,   as   the 


Supply  of  Ammunition  165 

required  aiiununition  may  be  dropped  by  tbe 
wagons  in  sheltered  spots  and  picked  up»by 
the  passing  troops." 

(e)  "Think  carefully  before  you  allow 
issues  to  go  on  prior  to  short  advance  guard 
and  rear  guard  actions,  or  in  positions  in 
readiness.  In  the  latter  there  may  be  no 
combat  or  you  may  march  again,  and  some 
majors  may  issue,  particularly  if  they  are 
ordered  to  occupy  a  tentative  line." 

(f)  "The  cream  of  the  discussion  is  that 
the  foot  soldier  carries  on  his  person  one 
hundred  rounds.  Is  that  enough  for  his 
purpose  in  carrying  out  your  orders  and 
can  you  quickly  resupply  the  amount  he 
expends  thereafter.''" 

Exercise : 

Purpose:  To  train  the  battalion  to  draw 
and  issue  ammunition  from  its  combat  train. 

Situation:  The  battalion  in  route  march 
followed  by  its  combat  train  properly  loaded. 

Action:  Upon  the  order  from  the  battalion 
commander  "Issue  Ammunition,"  the  first 
and  third  companies  halt  and  clear  the  road. 
The  second  and  fourth  companies  continue 
to  march  until  their  heads  are  opposite  the 
first  and  third  companies  respectively,  when 
they  halt  and  clear  the  road.  The  battalion 
is   then   in  double  eoltunn   with   the   roadway 


166  Battle  Fire  Training 

clear  between  the  columns.  The  ammunition 
wagons  are  driven  between  the  columns ;  the 
first  to  near  the  head  of  the  first  two  com- 
panies, the  second  to  opposite  the  intervals 
between  the  companies,  and  the  third  to 
opposite  the  tail  of  the  rear  companies. 

A  detail  of  one  noncommissioned  officer 
and  two  privates,  previously  made,  enter  each 
wagon,  let  down  the  tail  gate,  and  throw  the 
ammunition  on  the  ground  at  the  rate  of 
about  three  boxes  per  platoon.  The  sergeant 
in  charge  of  the  wagons,  should  there  be  one, 
supervises  the  issue,  otherwise  a  detail  should 
be  made  for  this  purpose. 

Each  squad  leader  reports  to  his  platoon 
commander  as  soon  as  his  squad  is  supplied, 
the  platoon  commanders  similarly  report  to 
the  company  commander,  who  in  turn  reports 
to  the  battalion  commander. 

Under    direction    of    the    first    sergeant, 
ammunition    is    issued    to    the    file    closers, 
guides,  and  company  buglers. 

The  company  officers  should  also  be  sup- 
plied. 

The    issue    should    not    require    over    ten. 
minutes. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


CONDUCT   OF    FIRE 


Conduct  of  fire  is  tlie  performance  of  those 
duties  by  the  individuals  of  a  unit  which  enable 
that  unit  to  develop  its  maximum  efficiency  in 
battle.  They  comprise  not  only  those  which 
arise  in  connection  with  the  actual  fire  figlit, 
but  many  wliich  are  necessary  prior  to  an 
action  to  insure  a  systematic  and  orderly 
entrance  into  battle  with  the  greatest  possible 
chance  of  success. 

In  a  study  of  this  subject  the  fact  is  empha- 
sized that  the  dividing  line  between  fire  and 
maneuver  tactics  is  often  so  indistinct  that  the 
two  subjects  appear  to  merge  one  into  tlie 
other.  For  this  reason,  therefore,  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  fire  tactics  includes  some  under- 
standing of  its  relation  to  maneuver  tactics. 
With  this  idea  in  view  it  has  been  thought  nec- 
essary to  broaden  the  scope  of  this  chapter  and 
in  a  few  instances  to  mention  subjects  which 
ordinarily  are  not  included  under  fire  tactics 
proper. 

It  has  been  stated  that  the  conduct  of  fire 
consists  in  the  performance  of  certain  duties 
by  the  individuals  of  a  unit.  Exactly  what  the 
duties  are  may  be  determined  by  a  study  of  fire 


168  Battle  Fire  Training 

direction,  fire  control,  and  fire  discipline;  for 
in  meeting  the  requirements  of  these  three  fac- 
tors certain  duties  are  made  obligatory  upon 
the  individuals  of  a  command.  The  coordina- 
tion and  performance  of  these  duties  consti- 
tutes "Conduct  of  Fire." 

Fire  direction  is  exercised  mainly  by  the 
company  commander,  but  really  includes  cer- 
tain functions  of  the  several  commanders  from 
the  captain  to  the  brigadier.  Above  the  grade 
of  captain,  as  we  shall  see,  the  direction  is 
mainly  tactical. 

Fire  control  is  the  function  of  the  comman- 
der of  the  fire  unit;    the  platoon. 

Fire  discipline,  of  course,  applies  to  the  indi- 
vidual soldier. 

Fire  direction  and  control  are  thoroughly 
explained  in  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations. 
Fire  discipline  has  been  defined  in  a  previous 
chapter. 

There  remains,  therefore,  only  the  necessity 
for  pointing  out  in  detail  the  duties  of  the  indi- 
viduals of  a  unit  which  are  necessary  for  proper 
conduct  of  fire.  These,  as  has  been  stated,  are 
determined  by  a  study  of  fire  direction,  control, 
and  discipline. 

It  would  possibly  have  been  more  attractive 
to  the  general  reader  to  present  the  subject- 
matter   of  this   chapter   in   more   or   less   of   a 


Conduct  of  Fire  169 

narrative  form,  but  to  the  student,  who  wants 
facts,  tlie  arrangement  adopted  is  thought  more 
suitable.* 

The  Colonel 

Imlcpcmlcnt  Commander:  Upon  serious  con- 
tact with  the  enemy  tlie  colonel  should  take 
position  well  towards  tlie  front  of  his  command 
so  that  he  may  receive  information  promptly, 
and  personally  reconnoiter.  This  enables  him 
to  issue  his  order  intelligently  and  without 
delay.  Such  a  position,  also,  permits  him  to 
control  the  situation  with  regards  to  his  own 
troops,  and  to  begin  the  action,  if  such  is  his 
desire,  strictly  in  accordance  with  his  own 
wishes. 

Subordinate  Commander:  After  receiving 
ills  orders  the  colonel  should  ]) recede  his  com- 
mand as  stated  above  and  for  the  same  reasons. 
He  should  direct  the  advance' of  his  regiment 
until  the  time  arlves  for  issuing  the  regimental 
order.  The  formation  adopted  depending  upon 
requirements  of  the  situation,  usually  column, 
or  line  of  colunms. 


•Note:  The  Hrranfrcinciit  and  the  details  of  this  cliap- 
ter  liave  been  taken  ahiiost  wliolly  from  a  conijiilatiou 
on  the  subject  by  the  School  of  Musketry.  This  compi- 
lation is  based  with  few  exceptions  upon  the  ]irovisions 
of  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  and  the  Field  Service 
Regulations. 


170  Battle  Fire  Training 

General  Duties: 

a.  Assign  targets  and  sectors  or  tasks  to 
battalions  and  special  units. 

b.  Provide  for  the  necessary  reconnaissance 
to  the  front  and  flanks. 

c.  Announce  his  position  and  that  of  the  next 
higher  commander. 

d.  Control  the  reserve  as  the  tactical  situa- 
tion demands. 

e.  Regulate  ammunition  supply. 

f.  Establish  communication  with  next  higher 
commander. 

g.  Use  his  regimental  staff  to  assist  him  in 
the  performance  of  his  duties. 

h.  During  the  progress  of  an  action  take  a 
position  from  which  he  can  observe  the  progress 
of  events,  receive  and  transmit  messages  and 
orders,  and  be  in  constant,  direct,  and  easy 
communication  with  the  reserve. 

The  Major 

Independent  Commander:  The  general  rules 
for  a  colonel  apply. 

Subordinate  Commander:  When  an  action 
is  imminent  the  major  should  talce  position 
where  he  can  best  observe  the  progress  of  events 
and  still  retain  control  of  his  unit. 

After  an  action  has  opened  the  major  should 
be  where  he  can  best  direct  the  reenforcing  of 


Conduct  of  Fire  171 

the  firing  line,  anxl  maintain  contact  with  rcgi- 
nuiital  headquarters. 

After  the  supports  have  joined  the  firing  line 
he  should  be  with  that  line. 

General  Duties: 

a.  Conducts  his  battalion  according  to  the 
mission  assigned  him. 

b.  By  tactical  orders  directs  initial  deploy- 
ment of  the  battalion. 

c.  Controls  support  and  sends  forward  reen- 
forccments  from  it  to  the  firing  line 

d.  Controls  movements  of  the  battalion  sub- 
sequent to  its  initial  deployment, 

e.  Regulates  ammunition  supply. 

f.  Maintains  contact  with  adjoining  troops. 

g.  May  harmonize  ranges  used  by  the  com- 
j)anies  on  the  firing  line. 

h.   Determines  when  bayonets  shall  be  fixed. 

i.  Subject  to  orders  from  higher  authority 
determines  the  point  from  which  the  charge  is 
to  be  made. 

j.   Orders  the  charge. 
Special  Duties:        In  Attack. 

a.  May  select  formation  in  which  companies 
advance. 

b.  Designates : 

1.  The  diri'ction  of  the  objective. 

2.  The  companies  for  the  firing  line. 
Ji.   The  companies  f()r  the  support. 

4.  The  order  and  front  of  the  companies 
in  the  firing  line. 


172  Battle  Fire  Training 

m 

5.   The   right   or   left   company    of   the 
firing  line  as  the  base  company. 

In  Defense 

a.  Describes  front  of  each  company. 

b.  Assigns  sector  of  fire.    • 

c.  Locates  fire,  communicating,  and  cover 
trenches. 

d.  Directs  preparation  of  obstacles, 

e.  Assigns  companies  to  construct  trenches 
and  obstacles. 

f.  Details  troops  to  occupy  trenches. 

g.  Causes  firing  line  and  supports  to  fix 
bayonets  when  a  charge  by  the  enemy  is 
imminent. 

h.   Seeks  opportunities  for  counter  attack. 

Battalion  Staff 
In  action  the  battalion  adjutant  and  sergeant 
major  are  with  the  major.  In  attack,  usually 
on  the  same  line  with  some  interval.  In  defense, 
where  they  can  best  perform  the  duties  assigned 
them.  One  orderly  is  usually  a  horse  holder, 
the  other  is  with  the  major.  The  major  divides 
the  following  duties  among  his  staff  according 
to  their  qualifications : 

a.  Reconnaissance. 

b.  Observation  of  the  firing  line. 

c.  Maintaining  contact  with  regimental  head- 
quarters. 


Conduct  of  Fire  ,173 

d.  Maintaining  contact  with  the  support. 

e.  Maintaining  contact  with  adjoining  units. 

f.  Receiving,  communicating,  and  sending 
visual  signals  from  and  to  front  and  rear. 

g.  Observing  fire  effect  and  progress  of 
events. 

h.  Keeping  copies  of  all  orders,  messages, 
and  other  data  necessary  for  his  war  diary. 

i.  Determination  of  ranges,  if  the  battalion 
is  equipped  with  only  one  instrument  for  this 
purpose. 

All  members  of  the  battalion  staff  should 
understand  all  signals  and  the  semaphore  code. 
The  orderlies  and  the  sergeant  major,  the  Inter- 
national Code  as  well. 

A  sergeant  should  be  temporarily  added  to 
the  battalion  staff,  who,  under  the  direction 
of  the  major: — 

a.  Conducts  coml)at  train  as  far  to  the  front 
with  the  battalion  as  directed. 

b.  Supervises  issues  of  anmiuiiition  to  tjic 
battalion. 

c.  Takes  comi)at  train  to  niule/vous  for 
refilling,  under  the  direction  of  the  regimental 
commander. 

d.  Rejoins  battalion,  if  it  is  not  in  action, 
or,  if  it  be  engaged,  joins  or  establishes  com- 
munication with  the  regimental  reserve. 


174  Battle  Fire  Training 

Captain 

In  action  the  captain  is  where  he  can  best 
control  his  platoons,  observe  fire  effect,  sec  the 
major  and  platoon  chiefs. 

Duties: 

a.  Conducts  his  company  to  place  of  deploy- 
ment assigned  by  the  major's  orders  in  the  best 
manner. 

b.  Designates  the  target,  and  allots  part  to 
each  platoon. 

c.  Determines  the  range. 

d.  Announces  the  sight  setting.    * 

e.  Indicates  class  of' fire. 

f.  Indicates  time  to  open  fire. 

g.  Informs  his  subordinates  as  to  the  loca- 
tion of  the  battalion  commander,  and,  when 
necessary,  announces  his  own  position. 

h.  Observes  fire  effect  and  maintains  a  check 
on  the  rate  of  fire. 

i.  Maintains  a  check  on  the  range,  har- 
monizes ranges  in  the  platoons,  and  corrects 
material  errors  in  elevations. 

j.  Maintains  communication  with  battalion 
headquarters  and  when  necessary  with  adjoin- 
ing units. 

k.  Prevents  exhaustion  of  ammunition  supply. 

1.  Distributes  ammunition  received  from  rear. 

m.  Provides  for  the  collection  and  distribu- 
tion of  the  ammunition  of  the  dead  and 
wounded. 


Conduct  of  Fire  175 

n.  In  the  absence  of  express  directions  from 
Hie  major,  if  commanding  a  flank  company, 
determines  when  advances  by  rushes  shall  be 
attempted. 

o.   Indicates  size  of  fractions  to  rush. 
.  •  p.   Leads  a  rush  by  the  entire  company. 

q.   Leads  the  charge, 

r.  When  necessary,  designates  new  platoon 
leaders  and  sees  that  new  squads  are  organized 
and  new  leaders  designated  to  replace  those 
disabled. 

s.  Must  understand  all  signals  and  sema- 
phore code. 

Buglers 

The  captain  divides  the  following  duties 
between  the  two  buglers : 

a.  Join  the  captain  when  the  comp.uiv 
deploys.    (Both) 

b.  Watch  platoon  leaders  for  signals. 

c.  Transmit  signals  to  platoon  leaders. 

d.  W^•lt^h  the  major  for  signals  and  repeal 
them   back. 

e.  'J'ransmit  information  to  the  major. 

f.  Act  as  messenger. 

g.  Repeat  bugle  signal  "Charge."    (Both) 

h.  Must  understand  all  signals,  semaphore. 
Mild  International  codes. 


I'yC  Battle  Pire  Training 

"  Range  Estimators 

Range  estimators,  as  we  have  seen,  are 
trained  in  the  several  methods  of  determining 
range.  They  may  or  may  not  be  assembled 
when  making  their  estimates.  In  either  case 
they  transmit  the  result  of  their  individual  esti- 
mates to  the  first  sergeant  either  by  signal  or 
verbally.  Having  once  been  given  the  target 
they  should  be  prepared  at  any  time  to 
announce  their  estimate  of  the  distance  thereto. 

First  Sergeant 
Duties  : 

a.  Joins  the  captain  when  the  company 
deploys. 

b.  Observes  the  enemy. 

c.  Observes  the  target. 

d.  Observes  fire  effect. 

e.  Observes  firing  line  and  progress  of  events. 

f.  Averages  estimates  of  estimators. 

g.  Keeps  check  on  range. 

h.  Keeps  copies  of  all  orders,  messages,  and 
other  data  necessary  for  rendering  proper 
reports. 

i.  Must  understand  all  signals  and  semaphore 
code. 

The  Platoon  Leader 

In  action  the  platoon  leader  is  where  he  can 
best  control  his  platoon,  observe  the  target  and 


Conduct  of  Fire  177 

Hrc  cifect,  and  observe  the  company  commander 
for  signals  or  commands. 

Duties: 

1.  Receives  liis  orders  from  the  company 
commander, 

2.  If  necessary,  may  indicate  tlie  fire  posi- 
tion that  has  been  ordered. 

.*i.   Announces  sight  setting. 

•i.  Points  out  designated  target  to  his  pla- 
toon, if  practicable,  otherwise  to  his  corporals 
only. 

5.  When  the  target  cannot  be  seen  indicates 
an  aiming  target. 

6.  Assigns  targets  so  as  to  insure  that  the 
entire  front  or  sector  given  him  by  the  company 
commander  will  be  covered  with  fire. 

7.  (lives  class  of  fire. 

8.  Amiomiees  I'ati'  of  fire. 

9.  If  commaiKJiiig  a  flank  platoon,  dciails  a 
man  to  watch  for  signals  from  the  combat 
patrols. 

10.  When  his  platoon  is  ready  to  open  fire, 
signals  "I  am  ready." 

11.  Repeats  captain's  signal  to  connnence 
firing  to  the  corporals. 


178  Battle  Fire  Training 

12.  Observes  fire  effect. 

13.  When  platoon  is  not  firing,  provides  for 
constant  observation  for  movements  of  the 
enemy. 

14.  Changes  sight  setting  of  his  platoon 
when  necessary. 

,15.  Regulates  rate  of  fire. 

16.  Increases  rate  of  fire  when  large  and 
distinct  targets  appear  and  decreases  it  when 
the  target  becomes  small  and  indistinct. 

17.  Prevents  decrease  in  rate  of  fire  when: 

a.  Changing  sight  setting. 

b.  Preparing  for  rushes.. 

c.  Fixing  bayonets. 

d.  Transmitting  firing  data. 

e.  Distributing  ammunition. 

18.  Increases  rate  of  fire  to  cover  advances 
of  adjoining  units. 

19.  Sees  that  the  fire  from  the  flanks  of  his 
platoon  does  not  endanger  a  rushing  unit. 

20.  Is  on  the  alert  for  signals  from  the  cap- 
tain ;  for  this  purpose  he  may  use  his  platoon 
guide,  but  it  is  preferable  to  detail  a  private 
for  this  purpose.     See  Communication. 

21.  Must  understand  all  signals  and  sema- 
phore code. 

22.  Leads  his  platoon  in  advancing  and 
charging. 

23.  Prevents  changing  fire  to  unauthorized 
targets. 


CoiuJuct  of  Fire  1T9 

24.  Insures  dishihulion  i»f  animunilion  from 
vv.iv  and  from  ckad  and  wounded. 

25.  In  coming  up  with  rcL-nforcements,  he 
takes  over  the  duties  of  disahled  phitoon  leaders 
of  the  platoon  which  lie  joins,  or  if  some  other 
section  of  the  line  needs  his  services  he  goes 
there. 

26.  Endeavors  to  preserve  the  integrity,  of 
the  squads  by  designating  leaders  to  replace 
those  lost,  and  placing  each  man  in  a  squad. 

27.  Causes  his  platoon  to  rush  with  a  mini- 
mum loss  of  time  after  suspending  fire,  and  to 
open  fire  immediately  upon  halting  or  after  a 
minimum  of  time  for  fixing  sights. 

28.  In  "Advancing  by  thin  lines,"  leads  odd 
numbered  line. 

29.  If  platoon  is  leading  unit  in  a  rush,  must 
select  ])oint  of  terminating  such,  with  a  view  to 
its  use  as  a  jww  firing  position  for  (■oiHj)aiiv  or 
battalion. 

Platoon  GuinKS 

Behind  the  firing  line  the  platoon  guides  arc 
on  the  loft  of  the  platoon  leader,  advancing 
"By  thin  lines"  leading  even  numbered  lines. 

Duties: 

1.  The  platoon  leaders'  assistant;  mav  bo 
assigned  any  duty  under  him. 

2.  Keeps  adjoining  units  under  observation, 
particularly  those  having  the  same  target. 


180  Battle  Fire  Training 

3.  Watches  firing  line. 

4.  Checks  every  breach  of  fire  disciph'ne. 

5.  Prevents  skulking  of  men  leaving  the 
ranks  to  care  for  the  wounded. 

6.  Insures  prompt  and  orderly  advance. 

7.  On  joining  firing  line  from  support  takes 
over  duties  of  disabled  sergeants. 

8.  If  the  platoon  leader  is  disabled,  he  takes 
over  his  duties,  hence  he  should  be  in  touch  with 
the  progress  of  events  and  understand  the  mis- 
sion of  the  platoon  commander  and  his  plans 
for  accomplishing  it. 

9.  Assists  the  platoon  leader  in  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  the  squads. 

10.  If  called  out  of  line  to  act  as  platoon 
leader,  notifies  senior  corporal. 

11.  Must  understand  all  signals  and  sema- 
phore code. 

CORPORAIi 

When  marching  as  skirmishers  the  corporal 
is  the  center  skirmisher  of  his  squad,  when  the 
line  is  halted  he  is  immediately  in  rear  of  his 
squad.  While  this  latter  position  is  not  yet  defi- 
nitely prescribed  it  is  so  obviously  the  correct 
one  that  We  may  expect  it  to  receive  definite 
authorization  in  a  short  time. 

Duties: 

1.  Receives  his  instructions  from  the  platoon 
leader. 


Conduct  of  Fire  181 

2.  Points  out  indicated  objective  to  his 
scjuad. 

3.  Takes  as  his  target  tliat  portion  of  the 
platoon  target  wliicli  corresponds  to  the  posi- 
tion of  his  squad  iti  the  platoon. 

4.  Announces  sight  setting  and  sees  that  it 
is  set  correctly  by  each  man. 

5.  Announces  class  and  rate  of  fire. 

6.  When  his  squad  is  ready  to  open  fire  sig- 
nals "I  am  ready." 

7.  Makes  all  fire  carefully. 

8.  Makes  all  use  ordered  rate  of  fire. 

9.  Insures  that  his  squad  fires  at  the  desig- 
nated objective. 

10.  Prevents  slighting  of  invisible  portions 
of  the  target  for  more  visible  parts. 

11.  Prevents  men  from  changing  to  unau- 
thorized targets. 

12.  Maintains  constant  observation  to  the 
front;  when  the  squad  is  firing,  for  fire  effect — 
wlicn  squad  is  not  firing,  for  movements  of  the 
enemy. 

13.  Insures  prompt  obedience  to  orders  to 
suspend  and  cease  firing. 

14.  Causes  men  to  utilize  full  effect  of 
ground  as  cover. 

15.  Sees  that  the  fire  of  his  squad  does  not 
fall  off  when:  changing  sight  settings;  pre- 
paring for  rushes;  fixing  bayonets;  transmit- 
ting fire  data;    and  distributing  ammunition. 


182  Battle  Fire  Training 

16.  Prevents  increase  of  vulnerability  in 
squad  when  preparing  for  a  rush,  rushes  as  soon 
after  cease  firing  as  possible,  and  opens  fire 
after  rush  with  greatest  possible  celerity. 

17.  Increases  the  rate  of  fire  in  his  squad 
when  other  units  which  have  the  same  target 
are  rushing. 

18.  In  rushing  causes  all  men  to  spring  to 
their  feet  to  run  at  full  speed,  all  men  drop  to 
the  ground  at  the  same  time,  and  those  who  are 
in  rear  to  crawl  up  to  the  line. 

19.  When  reenforcing  he  takes  over  the 
duties  of  disabled  squad  leaders,  moving  to  the 
right  or  left  if  this  is  necessary.  If  there  are 
no  vacancies  he  enters  the  line  and  assists  the 
squad  leaders  in  his  vicinity. 

20.  Prevents  waste  of  ammunition. 

21.  Prevents  use  without  orders  of  30  rounds 
of  ammunition  in  right  pocket  section  of  belt. 

22.  Distributes  extra  ammunition  received 
from  all  sources. 

23.  Looks  to  the  rear  only  when  the  platoon 
leader  calls  him  with  his  whistle. 

24.  Adds  the  fire  of  his  rifle  to  his  squad  only 
when  control  is  lost  at  the  shorter  ranges  or  ho 
is  ordered  in  by  the  platoon  commander  to 
increase  fire  effect  at  latter  stages. 

25.  To  control  his  squad  he  rolls  along 
behind  the  line  and  keeps  down. 


Conduct  of  Fire  188 

26.  Takes  advantage  of  every  opportunity 
to  reorganize  his  squad  and  increase  his  control. 

27.  Checks  ever}'  hreac}i  of  fire  discipline, 
abates  excitement,  and  prevents  men  from  going 
to  the  rear  for  any  purpose. 

28.  If  called  out  of  line  to  act  as  guide,  noti- 
fies private  designated  to  act  in  his  place.  His 
entire  squad  is  informed  of  this  designation. 

29.  Leads  his  squad  in  moving  to  front  or 
rear.  If  squad  is  leading  unit  in  a  rush  selects 
halting  point  with  a  view  to  its  use  as  a  new 
firing  position. 

JJO.  Must  know  all  signals  and  semaphore 
code  and  have  a  good  practical  knowledge  of 
tlie  theory  of  fire. 

31.  In  rushing,  prevents  his  squad  from 
blanketing  fire  of  units  in  rear  and  sees  that  his 
fire  docs  not  endanger  other  units. 

The  Private 

When  possible  each  enlisted  man  should  be 
thoroughly'  trained  in  the  duties  of  the  next 
higher  grade.  A  squad  of  8  corporals  is  more 
efficient  than  a  squad  of  one  corporal  and  7 
privates. 

The  individual  soldier  must  he  trained: — 

1.  To  quickly  recognize  targets  from  de- 
scription. 

2.  To  describe  and  define  targets. 


184  Battle  Fire  Training 

3.  To  use  rear  sight  in  describing  targets. 

4.  To  use  systems  of  target  designations 
given  herein  either  singly  or  in  combination. 

5.  To  set  sights  quickly  and  accurately  as 
ordered. 

6.  To  aim  carefully  and  deliberately  from 
habit  and  to  reload  quickly. 

7.  To  fire  at  the  ordered  rate. 

8.  To  fire  at  his  proper  place  on  the  target 
as  determined  by  correct  distribution. 

9.  Not  to  change  his  fire  from  designated 
target  unless  ordered. 

10.  Not  to  slight  invisible  parts  of  target. 

11.  To  maintain  constant  observation  to  the 
front. 

12.  To  utilize  accidents  of  ground  as  cover. 

13.  To  select  firing  positions. 

14.  To  fire  from  all  positions,  from  behind 
hillocks,  trees,  etc.,  ditches,  doorways,  windows, 
etc. 

15.  To  obey  orders  immediately  to  suspend 
and  cease  firing. 

16.  To  ignore  all  whistle  signals  except  sus- 
pend firing. 

17.  To  watch  closely  for  reappearance  of 
expected  target  after  a  suspension  of  fire. 

18.  To  obey  promptly  all  orders  from  his 
squad  leader. 


Conduct  of  Fire  185 

19.  When  rcenforcing  in  the  intervals  be- 
tween skirmishers  to  obey  the  orders  of  the 
nearest  corporal. 

20.  To  transmit  firing  data  rapidly  and 
accurately  without  decreasing  his  rate  of  fire. 

21.  To  call  for  range  and  target  when  reen- 
forcing. 

22.  To  have  confidence  in  his  ability  to  hit. 

23.  Set  sights,  fix  bayonets  without  delay, 
and  by  a  system  to  avoid  decrease  of  volume 
of  fire  in  the  unit. 

24.  To  prepare  for  rushes  with  the  niiniiiunn 
loss  of  fire. 

25.  To  rush  as  described  under  18,  The  Cor- 
poral. 

26.  To  avoid  bunching  in  rushes. 

27.  To  make  his  rush  directly  to  the  front 
so  as  not  to  blanki't   fii-c. 

28.  To  remain  with  his  company  but  if  acci- 
dentally detached  from  company  or  squad  to 
join  the  nearest  one. 

29.  To  maintain  silence  except  when  trans- 
mitting data  and  charging. 

30.  To  retain  presence  of  mind. 

31.  Not  to  waste  ammunition. 

32.  To  use  his  reserve  30  rounds  only  u{)on 
the  order  of  an  officer. 

33.  To  remain  with  the  tiring  line,  after 
bringing  up  ammunition. 


186  Battle  Fire  Training 

34.  Never  attempt  to  attend  to  dead  or 
wounded  in  action. 

35.  To  have  confidence  in  his  ability  w^ith 
the  bayonet. 

36.  To  have  a  firm  determination  and  desire 
to  close  with  the  enemy. 

37.  To  preserve  the  line  in  charging. 

38.  To  understand  that  the  charge  should 
be  slow  and  steady. 

39.  To  form  immediately  after  the  charge 
and  take  up  pursuing  fire. 

40.  To  recognize  service  targets. 

41.  To  count  distant  groups  of  objects  or 
beings. 

42.  To  understand  that  it  is  suicidal  to  turn 
his  back  to  an  enemy,  if  he  cannot  advance  to 
dig  in  and  wait  for  darkness  while  holding  his 
position. 

43.  Never  to  fire  until  he  understands 

WHAT    the    target    IS,    AT   WHAT    PART    HE    IS    TO 
FIRE,   AND   WITH   WHAT    SIGHT   SETTING. 


The  following  problems  are  given  in  the  hope 
that  they  will  serve  as  guides  or  examples  in 
framing  combat  drill  problems.  They  -were 
drawn  to  fit  a  particular  piece  of  terrain.  It 
is  hardly  probable  that  ground  will  be  found 
wiiich  will  permit  of  their  application  without 
modification,  however,  if  the  general  idea  is  car- 
ried out,  much  excellent  training  will  result. 


Conduct  of  Fire  187 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  number  of  com- 
panies deployed  in  the  problems,  three  in  attack 
and  two  in  defense,  is  the  reverse  of  the  usual 
procedure.  The  method  followed  was  adopted 
with  the  idea  that  it  would  better  illustrate  cer- 
tain features  of  training  and  is  not  intended 
to  suggest,  in  any  way,  a  change  in  the  form  of 
deployment  recommended  by  the  Infantry  Drill 
Hcgtdations. 

Battalion  Exercise — In  Attack 
(Time:    about  1^4^  hours) 

In  the  following  problem  the  advance  to  near 
the  initial  firing  position  is  simulated,  and  the 
order  for  the  movement  is  not  given  to  the  com- 
mander until  the  battalion  is  deployed  in  the 
selected  position.  This  is  done  in  order  to 
eliminate  features  which  do  not  relate  directly 
to  the  fire  of  the  unit,  and  to  save  time.  It  is 
perfectl}'  feasible,  of  course,  to  include  the 
entire  advance  in  the  attack,  or  to  begin  tlie 
attack  at  any  point,  the  stage  being  set  accord- 
ingly. It  is  desirable,  as  this  is  a  terrain 
exercise,  that  the  situation  and  orders  for  the 
commander  be  withheld  until  his  unit  is  deployed 
upon  tile  ground  and  everything  ready  to  begin 
the  action. 
Object: 

To  train  the  battalion  in  the  details  of  the 

attack. 


188  Battle  Fire  Training 

Situation: 

The  battalion  is  assumed  to  be  the  center 
of  the  regiment  deployed  in  attack. 

After  a  simulated  advance,  during  which 
time  the  reference  point  or  the  direction  of 
advance  has  been  known  but  the  target  has 
been  invisible,  it  arrives  at  a  position,  from 
which  the  target  is  visible.  There  are  three 
companies  deployed  in  the  first  line  and  one 
in  support.  The  supporting  company  is  a 
suitable  distance  to  the  rear  in  platoon  col- 
umns. The  scouts  are  out  some  distance  to 
the  front.  In  this  position  the  firing  line  is 
receiving  some  fire,  but  while  prone  is  well 
coverpd  by  a  rise  in  the  ground  to  its  imme- 
diate front.  The  line  occupied 'by  the  scouts 
should  be  chosen  so  that  a  correct  solution 
of  the  problem  requires  an  advance  to  that 
point  before  fire  is  opened  and  the  features 
of  the  ground,  either  real  or  imaginary, 
make  such  an  advance  possible.  All  orders 
should  be  given  to  the  battalion  commander 
ty  the  director  in  person. 

Each  soldier  on  the  firing  line  carries  5 
rounds  of  blank  ammunition  in  the  belt.  The 
supporting  company  carries  20  rounds  of 
blank  ammunition  per  man  in  bell  and  60  in 
bandoleers.  It  is  assumed  that  the  battalion 
is  equipped  with  a  range  finder. 


Conduct  of  Fire  189 

Tiirgets : 

Tlie  targets  should  extend  beyond  both 
flanks  of  the  front  assigned  to  the  battalion. 
They  may  be  the  ordinary  cardboard  silhou- 
ettes, some  of  the  prone  figures  and  some  of 
the  kneeling.  An  irregular  arrangement  of 
these  figures  will  give  the  appearance  of  a 
line  occupied  with  intervals,  and  will  afford 
an  excellent  opportunity  to  test  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  companies.  When  using  the  sil- 
houettes, however,  unless  a  particularly 
favorable  piece  of  ground  is  available,  they 
will  probably  become  visible  to  the  attack 
before  it  is  desired  that  they  should.  Thus 
opportunities  will  be  afforded  for  obtaining 
information  and  making  adjustments  which 
are  not  contemplated  in  the  problem.  The 
most  desirable  target  consists  of  a  cooperat- 
ing battalion,  under  cover  at  the  desired 
point,  or  moved  forward  to  it  from  a  con- 
cealed position  at  the  proper  time.  If  the 
men  composing  the  target  are  allowed  to  rest 
by  assuming  at  will  a  kneeling,  sitting,  or 
prone  position  the  irregular  appearance 
spoken  of  above  will  be  produced. 

As  it  is  desirable  to  furnish  the  attacking 
battalion  with  a  target  at  least  visible  in 
part,  the  posture  and  arrangement  of  the 
figures  or  men  composing  it,  will  depend  upon 


190  Battle  Fire  Training 

the  amount  of  cover  at  the  selected  position 
with  some  regard  to  an  assumed  necessity 
for  a  free  field  of  fire. 

First  Phase 

Action: 

After  the  battalion  has  been  placed  as 
indicated  above,  the  problem  is  handed  the 
battalion  commander  and  he  is  given  time 
•to  study  it.  Meanwhile,  the  situation  is  being 
explained  to  the  companies.  When  this  is 
accomplished  the  targets  appear  and  it  is 
assumed  that  fire  is  being  received.  There- 
after dangerous  grouping  and  undue  expo- 
sure is  penalized  by  "killing"  the  offenders. 
About  30%  to  40%  of  casualties  should  be 
assessed  during  the  exercise  to  test  the 
arrangements  for  succession  of  command. 

The  problem  should  include: 

(a)  A  description  of  the  tactical  situation. 
This  should  demand  an  attack. 

(b)  The  direction  of  advance. 

(c)  The  width  of  the  battalion  target. 

(d)  The  character  of  the  position  occupied 
by  the  scouts,  if  such  is  not  plainly  discernable. 

(e)  The  character  of  the  fire  received  at 
initial  position.  This  should  be  designed  to 
demand  an  advance  by  thin  lines. 


Conduct  of  Fire  191 

(f)  A  requirement  for  the  battalion  com- 
mander to  proceed  with  the  exercise  under  the 
orders  received. 

Second  Phase 

After  simulated  fire  has  oeen  opened  and 
continued  a  sufficient  length  of  time  to  permit 
of  determining  the  character  of  fire  direction, 
control,  and  discipline,  the  battalion  commander 
is  directed  to  begin  the  advance  by  rushes.  This 
phase  is  continued  until  ample  opportunity  is 
afforded  the  umpires  for  observation  of  the 
conduct  of  fire  throughout  the  battalion. 
Third  Phase 

When  the  advance  by  rushes,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  director,  has  progressed  sufficiently,  the 
battalion  commander  is  directed  to  reenforce, 
with  the  fourth  company,  in  the  intervals 
between  skirmishers.  Fire  is  then  opened  b}' 
the  firing  line  with  blank  cartridges.  It  should 
reach  its  maximum  volume  as  the  supports  join 
the  line.  This  phase  is  continued  until  extra 
ammunition  is  distributed,  and  at  least  one  rush 
made  by  the  battalion  to  test  the  ability  to 
control  the  reenforcements  absorbed  in  the  line. 
Bayonets  are  fixed  during  the  completion  of 
the  last  rush.* 


*Note:  Tn  order  that  the  fiO  rounds  of  ainniunitioTi 
suggested  may  lie  sufficient  for  this  exercise,  the  rush 
after  recnforceinent  should  be  bj'  company,  and  should 
be  started  promptly  and  be  continued  as  rapidly  as 
possible.  Preliminary  practice  in  this  particular  will 
indicate  what  is  desirable. 


192  Battle  Fire  Training 

Fourth  Phase 

Before  the  supply  of  blank  ammunition  is 
exhausted,  the  "charge"  should  be  sounded. 
The  point  from  which  the  charge  is  launched 
should  not  be  the  conventional  200  yards,  so 
that  the  battalion  may  be  tested,  without  pre- 
vious warning,  as  to  its  ability  to  cease  firing 
promptly,  and  immediately  move  forward, 
smoothly,  as  a  unit.  The  exercise  may  be  ter- 
minated with  the  charge,  or  the  battalion  may 
be  again  halted  and  pursuing  fire  opened  until 
the  remaining  ammunition  is  expended. 

The  following  qre  suggested  as  among  the 
most  important  details  which  the  director  and 
his  assistant  should  have  in  mind  during  the 
exercise : — Each  officer  acting  as  umpire  should 
have  these  points,  and  others  thought  neces- 
sary, arranged  in  a  systematic  manner  in  his 
notebook.  If  this  is  not  done  it  will  be  found 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  exercise  that  the 
umpiring  in  the  several  companies  has  pro- 
ceeded along  quite  different  lines.  It  is 
desirable,  of  course,  to  retain  as  much  of  the 
competitive  feature  as  possible,  and  for  this 
reason  a  uniform  system  of  checking  is  neces- 
sary. In  addition,  if  some  such  method  is  not 
adopted,  many  points  will  be  overlooked  in  the 
confusion  and  rush  of  the  problem.  The 
critique  following  the  exercise  is  a  most  impor- 


Conduct  of  Fire  193 

taut  feature.  A  comprehensive  critique  can- 
not be  held  unless  the  umpiring  is  complete  and 
uniform.  The  director  in  charge  should  be 
with  the  battalion  commander,  and -there  should 
be  at  least  one  umpire  with  each  company. 

First  Phase 

Battalion  Commander: 

1.  Did  he  have  a  definite  idea  of  what  he 
wanted  to  do,  and  did  his  order  express  clearly 
that  idea.'' 

2.  Did  he  describe  the  battalion  target 
clearl}'  and  correctly.'' 

3.  Was  he  able  to  give  his  order  promptly, 
and  without  dangerous  grouping  and  unneces- 
sarv  exposure.'' 

4'.   Did  he  issue  orders  to  the  support? 

5.  Did  he  designate  the  initial  firing  position? 

6.  Did  ho  allow  sufficient  time  to  the  com- 
panies for  obtaining  and  disseminating  initial 
firing  data? 

7.  Did  the  battalion  move  forward,  and  open 
fire,  as  a  unit? 

8.  Did  he  order  an  advance  by  thin  lines? 
Companies : 

1.  1,  2,  3,  above,  as  applied  to  a  company. 

2.  Was  there  a  satisfactory  system  in  the 
company  for  obtaining  and  disseminating  ini- 
tial firing  data? 


194  Battle  Fire  Training 

3.  Was  the  company  target  described  clearly 
and  correctly  by  the  platoon  commanders, 
guides,  and  corporals? 

4.  Was  the  advance  by  thin  lines  correctly 
made,  and  were  there  sufficient  subordinate 
commanders  with  the  first  line  to  insure  against 
premature  opening  of  fire? 

5.  Were  combined  sights  desirable?  If  so, 
were  they  used? 

Second  Phase 
Battalion  Commander: 

1.  Was  the  first  rush  started  when  he  desired, 
and  by  the  designated  unit? 

2.  Was  he  able  to  change  the  size  of  the 
rushing  unit,  change  the  rushes  from  the  right 
to  the  left  flank,  and  make  a  slight  change  in 
the  direction  of  the  advance?  Was  this  done 
by  means  of  signals  and  without  confusion? 

3.  Was  he  in  a  correct  position? 
Companies : 

1.  Same  as  1  above. 

2.  Were  the  rushes  correctly  made,  to  include 
opening  of  fire  at  the  conclusion? 

3.  Did  the  unit  inaugurating  the  rush  select 
for  its  halting  place  a  point  suitable  for  a  fire 
position  for  the  battalion? 

4.  Was  the  target  properly  covered  during 
rushes:  i.  e.,  was  the  fire  withdrawn  by  the 
rushing  unit  replaced  by  increase  of  fire  in 
adjacent  units  having  the  same  target? 


Conduct  of  Fire  195 

5.  Did  the  supporting  company  follow  in 
correct  formation  at  a  suitable  distance,  taking 
advantage  of  cover? 

Third  Phase 
Battalion  Commander: 

1.  Was  he  able  to  place  the  supporting  com- 
pany in  the  line  promptly  and  without  confu- 
sion ? 

2.  Did  he  himself  then  join  the  line? 

3.  Was  he  able  to  cause  bayonets  to  be  fixed 
promptly? 

Companies: 

1.  Was  the  firing  data  asked  for  and  received 
by  the  support,  including  officers  and  noncom- 
missioned officers? 

2.  Were  new  squads  formed,  and  did  sup- 
porting leaders  take  over  the  duties  of  those 
lost  through  casualties? 

3.  Was  ammunition  promptly  and  evenly 
distributed? 

Fourth  Phase 
Battalion  Commander: 

1.  Was  he  able  to  cause  a  prompt  cessation 
of  fire  followed  immcdiatdy  by  an  even,  simul- 
taneous, and  spirited  charge? 

2.  Did  he  lead  the  charge? 
Companies : 

1.  Did  all  the  officers  cooperate  to  produco 
the  greatest  possible  cohesion  in  the  charge? 


196  Battle  Fire  Training 

In  General 

1.  Was  the  battalion  target  covered? 

2.  Were  the  company  targets  covered? 

3.  Was  the  fire  in  the  correct  sector  at  all 
times? 

4.  Was  the  direction  line  of  attack  adhered 
to? 

5.  Was  there  an  interruption  of  fire  while : 

(a)  Changing  sight  setting? 

(b)  Fixing  bayonets? 

(c)  Transmitting  fire  data  to  supports? 

(d)  Distributing  ammunition? 

6.  Was  the  rate  of  fire  correct  at  the  various 
ranges  ? 

7.  Was  the  initial  range  correct,  and  was 
the  range  finder  used  to  the  best  advantage 
throughout  the  action? 

8.  Were  the  ranges  harmonized,  throughout 
the  action,  in  the  company  and  by  the  battalion 
commander? 

9.  During  rushes,  were  the  sight  settings 
changed  and  was  there  a  system  in  the  com- 
panies for  maintaining  the  range  during  the 
advance? 

10.  Was  the  system  of  communication 
throughout  the  battalion  capable  of  transmit- 
ting information  at  all  times  without  delays  due 
to  inattention  or  faulty  arrangements  and  were 
signals  used  when  under  service  conditions  the 
voice  would  have  been  inadequate? 


Conduct  of  Fire  197 

11.  Were  there  proper  arrangements  for 
succession  of  command? 

12.  Did  tlie  battalion  staff  occupy  its  proper 
position,  and  function  correctly.'' 

13.  Did  the  musicians  and  first  sergeant 
assist  the  captain,  and  the  platoon  guides  the 
platoon  commander.'' 

14.  Did  the  platoon  commanders  exercise 
proper  fire  control.'' 

15.  Did  the  squad  leader-s  control  and  com- 
mand their  squads. f* 

16.  Was  there  unnecessary  exposure.? 

17.  Did  the  men  aim  carefully  and  deliber- 
ately, and  load  quickly.'' 

18.  Were  there  at  any  time,  confusion,  loss 
of  control,  or  avoidable  delays.'' 

The  following  is  offered  as  one  of  several 
satisfactory  solutions  of  the  foregoing  exercise : 

After  a  study  of  his  order  the  battalion 
commander  estimates  the  situation  and  arrives 
at  a  decision.  (This  must  be  to  attack,  under 
the  terms  of  the  probhnn.)  He  then  moves  for- 
ward to  a  point  just  in  rear  of  the  crest  which 
is  protecting  his  firing  line,  accompanied  by  the 
adjutant  and  the  sergeant  major,  the  latter 
carrying  the  battalion  range  finder.  The  com- 
pany commanders  at  the  same  time  being  sig- 
naled to  join  him.  Upon  being  assembled  the 
battalion    commander    says :     "Do    you    under- 


198  Battle  Fire  Training 

stand  the  conditions  of  the  problem?  The 
battalion  will  attack  upon  its  present  front. 
Company  'D'  in  support  will  follow  in  rear  of 
the  center  at  400  yards.  Signal  me  when  firing 
data  has  been  transmitted  and  you  are  ready  to 
advance;  then  at  my  signal  move  forward  in 
thin  lines,  to  the  line  now  occupied  by  the 
scouts.  Signal  me  from  that  line  when  you  are 
ready  to  fire,  but  await  my  order  to  commence." 
He  then  moves  forward  cautiously  to  the  crest, 
accompanied  by  the  company  commanders 
and  adjutant.  Upon  reaching  the  hill  top  the 
sergeant  major,  who  in  the  meantime  had  been 
taking  the  range,  says :  "Range  to  hostile  line 
at  12  o'clock  1100."  The  battalion  commander 
continues :  "Reference  point  ...  at  ...  o'clock. 
Range  1100.  Target  four  sights  right  and  five 
left.  Divide  the  target."  The  captains,  begin- 
ning with  the  commander  of  the  base  company, 
after  studying  the  front  with  their  glasses, 
define  their  targets  thus : 

"Company  'A'  begins  four  sights  right  at 
edge  of  hill,  extends  three  sights  left  to  fence 
post." 

"Company  'B'  begins  one  sight  right  at  fence 
post,  extends  three  sights  left  to  small  bush." 

"Company  'C  begins  two  sights  left  at  small 
bush,  extends  three  sights  left,  no  mark." 

These  limits  are  verified  by  the  battalion 
commander  as  they  are  being  made.     If  satis- 


Conduct  of  Fire  199 

ficd,  he  continues:  "Correct.  Any  questions? 
(There  being  none)  I  will  be  between  the  firing 
line  and  the  support.  Posts."  He  then  directs 
the  adjutant:  "When  the  firing  line  advances, 
signal  the  support  forward.  Wait  here  and 
give  the  support  the  order,  thert  join  me." 

A  Company  Commander 
At  the  command  "Posts"  the  company  com- 
mander places  himself  at  the  crest  line  in  front 
of  his  company,  requiring  the  first  sergeant, 
platoon  commanders,  and  duty  sergeants  to 
join  him.  He  says:  "You  all  understand  the 
problem.''  The  battalion  attacks  in  its  present 
order,  moving  in  thin  lines  to  the  line  now  occu- 
pied by  the  scouts.  Fire  will  be  opened  from 
that  line  at  my  signal.  Firing  data  here.  Sig- 
nal me  when  you  are  ready  to  advance.  Refer- 
ence point.  ...  at  ....  o'clock.  Range  1100. 
Target:  Begins  four  sights  right  at  edge  of 
hill,  extends  three  sights  left  to  fence  post. 
Divide  target."  The  platoon  commanders  here- 
upon divide  the  target  as  described  above  for 
company  commanders.  They  and  the  sergeants 
using  their  glasses  meanwhile  to  the  best  advan- 
tage. After  the  target  is  divided,  the  company 
commander  continues :  "Any  questions .'*  (There 
being  none)  Posts." 

The    company    commander    then    causes    the 
company  to  move  forward  to  a  position  imme- 


200  Battle  Fire  Training 

diately  in  rear  of  the  crest,  to  halt  and  lie  down. 
He  then  says :  "Designate  targets,"  or  some 
other  suitable  expression.  The  chiefs  of  pla- 
toons cause  their  squad  leaders  to  crawl  to  the 
crest,  and  divide  the  target  as  heretofore 
explained.  The  company  commander's  orders 
are  repeated  to  the  squad  leaders  and  they  are 
directed  to  transmit  the  data  to  the  men.  Each 
squad  leader  causes  his  squad  to  join  him  by 
crawling,  points  out  and  divides  the  target,  and 
assures  himself  that  all  the  men  understand.  He 
then  withdraws  his  squad  behind  the  crest  and 
repeats  the  company  commander's  order,  after 
which  he  signals  the  platoon  commander  "I  am 
ready."  The  platoon  commander,  when  his 
platoon  is  ready,  repeats  the  signal  to  the  com- 
pany commander.  The  company  commander 
similarly   signals   to   the  battalion  cotamander. 

The  first  sergeant  explains  the  situation  and 
orders  to  the  buglers. 

All  men  are  cautioned  not  to  expose  them- 
selves unnecessarily  on  the  crest,  and  to  with- 
draw a  few  paces  as  soon  as  they  have  received 
their  instructions. 

When  the  three  companies  are  ready,  the 
battalion  commander  signals :  "Forward,  by 
thin  lines,"  As  each  man  arrives  on  the  new 
line,  he  is  cautioned  by  the  nearest  noncommis- 
sioned   officer    to    locate    his    target    and    take 


Conduct  of  Fire  201 

cover.  As  the  squads  arc  formed,  the  corporals 
signal  as  before  indicated,  and  when  all  are 
ready,  the  battalion  commander  signals:  "Com- 
mence Firing." 

Further  details  on  conduct  of  fire  have  been 
included  in  previous  exercises. 

Discussion 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  designation  of  the 
l:ase  company  is  omitted  from  the  order.  This 
is  allowable  when  standing  orders  exist,  that  in 
the  absence  of  instructions,  the  right  company 
of  the  firing  line  is  the  base  company.  There  is 
no  division  of  the  target  by  the  battalion  com- 
mander for  it  is  assumed  that  a  prearranged 
plan' exists  for  dividing  it  equally  among  the 
companies  of  the  firing  line.  It  is  to  be  noted 
also,  that  the  battalion  commander  might  him- 
self have  indicated  the  limits  of  the  company 
targets  and  required  the  captains  to  check  as 
he  proceeded.  The  method  adopted,  however, 
is  thought  to  be  more  rapid  and  to  afford  more 
positive  assurance  that  the  target  is  fully  cov- 
ered. A  captain  receiving  information  from 
the  battalion  commander  might  think  he  under- 
stood thoroughly,  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
he  did  not.  As  the  battalion  connnander  fol- 
lows the  description  from  right  to  left,  he  can 
assure   himself  positively    that   no   part   of   his 


202  Battle  Fire  Training 

target  is  neglected.  He  can  not  otherwise  be 
certain  of  this,  unless  he  requires  the  captains 
to  repeat  back  his  description.  This  repetition 
would,  of  course,  increase  the  time  consumed. 

While  the  method  given  above  is  a  very  delib- 
erate opening  of  fire  it  will  be  found  that  the 
time  spent  in  this  manner,  unless  carried  to  an 
extreme,  will  be  fully  justified  by  results.  A 
careful  and  detailed  method  of  distributing  and 
dividing  targets  should  be  followed  whenever 
possible  and  should  only  be  omitted  when  the 
exigencies  of  the  service  make  it  imperative. 

The  advance  by  thin  lines  has  been  incor- 
porated in  the  exercise  for  it  is  believed  that 
this  formation  brings  out  more  clearly  than  any 
other  certain  features  of  the  attack  which  must 
not  be  neglected  in  instruction. 

In  the  gradual  building  up  of  a  firing  line 
close  to  the  enemy's  position  and  under  his  fire, 
as  is  done  by  thin  lines,  the  danger  of  a  prema- 
ture opening  of  fire  by  the  individual  soldier  is 
emphasized.  This  is  an  ever  pre.<ent  danger  in 
any  formation,  and  must  be  guarded  against. 
The  remedy  lies  in  a  high  class  of  fire  disci- 
pline; in  maintaining  with  the  advance  unit, 
whatever  its  form,  a  sufficient  number  of  leaders 
to  insure  strict  control;  and  in  certain  cases 
in  the  opening  of  fire  by  the  commander,  even 
thouffh   it   be   at   variance   with   his   order    for 


Conduct  of  Fire  203 

.ittack.  Of  these  remedies  the  first  two  are 
phiin,  the  third  requires  some  exphmation. 

The  thin  Hne  formation  again  comes  to  our 
aid,  for  it  lends  itself  readily  to  presenting 
situations  under  which  the  commander  would  be 
justified  in  departing  from  his  original  plan. 
If  the  battalion  in  the  exercise,  during  its 
advance  by  thin  lines,  suffers  such  losses  that 
the  lines  in  rear  cannot  be  moved  forward,  then, 
as  a  last  resort,  the  commander  might  order  the 
part  of  the  line  already  in  position  to  open  fire, 
and  under  cover  of  that  fire  assemble  his  unit  at 
the  advanced  position.  Similarly,  if,  for  any 
reason  during  the  advance  the  men  already  on 
the  line  show  signs  of  demoralization  it  might 
l)ccome  imperative  to  allow  them  to  "shoot  up 
their  pluck."  In  general  terms  then,  the  com- 
mander would  be  justified  in  departing  from 
his  original  plan  in  regard  to  fire,  .when  his  line 
has  reached  a  point  from  which  it  can  not 
advance  without  protection  of  its  own  fire,  or 
when,  due  to  severe  losses  or  other  causes,  the 
individual  soldiers  are  becoming  demoralized 
nnd  it  is  apparent  that  if  not  ordered  to  fire 
they  will  presently  do  so  of  their  own  accord. 

It  is  plain  from  the  above  that,  in  spite  of  all 
precautions,  when  within  a  reasonable  distance 
of  the  enemy  control  of  the  situation  may  be 
taken  from  the  commander  at  any  time  and  he 


204  Battle  Fire  Training 

be  forced  to  choose  between  opening  fire  before 
he  had  planned  or  a  demoralization  of  his  unit. 
A  little  thought  will  make  it  clear  that,  if  such 
conditions  exist,  little  or  nothing  can  be 
expected  in  the  way  of  target  distribution  and 
designation  at  that  time.  Fire  opened  under 
these  conditions  without  firing  data  will  be  wild, 
ineffectual,  and  demoralizing.  Knowing  the 
conditions,  then,  which  he  may  be  obliged  to 
face,  there  is  no  excuse  for  the  commander  per- 
mitting himself  to  be  drawn  into  a  position 
which  may  require  fire  and  be  unprepared  .to 
deliver  it.  He  must,  therefore,  seize  an  early 
opportunity  for  the  transmission  of  initial 
firing  data.  With  the  target  clearly  defined 
and  carefully  divided  he  is  prepared  for  eventu- 
alities, and  if  the  initiative  be  taken  from  him 
and  he  be  obliged  to  open  fire  against  his  will, 
then,  at  least,  he  will  have  done  all  that  lies  in 
his  power  to  lay  the  foundation  for  a  well- 
directed,  well-distributed,  and  hence  effective 
fire. 

Battalion  Exercise — In  Defense 
(Time:    about  50  minutes) 
Object: 

To   train  the  battalion  in   certain  details 
of  the  defensive. 
Situation: 

In  a  meeting  engagement  the  battalion  has 
taken  up  a  defensive  position  with  two  com- 


Conduct  of  Fire  205 

panics  in  tlic  firing  line  and  two  companies 
in  support.  The  supporting  companies  are 
occupying  a  position,  about  200  yards  in 
rear  of  the  firing  Hnc,  from  which  the  targets 
are  not  visible.  Other  troops  are  assumed 
to  be  on  the  right  and  left.  The  enemy  is 
expected  in  about  ten  minutes.  He  will 
attack.  The  battalion  is  equipped  with  one 
range  finder. 

Targets  : 

As  it  is  desired  that  the  targets  should 
appear  on  signal,  and  at  different  times  in  at 
least  two  parts  of  the  sector,  they  should 
be  furnished  by  cooperating  units.  If  a  large 
numher  gf  silhouette  targets  are  available 
and  arrangements  at  hand  for  manipulating 
thoin,  they  may  be  used.  The  target  should 
full}'  cover  the  battalion  sector  and  may  be 
extend'.'d  beyond  both  flanks.  It  should  con- 
sist of  from  300  to  400  figures  and  be  divided 
for  the  purpose  of  operation,  into  two  parts. 
Part  1,  the  smaller,  should  appear  on  signal, 
deployed;  advance  a  short  distance,  halt,  and 
open  fire.  Part  2,  should  ajjpear  in  column 
of  squads  or  platoon  columns,  advance  a 
short  distance,  deploy,  and  move  forward 
towards  the  line  occupied  by  Part  1.  If 
sufficient  fire  is  directed  on  Part  2,  it  should, 
at    signal,   halt,   open    fire,    and    advance   by 


206  Battle  Fire  Training 

rushes.  Any  other  similar  arrangement  and 
movement  will  do  as  well,  provided  it  causes 
the  target  to  appear  at  different  times  in  at 
least  two  parts  of  the  sector  and  presents  a 
dense  group  for  a  limited  period.  The  idea 
being,  that  by  a  special  arrangement  of  the 
figures,  certain  features  of  fire  direction,  con- 
trol, and  discipline  may  be  more  readil}' 
emphasized. 

The  foregoing  arrangement  is  intended  to 
indicate  that  Part  1  is  stopped  by  the  fire  of 
the  defense  and  must  await  reenforcements 
before  it  can  advance.  Part  2  is  intended  to 
represent  these  reenforcements  and  is  moved  so 
as  to  require  support  for  the  firing  line,  switch- 
ing of  fire,  and  an  increase  in  its  rate. 

Action:  First  Phase 

When  the  troops  have  been  placed  in  the 
position  as  indicated,  the  problem  is  handed  the 
battalion  commander.  He  is  allowed  a  rea- 
sonable time  in  which  to  estimate  the  situation 
and  arrive  at  a  decision.  Upon  his  statement 
that  he  is  ready  to  proceed,  time  is  taken.  Ten 
minutes  is  allowed  in  which  to  prepare  the  bat- 
talion for  action.  At  the  end  of  the  allotted 
time  Part  1  of  the  target  appears.  This  phase 
is  continued  a  sufficient  length  of  time  to  permit 
observation  of  the  action  taken,  and  such 
detailed  inspection  of  the  troops  as  is  desired. 


Conduct  of  Fire  207 

The  problem  should  include: 

1.  A  statement  of  the  situation  which  requires 
the  defensive. 

2.  Information  that  the  enemy  is  expected 
to  attack  in  ten  minutes. 

3.  A  statement  that  there  are  troops  on  both 
flanks. 

4.  An  order  to  occupy  the  selected  position 
in  the  desired  formation, 

5.  The  width  or  limits  of  the  sector  assigned 
to  the  battalion  for  defense. 

6.  An  order  that,  upon  signal  from  the  direc- 
tor, the  original  firing  line  will  cease  firing, 
move  to  the  rear,  and  be  considered  out  of  the 
exercise.  This,  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of 
the  problem.     (See  Third  Phase.) 

Second  Phase 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  first  phase.  Part  2 
of  the  target  is  signaled  to  appear.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  battalion  commander  will 
reenforce  at  the  appearance  of  the  second  part 
of  the  target.  If  this  is  not  done,  orders  should 
be  issued  requiring  it.  The  second  phase  is 
continued,  after  rciinforcements  reach  the  line, 
until  a  reasonable  period  has  been  allowed  for 
the  transmission  of  firing  data,  say  a  minute 
or  a  minute  and  a  half. 

In  order  that  the  battalion  may  be  tested  as 
to   its   methods   of  transmitting  data    to   com- 


208  Battle  Fire  Training 

panies  reenforcing  both  on  the  flank  and  in  the 
intervals,  one  company  should  be  placed  in  a 
position  on  the  flank  and  the  other  required  to 
reenforce  in  the  intervals  between  skirmishers. 
The  problem  is  drawn  with  the  idea  of  inviting 
this  method  of  reenforcing.  Incorrect  dispo- 
sitions by  the  battalion  commander,  if  they 
interfere  with  the  essential  elements  of  the  exer- 
cise, should  be  modified. 

Third  Phase 

After  the  time  allowed  for  the  transmission 
of  the  data  has  expired,  the  original  line,  upon 
intimation  from  the  director,  is  marched  to  the 
rear.  The  exercise  is  continued  until  the  sup- 
porting companies  have  been  inspected.*  This 
affords  a  means  of  determining  the  ability  of 
the  battalion  to  transmit  data  while  firing.* 

The  details  of  fire  direction,  control,  and 
discipline  may  be  examined  into  by  the  director 
and  his  assistants,  as  thoroughly  as  desired. 
Many  of  these  details  and  others,  have  been 
covered  in  the  previous  problem  and  will  not 
be   again   noted   here.      With   these   exceptions 


*Note:  Inspection  of  many  of  the  most  important 
phases  of  this  exercise  will  be  facilitated,  if  rests  are 
provided  for  the  rifles.  This  may  be  done  as  heretofore 
explained,  or  before  the  exercise  begins  the  battalion 
may  be  permitted  to  throw  up  a  small  parapet.  Later, 
if  it  is  desired  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  labor  per- 
formed, the  work  may  be  continued  to  include  the  com- 
plete trench. 


Conduct  of  Fire  209 

the  following  arc  some  of  the  more  important 
points : 

First  Phase 

Tiie  Battalion  Commander : 

1.  Was  he  able  to  meet  the  requirement  of 
prompt  action,  and  issue  his  order  without 
depriving  the  companies  of  the  time  necessary 
to  communicate  initial  firing  data? 

2.  In  his  desire  to  be  ready  did  he  omit  from 
his  order,  among  other  necessary  things :  state- 
ment wJiich  would  enable  the  command  to  grasp 
the  situation;  time  of  opening  fire;  definition 
and  division  of  sector,  etc.? 

3.  Did  he  see  that  ranges  were  taken  to 
prominent  objects  and  that  they  were  trans- 
mitted to  the  companies? 

4.  Did  he,  in  his  desire  to  coiriplete  the 
preparations,  assume  the  duties  of  his  subordi- 
nates or  instead  of  indicating  xchat  should  l)r 
df)ne  indicate  how  things  should  be  done? 

5.  If  his  order  provided  that  fire  should  be 
opened  upon  his  signal,  did  he  give  that  signal 
promptly,  upon  the  appearance  of  the  enemy? 

6.  Did  he  direct  the  fire  of  both  of  his  com- 
panies upon  Part  1  of  the  target?  If  so,  was 
he  able  to  do  this  by  signal?  (Part  1  appears 
in  the  sector  of  one  company  only.) 

7.  Did  he  select  the  best  available  position 
for  himself  and  staff? 


210  Battle  Fire  Training 

Companies: 

1.  Were  the  captains  able  to  complete  their 
preparations  in  the  allotted  time?  If  not,  whose 
fault  was  it? 

2.  Did  the  men  know  the  ranges  to  at  least 
two  prominent  objects? 

3.  Were  they  familiar  with  the  situation,  and 
did  tlicj  know  from  which  direction  to  expect 
the  enemy? 

4.  Was  there  constant  observation  for  signs 
of  the  enemy,  and  was  his  presence  made  known 
to  the  commander? 

5.  Was  every  possible  means  used  to  prevent 
exposure  of  the  position  while  preparing  for 
defense  and  afterwards? 

6.  Was  the  sector  properly  divided  between 
the  platoons  of  the  companies? 

7.  Was  fire  opened  promptly  and  with  cor- 
rect data? 

8.  Was  the  company,  which  was  directed  to 
open  fire  outside  of  its  sector  able  to  do  this  in 
a  reasonable  time  and  with  proper  adjustment? 

Sennnd  Phase 
Battalion  Commander: 

1.  When  Part  2  of  the  target  appeared,  did 
he  assure  himself  that  the  company  in  whose 
sector  it  advanced  opened  fire  upon  it? 

2.  In  the  absence  of  standing  orders  for 
reenforcing    companies,    did    he    designate    the 


Conduct  of  Fire  211 

target  for  the  company,  placed  on  the  flank, 
before  it  reached  the  line? 

3.  Was  the  greater  part  of  the  fire,  of  the 
supporting  companies  directed  upon  tlie  proper 
target?  i.  e.,  Part  2  (Part  1  being  licid  in  its 
position,  unable  to  advance). 

4,  Was  the  range  promptly  taken  to  both 
parts  of  the  target  when  they  appeared,  and 
promptly  transmitted  to  the  proper  companies? 
Companies : 

1.  When  Part  2  of  the  target  appearied,  did 
the  company  in  whose  sector  it  advanced,  turn 
its  fire  upon  it  with  increased  rate  and  without 
orders?  If  so,  was  it  able  to  do  this  promptly? 
Was  the  elevation  changed? 

2.  Did  the  supporting  companies  move 
quickly  and  in  correct  formations? 

3.  Did  the  supporting  companies  open  fire 
promptly? 

Third  Phase 
Battalion  Commander: 

1.  Was  he  able  to  move  the  original  firing 
line  to  the  rear  promptly  and  without  confu- 
sion? (This  feature  has,  of  course,  no  direct 
connection  with  the  tactics  of  the  occasion,  but 
furnishes  an  excellent  indication  of  the  charac- 
ter of  the  control  exercised  by  the  battalion 
commander.) 


212  Battle  Fire  Training 

Companies : 

1.  Did  the  supporting  companies  fire  at  the 
target  ordered  and  with  correct  elevations? 

In  General 

1.  Was  there  at  any  time  too  great  haste, 
loss  of  time,  or  confusion? 

2.  Was  there  any  firing  outside  the  assigned 
sectors  without  orders? 

3.  Were  verbal  orders  and  commands  given 
when  signals  should  have  been  used? 

4.  Were  the  changes  in  sight  settings  made 
in  conformity  \Vith  the  principles  laid  down  for 
defense? 

5.  Excluding  those  mentioned  above,  were 
the  requirements  of  fire  direction,  control,  and 
discipline  complied  with,  in  as  far  as  it  was 
intended  to  test  them  in  this  exercise? 

The  following  is  suggested  as  a  possible  solu- 
tion of  the  foregoing  exercise: 

When  the  battalion  commander  has  arrived 
at  his  decision,  he  announces  that  he  is  ready 
to  proceed  with  the  exercise.  He  immediately 
assembles  the  captains  of  the  companies  on  the 
first  line,  causing  them  to  move  at  a  double  time. 
While  they  are  assembling  he  directs  the  adju- 
tant :  "The  enemy  may  be  expected  in  ten  min- 
utes, troops  are  assumed  to  be  on  the  right 
and  left,  the  battalion  will  take  up  a  defensive 


Conduct  of  Fire  213 

position  here.  Our  sector  extends  from  ...  to 
....  Take  ranges  at  once."  To  the  sergeant 
major:  "Take  notes  of  my  order  as  I  give  it, 
and  when  completed  transmit  it  to  the  captains 
of  the  companies  of  the  second  line."  To  the 
orderly:  "Take  my  glasses,  keep  a  lookout  in 
that  direction  (pointing)  for  signs  of  the 
enemy."  When  the  officers  are  assembled  he 
states:  "The  enemy  is  expected  to  attack  within 
ten  minutes  from  that  direction  (pointing). 
Troops  are  assumed  to  be  on  our  right  and  left. 
The  battalion  assumes  the  defensive  in  its  pres- 
ent position.  A  and  B  companies,  firing  line; 
C  and  D  support.  Our  sector  begins  at  .  .  .  (Do 
you  all  see  it.'')  and  extends  to  .  .  .  (Do  you  all 
see  it.'')  .  .  .  marks  its  center.  (Do  you  all  see 
it.'')  Get  ranges  from  the  adjutant.  Open  fire 
at  my  signal."  The  commander,  in  order  to 
comply  with  instructions,  should  then  add: 
"To  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  problem, 
A  and  B  companies  will  at  my  signal  'To  the 
rear,'  given  at  any  time,  cease  firing,  and  move 
to  the  rear.  Their  participation  in  the  exer- 
cise terminates  at  that  time.  I  will  be  at  .... 
(pointing).  Any  questions.?  Posts."  The 
Ijattalion  commander  then  takes  his  position, 
and  while  the  companies  arc  preparing,  occupies 
liimself  by  observing  them,  and  a  study  of 
the  terrain.  When  the  adjutant  joins,  he  is 
Informed  of  the  order  issued. 


214  Battle  Fire  Training 

Company 
The  company  commander  joins  his  company, 
and  directs  the  first  sergeant  to  obtain  the 
ranges  from  the  adjutant.  These  are  trans- 
mitted to  the  platoon  commanders  as  soon  as 
obtained.  The  first  sergeant  draws  a  rough 
sketch  which  he  exhibits  to  the  platoon  com- 
manders. Later,  if  time  permits,  the  sketch 
should  be  copied.  After  his  order  to  the  first 
sergeant  the  company  commander  turns  to  the 
buglers  and  directs :  "Observe  in  that  direction 
(pointing)  for  signs  of  the  enemy."  If  condi- 
tions are  such  that  he  can  make  himself  heard 
throughout  the  company  from  his  position  in 
the  rear,  instructions  are  given  from  that  point. 
If  such  is  not  the  case,  the  platoon  commanders 
and  sergeants  must  be  assembled,  having  due 
regard  to  unnecessary  exposure.  The  company 
commander  then  states :  "The  enemy  is  expected 
to  attack  from  that  direction  (pointing)  in  .  .  . 
minutes."  Time  consumed  by  the  battalion 
commander  being  deducted.  "Other  troops  are 
assumed  to  be  on  our  right  and  left.  The  bat- 
talion assumes  the  defensive  here.  The  first  ser- 
geant will  give  ranges  to  the  platoon  command- 
ers. Our  sector  begins  at  ....  and  extends 
to  ....  Do  you  all  see  these  points .''  Open  fire 
at  my  signal.  The  battalion  commander  is  at 
.  .  .   (pointing).     The  regimental  commander  is 


Conduct  of  Fire  215 

at  ....  Any  questions.''  Divide  sector  simul- 
taneously."* If  circumstances  permit,  the  com- 
pany commander  will  verify  this  division.  He 
then  occupies  himself  by  observing  his  company 
and  the  terrain. 

Each  platoon  leader  hurries  to  the  rear  of 
the  center  of  his  platoon,  and  directs  the  pla- 
toon guide  to  observe  the  front  for  indications 
of  the  enemy.  From  his  position,  he  states 
briefly  the  situation,  and  the  company  com- 
mander's orders.  He  then  points  out  the  limits 
of  his  sector.  The  corporals  point  out  the 
squad  sectors.  When  the  first  sergeant  reaches 
the  platoon  with  ranges,  the  platoon  commander 
announces  one  or  two,  selecting  prominent 
objects.  More  might  cause  confusion:  If  time 
permits,  more  detailed  information  may  be 
givin  by  means  of  the  rough  sketch  referred  to 
above.  When  all  is  ready,  the  platoon  com- 
manders signal  the  fact  to  the  company  com- 
mander, who  in  turn,  repeats  it  to  the  battalion 
commander. 

When  Part  1  of  the  target  is  exposed,  the 
battalion  commander  signals  the  company  in 
whose  sector  it  appears  (for  example,  Company 
"A")  to  open  fire.     The  other  company  ("B") 


"Note:  Tlie  word  simultaneously  is  used  to  indicate 
that  the  Captain  desires  the  platoon  commanders  to 
divide  the  sector  at  the  same  time,  and  not  in  rotation 
as  described  in  the  problem  in  attack. 


216  Battle  Fire  Training 

does  not  fire.  Observation  by  the  battalion  com- 
mander indicates  that  the  remainder  of  the  bat- 
talion sector  is  vacant.  Thereupon  he  signals 
Company'  "B"  to  swing  its  fire  into  the  occupied 
sector.  Upon  the  appearance  of  Part  2  of  the 
target,  "B"  company's  commander  returns  its 
fire  to  the  company's  proper  sector,  and  the 
platoon  leaders  increase  the  rate. 

The  battalion  commander  signals  to  the  right 
company  of  the  support,  "D":  "D  RR  B" 
("D"  reenforce  right  of  "B").  To  left  com- 
pany, "C":  "C  R  W  L"  ("C"  reenforce  whole 
line  in  intervals). 

Upon  the  signal  to  swing  its  fire,  "B"  com- 
pany's commander  repeats  the  signal  to  the 
platoon  commanders  who,  in  turn,  repeat  it  to 
their  squad  leaders.  The  signal  should  indicate 
approximately  how  many  "sights"  of  change  arc 
desired.  It  is  obvious  that  this  cannot  always 
be  exact.  The  platoon  and  squad  leaders, 
therefore,  should  be  trained  to  meet  such  situa- 
tions by  instruction  in  the  application  of  fire. 
With  a  good  workable  knowledge  of  this  subject 
they  should  be  able  to  comprehend  instantly 
what  is  desired.  It  is  plain,  in  this  case,  that 
the  company  commander  desires  to  cover  the 
enemy's  present  position.  Hence,  squad  leaders 
direct  their  fire  at  a  portion  of  the  target  cor- 
responding to  their  position  in  the  company. 


Conduct  of  Fire  217 

Siinilarl}',  wIkmi  the  company  is  directed  to 
return  its  fire  to  its  original  sector,  the  pLatoon 
and  squad  leaders  should  see  immediately  that 
a  rapid,  concentrated  fire  is  required.  Later, 
when  Part  2  deploys,  the  several  platoons  and 
squads  should  cover  tiieir  proper  portion  of  th'.' 
target  and  drop  the  rate  of  fire. 

When  Part  1  of  the  target  appears,  the  ser- 
geant major,  who,  in  the  meantime,  has  relieved 
the  adjutant  of  the  range  finder,  immediately 
determines  its  distance  and  signals  it  to  Com- 
pany "A."  It  is  probable  that  "B"  company, 
which  has  not  as  3'et  opened  fire,  will  catch  this 
signal  and  will  have  the  necessary  information 
when  ordered  to  fire.  If  such  is  not  the  case,  it 
is  a  simple  matter  for  it  to  obtain  the  range 
from  Company  "A."  When  Part  2  appears,  its 
distance  is  similarly  signaled  to  Company  "B." 
The  reenforcing  companies  will,  of  course,  get 
their  elevations  from  the  companies  on  the  line. 

With  regard  to  the  sectors  for  the  support- 
ing comjianies,  several  courses  are  open. 

If  there  is  a  prearranged  method  for  division 
in  the  battalion,  no  instructions  will  be  neces- 
sary. In  this  case  the  company  which  reen- 
forces  in  the  intervals  between  skirmishers  will 
obtain  its  targets  from  the  company  or  com- 
panies it  reenforces.  The  company  reenforcing 
on  th(>  flank  will  take  the  sector  of  the  company 


218  Battle  Fire  Training 

next  to  it.  In  this  exercise  it  has  been  assumed, 
in  order  to  make  a  thorough  test  of  the  ability 
to  transmit  data  under  fire,  that  such  action 
was  impossible.  For  this  reason  the  support 
was  placed  where  it  could  not  see  the  targets. 

If  no  prearranged  plan  exists  in  the  bat- 
talion, the  men  who  reenforce  in  the  intervals 
must  be  directed  to  take  the  target  of  their 
next  neighbor.  The  other  company  must,  how- 
ever, be  reached  by  an  order,  or  the  choice  of 
the  sector  which  it  will  cover,  be  left  to  the  com- 
pany commander.  Probably  the  surest  means 
of  transmitting  the  order  to  the  supporting 
company  is  to  have  the  orderly  work  himself 
to  a  point  in  its  line  of  advance,  and  as  it 
passes,  inform  the  captain :  "Take  'B'  com- 
pany's sector."  If  more  detailed  instructions 
are  necessary  a  written  order  will  have  to  be 
sent,  or  signal  flags  used.  In  either  case,  when- 
ever possible,  the  division  of  sectors  should  be 
explained  to  the  men  before  they  move  forward 
to  support,  so  that  a  minimum  of  data  is  neces- 
sary after  they  reach  the  line. 
Discussion 

Referring  to  the  definition  and  division  of 
sectors  by  the  several  commanders  in  this  exer- 
cise, it  will  be  noted  that  there  has  been  a  radi- 
cal departure  from  the  method  suggested  in  the 
exercise  in  attack.     It  has  already  been  stated 


Conduct  of  Fire  219 

tlijit,  wlitn  circumstances  permit,  detailed  and 
painstaking  care  should  be  used  in  obtaining 
and  transmitting  initial  firing  data.  In  the 
exercise  in  attack,  time  was  not  an  important 
element.  In  this  case,  however,  time  is  an 
important  element.  Hence,  if  the  battalion  is 
to  be  ready  in  the  allotted  period,  it  cannot  stop 
for  the  detailed  methods  adopted  when  time  is 
not  a  factor.  To  meet  the  requirements  of  this 
particular  situation,  each  commander  must 
state  clearly  what  he  desires  in  the  way  of  divi- 
sion, and  trust  to  his  immediate  subordinates 
to  carry  out  his  wishes  correctly.  If  practi- 
cable, a  verification  should  be  made  later. 

Fortunately  it  is  generally  much  easier  to 
define  and  divide  sectors  on  the  defense  than  it 
is  to  designate  and  divide  targets  in  attack. 
This  is  true  because  natural  features  which 
provide  the  easiest  means  of  contrast  arc 
usually  available  in  the  defense.  This  latter 
statement  becomes  clear  when  it  is  remembered, 
that  in  attack,  the  line  of  the  enemy's  position 
must  be  divided,  while  in  the  defensive,  any  line 
may  be  chosen,  provided  it  lies  a  reasonable  dis- 
tance in  the  background.  The  liberty  thus 
accorded  the  commander  on  the  defensive, 
usually  enables  him  to  select  a  line  containing 
prominent  features. 

In  this  problem  it  may  be  necessary  for  the 
battalion  or  other  commander  to  tie  in  to  the 


220  Battle  Fire  Training 

chosen  line  by  means  of  a  reference  point.  If 
such  is  the  case,  he  will,  of  course,  act  accord- 
ingly. 

Nothing  has  been  said  about  the  position  of 
the  battalion  commander  at  the  time  of  receipt 
of  the  order.  It  has  been  assumed  that  he  was 
near  the  two  advanced  companies.  For  this 
reason  he  did  not  desire  to  await  the  arrival  of 
the  captains  from  the  companies  in  the  rear  to 
issue  his  order.  If  he  happened  to  be  mounted 
at  the  time,  he  should  have  ridden  towards  the 
advanced  companies.  In  general,  his  action 
should  have  been  such  as  to  facilitate  a  rapid 
transmission  of  his  instructions. 

If  the  sergeant  major  is  sufficiently  well 
trained,  the  duty  of  taking  the  ranges  might 
have  been  left  to  him  and  the  adjutant  directed 
to  deliver  the  order  verbally  to  the  supporting 
companies.  As  the  taking  of  the  ranges  in  a 
defensive  position  involves  more  than  a  single 
operation  of  determining  the  distance  to  a  hos- 
tile line,  it  was  left  to  the  adjutant  with  his 
superior  knowledge  and  training. 

The  question  is  asked  whether  the  battalion 
commander  selected  the  best  available  position 
for  himself  and  staff.  His  position  should  have 
been  in  rear  of  the  firing  line  at  a  point  where 
hp  could  sec  the  cncm}^  and  at  the  same  time 
be    in    communication    with   the    support.      He 


Conduct  of  Fire  221 

should  be  under  cover  if  practicable.     His  staff 
would  ordinarily  he  with  him. 

Ke^ardint;'  the  direction  of  the  fire  of  the 
right  company  upon  the  target  in  the  sector  of 
the  left  company;  the  commander's  immediate 
mission  is  to  prevent  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 
He  may  best  accomplish  this  by  directing  all  his 
available  fire  upon  the  first  serious  attempt  to 
advance.  This  he  does.  He  is  temporarily 
successful,  for  the  enemy  remains  in  position. 
When  in  this  situation,  reenforcements  appear. 
If  he  can  stop  these  the  advance  for  the  present 
will  cease.  In  other  words,  he  must  check  this 
increase  in  the  enemy's  force,  and  at  the  same 
time  hold  the  original  hostile  line  in  position. 
He  accomplishes  this  by  substituting  half  the 
fire  of  "C"  compan}^  for  the  fire  of  "B"  com- 
pany, the  latter  being  automatically  withdrawn 
and  turned  on  the  enemy's  reenforcements.  Also 
he  puts  "D"  company  on  the  flank  of  "B"  com- 
pany with  "B"  company's  target.  Had  he  sent 
"C"  company  into  the  intervals  of  "A"  com- 
pany and  "D"  company  into  the  intervals  of 
"B,"  he  would  not  have  placed  the  greatest 
volume  of  fire  on  the  most  dangerous  target, 
and  he  would  have  lost  the  value  of  the  "D" 
company  machine  by  merging  it  with  that  of 
"B."  The  desired  distribution  of  fire  would 
have  been  obtained  had  both  rcenforcing  com- 


222  Battle  Fire  Training 

panics  been  placed  on  the  flank,  giving  one  the 
entire  battalion  sector  and  the  other  "B"  com- 
pany's sector.  It  is  believed,  however,  that  the 
arrangement  adopted  would  produce  the  great- 
est possible  effect  in  the  shortest  period  of  time. 

The  arrangements  made  by  all  commanders 
for  observation  of  the  front,  were  temporary  in 
character,  and  were  designed  to  meet  the  imme- 
diate requirements  of  the  situation.  It  is  the 
duty  of  the  platoon  commanders  to  provide 
observation  to  the  front.  Had  the  situation 
continued  for  any  length  of  time  they  should 
have  established  a  regular  system  of  observa- 
tion. This  would  have  been  supplemented  by 
any  further  observation  which  the  battalion 
or  company  commanders  thought  necessary. 
Under  normal  con(titions  observation  to  the 
front  would  have  been  established  by  the  com- 
panies upon  halting,  but,  as  the  situation  was 
not  known  to  them  until  the  battalion  comman- 
der issued  his  order  this  was  not  done. 

It  is  apparent  that  a  prearranged  system  of 
reenforcing  solves  many  difficulties.  No  disad- 
vantages accrue  from  its  use,  for  it  may  always 
be  changed  by  order.  The  issuing  of  orders  at 
such  a  time  is  attended  with  great  difficulties, 
it  is  true,  but  without  a  prearranged  plan  they 
must  be  issued  in  every  case,  with  such  a  plan 
only  in  exceptional  cases. 


Conduct  of  Fire  223 

It  has  been  assumed  tliat  the  battalion  has 
been  trained  in  the  proper  application  of  fire 
as  a  unit.  If  such  is  not  the  case,  the  battalion* 
commander  would  have  been  obliged  to  supple- 
ment his  order  with  instructions  about  as  fol- 
lows: "Each  company  is  responsible  for  the 
targets  in  its  sector.  It  will  not  fire  in  any 
other  sector  without  my  order.  If  so  ordered 
it  will  return  to  its  own  sector  when  a  target 
appears  therein.  Companies  will  provide  con- 
stant observation  to  the  front  and  will  report 
the  appearance  of  the  enemy  to  me.  Establish 
signal  communication  with  me." 

The  small  amount  of  time  allowed  for  prepa- 
ration makes  it  impossible  to  clear  the  fore- 
ground or  attempt  the  construction  of  obsta- 
cles. 'I'iiiie  permitting,  no  well-trained  unit  will 
neglect  these  important  aids  to  effective  fire. 


CHAPTER  IX 


COMBAT    PRACTICE 


No  system  of  "musketry"  training  is  com- 
plete without  combat  practice,  for  in  this  prac- 
tice will  be  found,  among  other  necessary  things, 
the  ultimate  peace  test  of  the  fire  efficiency  of  a 
unit.  The  subject,  however,  has  been  quite 
thoroughly  covered  in  official  publications 
accessible  to  all,  such  as:  Small  Arms  Firing 
Manual,  Regulations  Prescribing  Standard  for 
Field  Firing  and  Propciency  Test,  and  an  excel- 
lent bulletin,  "Combat  Practice,"  recently 
issued  to  the  service  from  the  School  of  Mus- 
ketr3\  It  is  believed  that  a  full  repetition  of 
matter  which  has  been  thoroughly  discussed  and 
explained  in  official  publications  would,  in  this 
case,  be  of  no  particular  value,  hence  this  chap- 
ter has  been  considerably  curtailed.  It  will  be 
found  that  many  features  have  been  omitted 
from  the  text  which  at  first  sight  appear  neces- 
sary to  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  sub- 
ject. It  is  hoped,  however,  that  this  explana- 
tion will  satisfactorily  account  for  their 
absence. 

The  Object  of  Combat  Practice: 

The  object  of  musketry  instruction  is  to 
train  the  soldier  in  the  fundamental  principles 


Combat  Practice  225 

of  marksmanship,  and  the  unit  in  the  conduct 
of  fire.  Combat  Practice  is  the  last  phase  of 
this  training.  The  Small  Arms  Firing  Manual 
states,  that  in  combat  practice  " Indi- 
viduals learn  cooperation,  and  commanders  and 
leaders  how  to  obtain  the  maximum  efficiency 
of  fire  by  a  judicious  coordination  of  the  skill 
and  efforts  of  all  the  individuals  of  the  group 
or  unit."  In  other  words,  learn  conduct  of  fire. 
It  is  not  believed  that  this  statement  is  meant 
to  be  taken  literally,  for  under  the  present  sys- 
tem of  instruction,  neither  sufficient  time  nor 
juiimunition  are  available  to  teach  conduct 
of  fire  by  means  of  combat  practice.  It  is 
doubtful  if  sufficient  time  can  be  allotted  for 
this  purpose  without  seriously  curtailing  other 
piiases  of  instruction.  It  is  certain  that  the 
cost  of  ammunition  will  always  operate  to  pre- 
vent more  than  a  limited  amount  of  combat 
practice.  However,  even  if  time  and  ammuni- 
tion were  available,  which  they  arc  not,  combat 
practice,  with  its  distracting  noise,  its  strain 
upon  tiie  individual,  and  its  possible  danger 
tlirougli  carelessness,  is  the  poorest  possible 
iiiediuin  of  instruction  for  most  of  the  elements 
of  conduct  of  fire.  There  are  exceptions  to 
this,  in  such  subjects  as  observation  and  adjust- 
ment of  fire.  These,  of  course,  must  be  taught 
principally  during  combat  practice.   This  prac- 


226  Battle  Fire  Training 

tice  then,  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  means 
of  teaching  conduct  of  fire,  except  in  a  very 
limited  way.  Combat  practice  is  the  culmina- 
tion of  the  season's  instruction.  It  is  a  means 
by  which  units  and  commanders  are  taught  cer- 
tain phases  of  fire  direction  and  control  which 
cannot  be  fully  learned  elsewhere,  and  a  means 
by  which  they  are  trained  to  adhere  to  previ- 
ously mastered  principles  of  conduct  of  fire, 
under  the  nearest  possible  approach  to  battle 
condition*. 
Preliminary  Training: 

It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing,  to  produce  the 
best  results,  preliminary  training  must  precede 
combat  practice.  This  is  true,  not  only  because 
certain  phases  of  conduct  of  fire  are  more  easily 
learned  before  combat  practice  is  reached,  but 
also  because  this  costly  and  limited  form  of 
training  should  not  be  used  to  teach  things 
which  may  be  taught  as  well  elsewhere,  lest  it 
be  at  the  expense  of  things  which  can  only  be 
taught  therein. 

Preliminary  training  for  combat  practice  is 
just  as  important  as  preliminary  training  for 
individual  practice.  Without  preliminary  train- 
ing the  results  of  individual  practice  are 
materially  reduced.  So  also,  combat  practice 
without  preliminary  training,  results  in  but  a 
pleasing  departure  from  routine  work,  accom- 


Combat  Practice  227 

panii'd  by  a  great  waste  of  ammunition  and  a 
small  amount  of  instruction.  Unfortunately 
the  Small  Arnts  Firing  Manual,  which  explains 
at  I'jngth  the  importance  of  preliminary  train- 
ing for  individual  practice  and  prescribes  a 
thorough  system  of  instruction  therein,  contains 
hut  one  short  paragraph  on  preliminary  train- 
ing for  combat  practice. 

The  net  result  of  the  manual's  ex})lanation 
of  the  object  of  combat  practice,  and  its  failure 
to  strongly  emphasize  the  importance  of  pre- 
h'minary  training  therefor,  is,  that  the  service 
has  no  S3'stem  of  preliminary  instruction 
in  this  important  subject.  In  consequence  of 
which  such  instruction  is  generally  neglected. 

In  addition  to  the  system  of  preliminary 
training  outlined  in  the  preceding  chapters,  in 
order  that  a  command  may  approach  combat 
practice,  equipped  to  derive  the  greatest  benefit 
therefrom,  it  is  recommended  that  commanders 
of  all  grades  be  trained  in  the  preparation  and 
solution  of  preliminary'  combat  firing  exercises. 

By  preliminary  combat  firing  exercises  arc 
meant :  combat  firing  exercises  in  the  form  of 
map  problems;  in  the  form  of  terrain  exercises; 
and  in  the  form  of  drill  exercises.  The  appli- 
cation of  the  latter  form  of  exercise  has  been 
covered  in  the  preceding  chapters.  These  three 
forms  of  exercises  are  prepared  and  solved  by 


228  Battle  Fire  Training 

an  application  of  the  same  principles  which 
govern  the  preparation  and  solution  of  the 
combat  firing  exercise  proper ;  that  is,  the 
exercise  with  ball  ammunition.  These  forms  of 
exercises  are  sometimes  called  combat  firing 
problems,  firing  problems,  or  simply  combat 
problems. 

Th,e  Co7nhat  Firing  Exercise  Proper: 

Combat  practice  usually  consists  in  the  firing 
of  a  number  of  combat  firing  exercises.  All 
authorities  agree  that  such  exercises  are  diffi- 
cult things  to  prepare.  Authorities  also  agree 
that,  until  the  ability  to  prepare  good  exercises 
has  been  acquired,  the  subject  is  not  mastered. 
A  consideration,  then,  of  their  preparation  is 
necessary.  This  is  so,  not  only  for  the  fore- 
going reasons,  but,  as  these  exercises  must  be 
prepared  in  order  to  hold  combat  practice, 
training  therein  is  necessary.  Examples  are 
available  in  the  authorized  publications.  These 
examples  indicate  the  form  and  general  nature. 

The  following  outline  covers  the  most  impor- 
tant points  which  must  be  considered  in  their 
preparation. 

The  exercise  should  contain : 

A  definite  lesson  in  fire  tactics. 
A  mission  which  can  be  readily  deter- 
mined from  the  situation. 


Combat  Proct'ice  229 

A  tactical  principle,  tlic  violation  of 
which,  if  possible,  would  prevent  the 
accomplishment  of  the  mission. 

A  tactical  situation,  which  may  be  any 
phase  of  an  action,  provided  it  demands 
fire,  and  selected  with  the  idea  of  best  pre- 
senting the  lesson  to  be  learned. 
In   reference  to   this  latter   requirement  the 
School   of  Musketry   sa3's :    "While   it   is   true 
tiiat   the   fire   problem   must  involve   a   tactical 
situation    with    a    definite    mission,    it    must    be 
remembered  that  the  fire  feature  of  the  problem, 
requiring  the  fire  estimate  and  orders,  must  be 
the  dominant  factor  in  the  situation." 
Consideration  should  be  given  to: 

1.  The  element  of  time  in:  (a)  The  amount 
of  time  required  for  the  entire  exercise  in  order 
that  it  may  not  be  excessive,  (b)  The  time 
necessary  to  fire  the  number  of  rounds  required 
by  the  situation,  based  on  the  proper  rate  of 
fire  for  the  various  ranges. 

2.  The  amount  of  ammunition  necessary  to 
accomplish  the  desired  mission,  deduced  from 
the  amount  that  will  probably  be  necessary  to 
produce  the  required  number  of  hits.  This  with 
a  view  of  obtaining  the  greatest  results  from 
the  season's  allowance. 

3.  The  number  of  targets,  pits,  and  men 
necessary   to   stage   the   situation,   usually   one 


230  Battle  Fire  Training 

target  for  each  man.     This  with  regard  to  the 
available  supply,  and  due  economy. 

4.  The  terrain  available,  in  order  that  the 
situation  involved  ma}'^,  as  far  as  possible,  be 
free  from  imaginary  restrictions  and  limita- 
tions, and  be  new  to  the  commander  or  at  l#ast 
involve  different  pits  and  angles. 

5.  The  possible  presence  of  any  factor  which 
might  prevent  the  desired  lesson  being  taught. 

6.  The  desirability  of  simplicity  in  all 
arrangements. 

7.  The  necessity  for  arrangements  to  prevent 
the  location  of  the  targets,  ranges,  situation, 
etc.,  from  being  known  in  advance  by  the  first 
organization  to  fire  or  any  which  may  follow. 

In  combat  firing  exercises,  as  in  tactical 
problems,  the  commander  must  first  "estimate 
the  situation"  and  then  issue  his  order.  In  such 
exercises  these  are  called  the  "Fire  Estimate" 
and  the  "Fire  Order." 

The  School  of  Musketry  gives  the  following 
details  as  those  which  must  be  considered  and 
covered  in  the  fire  estimate  and  fire  order. 
The  Fire  Estimate: 

Location,  strength,  and  intentions  of  the 

enemy. 
Observation   of  Targets  both  before   and 

during  firing. 
Determination  of  Range. 


Combat  Practice  231 

Relative  Importance  of  Targets. 

Strength  of  Firing  Line. 

Location  of  Fire  Positions. 

Class  of  Fire,  i.  e.,  Volley,  Clip,  or  At  Will. 

Rate  of  Fire. 

Time  of  Opening  Fire. 

Formation  in  Advancing  Under  Fire. 

Ammunition  Supply. 
The  Fire  Order : 

Designation  of  Targets. 

Assignment  of  Troops  to  Targets. 

Directions  as  to  Occupation  of  Fire  Posi- 
tions. 

Announcement  of  Sight  Setting. 

Rate  of  Fire. 

Class  of  Fire. 

Time  of  Opening  Fire. 

Position  of  Leader  During  Firing. 
In  connection  with  these  details  of  the  fire 
estimate  and  the  fire  order  the  School  of  Mus- 
ketry says:  "There  will  be  few  occasions  in 
wjiich  all  of  the  factors  enumerated  above  will 
have  to  be  thought  out  in  the  estimate  and 
announced  in  the  fire  orders.  In  fact  the  sim- 
plicity of  most  problems,  particularly  those 
conducted  on  'A'  ranges,  will  make  it  unneces- 
sary to  give  any  consideration  to  many  of  them. 
Again,  it  must  be  remembered  that  at  the 
moment    when    the    fire    orders    must   be    issued 


232  Battle  Fire  Training 

many  of  the  factors  embraced  in  the  estimate 
will  have  been  considered,  some  of  them  in  an 
involuntary  manner.  On  some  occasions  the 
fire  order  may  be  as  simple  as  'Fire  at  Will.'  " 

The  methods  followed  by  the  School  of  Mus- 
ketry in  keeping  records  of  combat  firing  exer- 
cises, together  with  the  forms  used,  are  given 
under  "Records." 
The  Critique: 

Every  exercise  should  be  followed  by  a  cri- 
tique. This  should  be  given,  if  practicable,  on 
the  target  range  and  immediately  following  the 
exercise,  so  that  the  details  will  be  fresh  in  the 
minds  of  all  and  the  features  of  the  ground 
visible. 

The  critique  is  based  on  the  conduct  of  the 
exercise  and  the  results  obtained  in  accuracy, 
distribution,  and  time,  as  shown  by  the  umpire's 
record. 

With  reference  to  the  critique  the  Regula- 
tions Prescribing  Standard  for  Field  Training 
states :  "In  field  firing  exercises  over  unknown 
ground,  the  accuracy  to  be  expected  from  aver- 
age shots,  assuming  an  error  of  5%to  have  been 
made  in  the  estimation  of  the  range,  is  consid- 
ered to  be  a  proper  standard  of  proficiency  in 
case  the  performance  has  been  good  in  other 
respects. 

"It  is  not  admissible,  however,  merely  to  say 
that  a  command  is  proficient,  or  deficient,  or  to 


Combat  Practice  233 

characterize  a  firing  exercise  as  'good,'  'satis- 
factory,' or  'poor.'  If  not  more  than  this  be 
said  no  one  will  know  what  faults  have  been 
committed  or  how  they  should  be  corrected. 
The  critique  should  begin  with  a  statement  of 
the  exercise,  including  a  description  of  the  tar- 
gets— kind,  number,  location,  front  covered,  or 
intervals  between  figures,  the  actual  range,  the 
estimated  range,  the  time  required  for  firing, 
and  the  computed  percentage  of  hits  to  be 
expected  by  average  shots  under  good  leaders, 
and  also  by  good  shots  under  the  same  circum- 
stances. This  should  be  followed  by  a  brief 
outline  of  the  tactical  idea  involved  in  the 
proper  execution  of  the  exercise  and  this  in  turn 
followed  by  comments  on  the  manner  in  which 
the  idea  was  actually  carried  out. 

"The  accuracy  obtained  as  shown  in  the 
actual  number  of  hits  made  in  the  exercise 
should  be  compared  with  that  to  be  expected 
from  average  and  good  shots  under  favorable 
conditions,  and  in  case  of  deficiency  the  reasons 
therefor  should  be  stated. 

"The  same  cuurse  should  be  followed  with  the 
results  obtained  in  distribution  and  time,  which 
should  be  taken  up  in  turn. 

"The  operation  which  precedes  the  actual 
firing  may  be  spoken  of  as  preparation.  This 
phase  of  a  firing  exercise  has  a  somewhat  remote 


234  *  Battle  Fire  Training 

$ 

bearing  on  the  .actual  results  obtained  in  firing, 
but  must  receive  some  consideration.  Assum- 
ing correct  tactical  procedure,  the  chief  element 
for  consideration  is  the  matter  of  time,  and  in 
judging  the  time  consumed  prior  to  opening 
fire  one  must  consider  all  the  difficulties  that 
have  been  encountered  and  then  determine 
whether  or  not  there  has  been  an  unreasonable 
delay  which  would  not  have  occurred  had  the 
leadership  been  good  and  the  organization 
properly  trained. 

"This  part  of  the  critique  might  be  worded: 
'The  preparation  was  completed  with  reason- 
able celerity,'  or  'the  preparation  consumed 
twelve  minutes.'  This  is  considered  too  long 
and  is  mainly  due  to: 

"1.  Lack  of  familiarity  with  range  find- 
ing methods. 

"2.  Lack  of  training  in  describing  objec- 
tives. 

"3.  Inadequate  reconnaissance  resulting 
in  several  changes  of  position  before  the 
firing  line  was  so  placed  that  the  targets 
could  be  seen. 

"Further  training  in  these  subjects  would 
tend  towards  greater  promptness  in  opening 
fire. 

"It  will  usually  be  sufficient  merely  to  com- 
ment on  minor  errors  committed  in  the  course 


Combat  Practice  235 

of  the  preparation,  but  in  case  of  serious  and 
unnecessary  delays  in  opening  fire,  which  in 
combat  would  give  an  active  enemy  a  decided 
advantage,  weight  should  be  given  in  propor- 
tion to  the  faults  committed.  It  should  be 
borne  in  mind,  however,  that  in  passing  judg- 
ment as  to  proficiency  and  deficiency  the  actual 
results  obtained  in  firing  by  a  detachment  or 
organization  must  remain  the  chief  basis,  how- 
ever nmch  this  judgment  may  need  to  be  modi- 
fied through  faults  committed  in  the  prepara- 
tion." 

The  critique  is  a  means  of  instruction.  It 
should  not  be  in  the  nature  of  a  reprimand,  but 
to  produce  the  greatest  results,  should  be  in 
the  nature  of  a  tactical  summing  up  of  the 
errors  committed,  with  comments  upon  features 
particularly  well  performed.  It  should  point 
out  the  means  of  correcting  errors  made  and 
the  lines  along  which  further  training  is 
necessary. 

Umpire's  Duties: 

In  addition  to  delivering  the  critique,  the 
umpire  has  general  charge  of  the  exercise  from 
the  time  of  arrival  of  the  troops  near  the  target 
grounds  until  the  exercise  is  completed.  Suffi- 
cient assistants  should  be  furnished  him  to  per- 
mit of  complete  observation  of  all  features  of 
inij)ortaiice  connected  with   the  exercise.     The 


236  Battle  Fire  Training 

umpire  is  generally  charged  also  with  the  duty 
of  making  known  to  the  commander  the 
assumed  character  and  effectiveness  of  the  ene- 
my's fire  and  the  results  of  its  effect  upon  the 
firing  unit.  That  is,  he  must  inform  the  com- 
mander, for  instance,  "The  enemy  has  fire 
superiority  and  you  cannot  advance,"  or  "a 
certain  part  of  your  unit  may  advance,  the 
enemy's  fire  at  will  being  somewhat  wild." 
Suggestions: 

Except  in  the  earlier  stages  of  instruction, 
when  a  combat  firing  exercise  is  once  started  it 
should  be  allowed  to  proceed  without  interrup- 
tion, except  to  prevent  accidents.  It  should  bo 
conducted  by  the  usual  signals  and  commands 
and  in  a  manner  laid  down  in  Drill  Regulations, 
This  is  true,  not  only  because  it  is  the  pre- 
scribed way,  but,  because  this  is  the  only  means 
provided  for  training  in  these  necessary  fea- 
tures while  firing. 

The  position  of  the  targets,  the  intervals 
between  targets,  and  their  form  should,  as  a 
rule,  conform  to  service  conditions.  At  the 
beginning  of  an  exercise  the  targets  should  bo 
either  pointed  out  or  their  location  made  known 
by  the  firing  of  blank  ammunition  in  their 
vicinity.  If  targets  are  well  hidden  and  no 
means  provided  for  indicating  their  location 
little  will  be  accomplished  except  an  irritation 


Combat  Practice  237 

of  the  firiiif^  unit.  Combat  jiriicticc  is  not  Hie 
place  to  teach  the  h)cation  of  inflistiiict  targets. 
In  attack  exercises  the  greatest  possible 
benefit  will  be  derived  if  the  information,  rela- 
tive to  fire  effect  transmitted  by  the  umpire, 
is  based  upon  the  actual  result  of  the  fire  being 
delivered  at  the  time.  This  entails  the  necessity 
for  some  arrangement  by  means  of  which  hits 
may  be  recorded  and  their  number  transmitted 
to  the  umpire  from  time  to  time,  without  inter- 
rupting the  firing.  If  this  is  done,  then  by  a 
table  previously  prepared,  it  may  be  deter- 
nu'ned  what  fraction,  if  any,  of  a  unit  may 
advance,  assuming  that  the  more  accurate  the 
enemy's  fire,  the  smaller  the  fraction  which 
may  advance.  The  length  of  time  which  the 
advance  may  be  continued  may  also  be  deter- 
mined, and  if  desired  the  probable  number  of 
casualties  which  would  result.  If  such  an 
arrangement  is  undertaken,  then,  in  the  prepa- 
ration of  the  table  the  probable  number  of  hits 
which  should  be  made  by  average  marksmen  at 
the  various  ranges  must  be  used  as  the  basis  for 
determining  Mhether  or  not  the  fire  superiority, 
in  any  degree,  has  been  obtained.  Thus,  if  with 
average  marksmen  and  with  the  number  of 
targets  exposed,  at  the  range  used  X  number 
of  men  should  make  Y  number  of  hits  on  Z 
number    of    targets    and    the    unit    firing    falls 


238  Battle  Fire  Tr aiming 

below  this  standard,  complete  fire  superiority 
is  not  obtained.  A  sliding  scale  downward  may 
be  arranged,  if  desired,  upon  which  to  base 
decision  as  to  whether  or  not  the  hits  made  are 
sufficient  to  enable  a  fraction  of  the  unit  to 
advance.  As  it  is  impossible  to  determine  the 
probable  number  of  hits,  for  every  possible 
distance  from  the  target  the  target  ground 
should  be  divided  into  a  number  of  zones,  and 
the  range  to  the  extreme  limits  of  each  zone 
used  as  the  basis  for  calculation.  In  this  class 
of  exercise,  in  arriving  at  a  general  figure  of 
proficiency,  values  may  be  assigned  to  the  dis- 
tances covered  in  advances.  This  is  illustrated 
in  the  Casey  problem  given  herein. 

The  arrangements  necessary  to  provide 
means  by  which  hits  may  be  read  while  firing  is 
in  progress  may  be  difficult  to  obtain,  but  it  is 
believed  any  efforts  made  with  this  idea  in  view 
will  be  more  than  repaid  by  the  excellent  effect 
upon  the  firing  unit,  the  splendid  opportunity 
it  affords  commanders  to  actually  adjust  their 
fire  by  its  true  effect,  and  to  learn  by  observing 
fire  when  it  is  in  adjustment.  If  some  such 
method  as  this  is  not  adopted  the  rulings  of  the 
umpire  regarding  the  effect  of  the  fire  being 
delivered,  both  by  the  enemy  and  the  firing 
unit,  must  be  in  the  nature  of  a  guess  and  may 
possibly  be  entirely  erroneous.     Hence  the  com- 


Combat  Practice  239 

niandcr  may  assume  that  a  certain  appearance 
of  the  sliot  group  on  the  ground  indicates  that 
his  fire  is  adjusted,  when  as  a  matter  of  fact  it 
is  not.  He  may  assume  that  his  range  finding 
methods  are  correct,  when  they  are  not.  He 
may  assume  that  his  rate  of  fire  is  correct, 
when  it  is  not.  In  fact  he  may  make  any  num- 
ber of  assumptions  connected  with  conduct  of 
fire,  based  on  the  ruHngs  of  the  umpire,  and  all 
these  assumptions  may  be  drawn  from  false 
premises.  There  are  firing  exercises,  of  course, 
in  which  this  arrangement  is  not  necessary  or 
desirable.  For  any  exercise,  however,  which 
purports  to  be  a  means  of  training  in  those 
features  of  conduct  of  fire  which  can  only  be 
taught  by  fire,  which  attempts  to  emphasize 
emphatically  the  advantage  of  effective  fire, 
and  to  teach  commanders  to  draw  conclusions 
from  correct  premises,  this  plan  is  necessary. 
In  other  words,  by  means  of  such  arrangements 
the  nearest  possible  approach  to  actual  condi- 
tions ill  battle  is  obtained.  The  situation  is 
clear  to  the  commander  and  he  can  base  his 
actions  on  the  tangible  results  of  his  fire. 
Without  these  arrangements  a  commander  is 
surrounded  with  a  lia7,e  of  doubt  which  may  or 
may  not  be  dispelled  by  the  rulings  of  the 
umpire.  '' 

The    amount    of    ammunition     available    for 
combat  practice  is  necessarily  limited;    there- 


240  Battle  Fire  Training 

fore  it  should  be  expended  in  exercises  which 
provide  the  greatest  amount  of  training.  Too 
often  the  limited  supply  of  ammunition  leads 
to  tlie  selection  of  a  number  of  exercises  of 
short  duration,  rather  than  a  few  exercises  of 
long  duration.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
combat  practice  has  two  main  objects;  to  teach 
certain  features  of  conduct  of  fire  which  cannot 
be  taught  elsewhere,  and  to  train  a  unit  to 
function  true  to  its  training  while  firing  ball 
ammunition.  The  short  exercise  is  suitable  to 
train  noncommissioned  officers  and  small  units 
in  parts  of  their  duties,  but  as  a  rule  it  is  not 
a  suitable  means  of  training  platoons,  com- 
panies, or  battalions  in  the  larger  and  more 
important  phases  of  conduct  of  fire.  In  the 
short  exercise  it  is  impossible  for  a  commander 
to  observe  his  fire  a  sufficient  length  of  time  to 
deduce  anything  from  it.  Even  if  he  were  able 
to  arrive  at  some  conclusion,  which  he  is  not, 
there  will  be  no  time  available  to  apply  the 
information  obtained  in  a  practical  way.  When 
only  five  or  ten  rounds  are  fired,  how  is  it  pos- 
sible to  observe  and  adjust  fire.''  Unfortunately 
this  hit  or  miss  variety  of  firing  problem  is  all 
too  common ;  a  hasty  estimate  of  the  range,  a 
hasty  designation  of  targets,  a  few  brief  sec- 
onds of  fire,  and  the  succeeding  organization 
takes  its  place  on  the  range  to  blaze  away 
costly  ammunition. 


Combat  Practice  241 

A  few  long  exercises  are  much  better  tlian  a 
number  of  sliort  ones.  In  the  problem  of  con- 
siderable duration  the  commander  is  given  an 
opportunity  to  judge  his  fire  effect,  to  correct 
errors  therein,  and  to  actually  control  his  fire. 
Opportunity  is  afforded  to  train  the  company 
and  battalion  machinery  to  function  while  in 
the  midst  of  a  noisy  and  disconcerting  fire;  to 
see  the  cr.rors  of  individuals,  to  correct  them, 
and  to  see  the  corrections  put  into  effect ;  to 
actually  transmit  firing  data  while  firing,  to 
fix  bayonets,  to  control  fire,  to  advance,  and, 
finally  to  charge.  How  otherwise  can  a  unit 
learn  to  perform  these  things  instinctively  in 
battle.''  Training,  before  the  class  (B)  range 
is  reached,  is  not  sufficient.  The  firing  of  short 
exercises  covering  one  small  phase  and  designed 
to  illustrate  one  principle  is  not  sufficient.  The 
solution  of  fire  problems  in  which  artificial  fea- 
tures are  dominant  is  not  sufficient.  There  is 
no  short  cut  to  success  here.  .There  is  no 
means  of  training  an  organization  to  function 
while  firing  except  by  training  it  to  function 
while  firing.  To  accomplish  this,  fire  problems 
must  be  of  sufficient  duration  to  permit  of  drill 
therein.  Moreover,  a  greater  amount  of 
instruction  may  be  imparted  in  a  given  period 
of  time  with  less  expenditure  of  ammunition  if. 
in  these  problems,  the  action  of  the  unit  is  con- 


242  Battle  Fire  Training 

trolled  by  its  actual  fire  effect,  determined 
while  firing  is  in  progress. 

The  problem  which  follows  is  along  the  lines 
of  one  prepared  by  the  board  of  officers  hereto- 
fore mentioned.  It  is  given  here  because  it 
contains  features  which  have  been  emphasized 
in  the  foregoing  discussion.  This  exercise  in 
one  season  was  fired  by  48  companies  and  12 
battalions  and  in  every  instance  its  value  was 
unmistakable. 

If  in  order  to  meet  local  conditions,  as  was 
true  in  the  foregoing  instance,  it  is  necessary 
to  use  one  locality  for  both  company  and  bat- 
talion training,  the  exercise  may  be  made  con- 
tinuous and  include  the  fire  of  both  units.  If 
this  is  done  many  points  of  maneuver  and  fire 
tactics  will  be  brought  out  that  might  other- 
wise have  been  omitted,  and  an  excellent  oppor- 
tunity will  be  afforded  to  illustrate  team  work 
in  the  battalion. 

Local  features  of  the  terrain  which  were 
included  in  the  original  problem,  to  avoid  con- 
fusion, have  been  omitted  here.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  this  problem  as  written  was  framed 
for  a  particular  piece  of  ground.  If  used, 
details  may  have  to  be  changed  to  conform  to 
the  terrain  available. 


Combat  Practice  243 

Problem 
Time:    30  minutes. 
Rounds  for  company,  50 ;    for  battalion,  45. 

Object: 

To  train  the  company  and  battalion  to  func- 
tion as  a  unit  under  full  control  while  firing; 
to  train  commanders  to  exercise  fire  direction 
and  control;  to  observe  and  adjust  fire;  to 
train  individual  soldiers  in  fire  discipline.  To 
illustrate  the  necessity  for  celerity  of  move- 
ment, proper  rate  of  fire,  accuracy  of  firing 
data,  good  marksmanship,  and  team  work. 
Situatioii: 

The  battalion  following  a  successful  engage- 
ment, is  in  close  pursuit  of  a  retreating  enemy. 
The  remainder  of  the  regiment  which  is  follow- 
ing with  additional  ammunition  is  about  an 
hour  in  rear.  The  ammunition  supply  is  low. 
No  time  has  been  available  since  the  engage- 
ment to  redistribute.  The  company  which  is 
detached  (to  fire  the  problem)  is  assumed  to 
liave  fifty  rounds  per  man.  The  battalion  com- 
mander's orders  are  to  push  on  and  occupy  a 
certain  place  in  advance  of  the  regiment.  (In 
preparing  the  problem  for  presentation  to 
troops  this  place  must  be  selected  so  as  to 
require  the  desired  action.)  When  a  suitable 
point  is  reached  near  the  target  range,  the  bat- 
talion commander  is  informed  that  a  company 


244  Battle  Fire  Training 

of  the  enemy,  somewhat  smaller  in  number  than 

the  companies  of  the  battalion,  has  taken  up  a 

position    on   his   flank   and   he   cannot   advance 

further  without  driving  the  enemy  therefrom. 

He  is  directed  to  detach  a  company   for  this 

purpose. 

Action:  The  Company 

The  detached  company  is  conducted  to  a 
point  from  which  it  can  see  the  targets  and 
still  be  protected  from  fire.  The  situation  is 
handed  to  the  company  commander  and  he  is 
given  a  reasonable  time  to  reach  a  decision. 
When  all  is  ready  the  company  is  permitted  to 
advance,  in  proper  formation,  until  the  point 
selected  for  opening  fire  is  reached,  say  between 
800  and  900  yards.  At  this  point  the  company 
commander  is  informed  that  the  accuracy  of 
the  enemy's  fire  prevents  further  advance 
except  under  covering  fire.  Once  fire  is  opened, 
the  further  advance  of  the  company  is  depen- 
dent upon  the  number  of  hits  made.  The  exer- 
cise is  continued  until  the  enemy  is  assumed  to 
be  driven  away,  the  ammunition  is  exhausted, 
or  the  time  limit  of  30  minutes  has  expired. 
Each  company  in  turn  fires  the  exercise. 
Targets : 

Fifty  F  targets  spaced  a  distance  apart  suffi- 
cient to  give  the  desired  width  to  the  whole 
target.      Five  E  targets  in   rear  will   indicate 


Condxit  Practice  245 

the  director  and  controllers.  These  afford  a 
ready  means  of  picking  up  the  target.-  Hits  on 
these  latter  targets  are  disregarded  until  the 
conclusion  of  the  exercise.  A  strip  of  canvas 
19  inches  high  and  somewhat  longer  than  the 
target  is  wide,  is  placed  immediately  in  rear  of 
the  line  of  E  targets.  The  canvas  is  held  in 
an  upright  position  by  means  of  wooden  strips 
nailed  together  from  both  sides  of  the  canvas 
throughout  its  width,  and  spaced  throughout  its 
length  sufficiently  near  together  to  hold  it  taut 
and  straight.  These  strips  extend  above  and 
below  the  canvas,  at  which  points  they  fit  into 
greased  slots  held  in  position  by  wooden  sup- 
ports. At  either  end  of  the  target,  wooden 
latticed  drums  are  placed  in  an  upright  posi- 
tion and  provided  with  handles  for  turning. 
These  drums  should  be  protected  from  the 
front  by  a  revetted  mound  or  a  combination 
of  mound  and  ditch.  Each  end  of  the  canvas 
strip  is  made  fast  to  a  drum.  When  the  drums 
are  turned  the  strip  unwinds  from  one  and 
winds  upon  the  other,  the  upright  strips  sliding 
in  the  slots.  As  the  canvas  passes  behind  the 
targets  it  receives  hits  which  are  marked  and 
recorded  as  it  is  wound  on  the  drum.  It  was 
found  by  practice  that  about  two  minutes  were 
required  to  mark  the  hits  on  about  50  yards 
of  canvas.     It  will  be  noted  that  shots  passing 


246  Battle  Fire  Training 

between  the  targets  as  well  as  those  passing 
through  them  will  be  received  upon  the  canvas 
and  hence  recorded,  but  no  particular  harm  is 
done  by  recording  "near  hits."  If  desired  the 
actual  hits  may  be  counted  at  the  completion 
of  the  exercise.  From  its  description  this  tar- 
get might  be  thought  too  visible  but  experience 
has  shown  that  if  properly  placed  in  relation 
to  the  background  it  offers  a  difficult  aiming 
target. 

Method  of  Scoring: 

The  following  method  of  scoring  is  designed 
to  give  the  highest  score  to  that  company  which 
by  its  collective  shooting  and  fire  tactics  would 
probably  make  the  greatest  success  were  the 
assumed  situation  real.  The  object  of  this 
exercise  is  to  drive  the  enemy  from  his  position 
as  quickly  as  possible  and  with  the  least  expen- 
diture of  ammunition  compatible  with  that  end. 
To  carry  out  this  mission  the  company  must 
inflict  so  considerable  a  loss  upon  the  enemy  in 
a  short  space  of  time  that  he  will  be  forced 
from  his  position  by  these  losses  and  by  the 
aggressive  forward  movement  of  the  attacker. 
An  accurate  delivery  of  fire  in  adequate  volume 
would  not  avail  if  undistributed ;  hence  the  rate 
of  movement  toward  the  enemy  would  depend 
upon  the  number  of  figures  hit  in  a  given  unit 
of  time.     Hits  on  the  canvas  are  treated  as  hits 


Combat  Practice  247 

on  figures.  For  a  proper  conduct  of  the  attack, 
therefore,  an  arbitrary  table  of  losses  must  be 
prepared  based  upon  which  the  company  would 
be  allowed  to  advance  during  the  problem  in 
various  sized  units.  In  preparing  this  table  a 
computation  must  be  made  of  the  maximum 
number  of  hits  per  minute  that  may  be  expected 
of  good  marksmen  firing  with  correct  data  at 
the  various  ranges  used.  For  instance,  if  the 
target  ground  is  divided  into  four  zones,  900, 
800,  700,  and  600  yards,  the  computation  will 
be  made  using  these  ranges  as  a  basis  for  calcu- 
lation. This  table  must  be  elastic  enough  to 
provide  for  various  sized  companies  and  various 
tactical  dispositions.  Arrangements  must  be 
made  for  recording  the  ninnber  of  hits  during 
the  advance  and  reporting  these  hits  to  the 
umpire,  for  instance,  every  two  minutes.  Based 
upon  these  reports  of  hits  the  company  is  per- 
mitted to  advance  by  individuals,  squads,  pla- 
toons, etc.  No  limit  should  be  placed  upon  the 
length  of  the  rushes.  The  units  halting  at  the 
end  of  the  rush  wherever  in  the  opinion  of  the 
leader  it  should  have  been  stopped  in  war.  It 
is  well  to  assume  that  if  the  company  reached 
a  point  500  yards  from  the  enemy  in  30  min- 
utes the  enemy  would  be  defeated  by  his  losses 
and  the  fierceness  of  the  attack,  and  that  as  the 
company    approaches    this    critical    range    the 


248  Battle  Fire  Training 

hostile  fire  will  gradually  grow  less  effective. 
The  tcihle,  therefore,  should  provide  for  an 
increasingly  difficult  advance  from  900  to  600 
yards,  and  a  gradually  decreasing  requirement 
from  600  to  500  yards. 

For  the  purpose  of  comparison  tlie  following 
four  factors  may  be  considered: 

(a)  Accuracy,  or  per  cent  of  hts  to  shots 
fired. 

(b)  Distribution  or  percentage  of  figures 
hit,  the  per  cent  being  based  on  the  number 
that  should  have  been  struck  with  the  ammu- 
nition actually  fired. 

(c)  Time  required  to  defeat  the  enemy 
(if  successful). 

(d)  Distance  covered  in  the  advance. 
The  method  of  determining   (a)    is  obvious. 

In  determining  (b)  one  has  first  to  consider 
how  many  figures  should  have  been  hit  by 
"good"  marksmen  using  accurate  data  and 
properly  distributed  fire  over  the  whole  target, 
(d)  should  be  determined  from  a  table  of  values 
for  distance  advanced,  the  values  varying  regu- 
larly from  0  for  no  advance  to'  100  for  an 
advance  of  500  yards.  An  arbitrary  valbc  of 
say  100,  if  successful,  may  be  attached  to  (c), 
that  is,  the  whole  company  reaches  500  yards 
in  10  minutes.  This  value  to  be  decreased  to  0 
for    success    in    30    minutes.      The    per    cents 


Combat  Practice  249 

reached  by  the  above  process  may  be  changed 
to  "Points"  for  the  purpose  of  scoring  in  the 
following  manner.  The  per  cent  of  accuracy 
obtained  should  be  referred  to  the  per  cent  con- 
sidered possible,  and  the  quotient  callerl 
"Points."  Thus,  if  20  per  cent  is  the  possible 
per  cent  of  accuracy  and  a  company  makes 
232  hits  with  1,981  rounds  of  ammunition, 
or  11.7','',  which  is  58.5%  of  the  possible,  its 
score  therefore  for  accuracy  would  be  58.5. 
The  per  cent  of  distribution  attained  is  consid- 
ered as  "points"  thus :  36  figures  hit  of  50 
exposed  by  a  company  firing  1,981  round-; 
would  give  a  per  cent  of  72,  which  are  called 
"points"  for  distribution.  It  is  to  be  noted 
that  in  this  instance  a  company  firing  1,981 
rounds  should  hit  all  figures.  If  a  company 
"succeeded"  in  23  minutes  20  seconds,  their 
"points"  for  success  would  be  33,  and  if  at  the 
end  of  the  exercise  it  had  all  of  its  men  at  500 
yards,  the  "points"  gained  for  "progress" 
would  be  100.  The  following  example  taken  at 
random  from  the  scores  of  a  nunil)er  of  com- 
])anics  will  illustrate  the  process.  It  is  assumed 
in  this  instance  that  the  company  should  have 

made  207o   of  hits: 
(a)     Accuracy: 

JiW     hits        .^,^  '2.r.7r',:^-^^J"     Uivrs    12.S.V;;,   or    12.9. 
1,904,  shots  20.0 


250  Battle  Fire  Training 

(b)  Distribution: 

°^ —  gives  54.0%   of  the  possible,  or  54.0. 

60  figures 

(c)  Time,  or  success.     Did  not  succeed.     Value  00.0. 

(d)  Progress: 

7  men  at  755  yards,  is  16.2%  of  the  company  at  755. 
36  men  at  810  yards,  is  83.8%  of  the  company  at  810. 
16.2%  X  .36  gives     5.83   (755  yds.  from  table  "is  36). 
83.8%  X  .23  gives  19.30   (810  yds.  from  table  is  23). 

25.13 

Recapitulation: 

First  Case     Second  Case 

(a)  Accuracy   58.5  12.9 

(b)  Distribution    72  54 

(c)  Time    33  00 

(d)  Progress    100  25.1 

263.5  92.0 

•  The  following  plan  for  the  transmission  of 
information  from  the  pit  to  the  umpire  has 
been  found  satisfactory.  Telephone  connec- 
tions from  the  pit  to  a  convenient  point  in  rear 
of  the  first  firing  position.  At  this  point  a 
post  is  erected  which  can  be  plainly  seen  from 
all  parts  of  the  range.  A  movable  arm  is 
fastened  on  the  post  and  the  size  of  the  unit 
which  is  permitted  to  advance  is  indicated  by 
the  position  of  the  arm.  An  assistant  to  the 
umpire,  provided  with  the  necessary  tables,  is 
charged  with  the  duty  of  indicating  the  size 
of  the  unit  to  advance. 

Situation:  Battalion 

In  the  battalion  problem  it  is  assumed  that 
the   detached    company   was    unsuccessful.      If 


Combat  Practice  251 

such  WHS  nctuiilly  the  case  the  initial  firing 
position  of  the  battalion  is  placed  at  a  point 
in  the  advance  corresponding  to  the  point 
reached  by  the  advance  of  the  average  com- 
pany. Thus,  if  "A"  company  reaches  600 
yards,  "B"  650  yards,  "C"  675  yards,  "D" 
700  yards,  tlic  initial  battalion  position  would 
be  about  656  yards.  If  the  companies  are 
successful  the  initial  point  must  be  chosen  with 
the  idea  of  meeting  the  requirements  of  the 
problem.  Three  companies  of  the  battalion  are 
located  at  or  near  the  point  at  which  their 
advance  was  originally  assumed  to  have  been 
stopped.  The  fourth  company  is  in  position 
at  the  point  selected  for  opening  fire.  The 
situation  is  assumed  to  be  that  at  the  beginning 
of  the  last  10  minutes  of  the  preceding  problem, 
the  company  in  the  line  has  10  rounds  of  ammu- 
nition, the  balance  of  its  allowance  of  45  rounds 
is  in  bandoleers  in  the  hands  of  the  other  com- 
p.Miies.  It  is  assumed  that  this  ammunition 
was  obtained  by  a  redistribution  in  the 
battalion. 
Action: 

When  all  is  ready  the  battalion  is  made 
acquainted  with  the  situation.  When  sufficient 
time  has  been  allowed  to  transmit  this  informa- 
tion to  the  companies,  a  message  is  handed  to 
the  battalion  commander  from  the  company  on 


252  Battle  Fire  Training 

the  firing  line.  This  message  states:  "Enemy 
reenforced  by  about  one  company.  Losses 
heavy.  Am  unable  to  advance  further.  Ten 
rounds  of  ammunition  per  man  left."  When  the 
battalion  commander  digests  this  infornlation, 
fire  is  opened  by  the  company  in  position  and 
the  problem  begins.  The  tactical  situation  is 
designed  to  require  reenforcing  by  two  com- 
panies at  once.  The  final  company  being 
thrown  into  the  line  upon  the  initiative  of  the 
battalion  commander  or  upon  the  intimation 
of  the  umpire  that  its  fire  is  necessary.  The 
action  is  continued  until  the  ammunition  is 
practically  .  exhausted,  when  the  battalion  is 
tested  in  its  ability  to  charge.  Extra  ammuni- 
tion for  the  first  company  on  the  line  is  deliv- 
ered to  it  by  the  first  supports  sent  forward. 
In  order  that  reenforcemcnts  may  reach  the 
company  on  the  line- before  its  ammunition  is 
exhausted  the  place  of  the  receipt  of  the  mes- 
sage by  the  battalion  commander  may  have  to 
be  arbitrarily  assumed. 

Targets: 

The  original  company  targets  plus  additions 
necessary  to  bring  the  target  to  a  size  sufficient 
for  a  battalion.  If  facilities  are  available  these 
additional  targets  should  be  made  to  appear  at 
intervals  so  as  to  finally  require  the  absorption 
of  the  entire  support  or  reserve  into  the  firing 


4 
Combat  Practice  253 

liiic.  In  the  probk-in  from  wliicli  tliis  exercise 
was  taken  F  targets  placed  on  sleds  were  drawn 
into  position  to  represent  reenforcements. 
Unfortunately,  witli  such  a  large  number  of 
targets  it  is  not  possible  to  read  hits  as  made. 
Movements  of  the  battalion  forward,  therefore, 
cannot  he  controlled  by  its  fire  effect.  Much 
training,  however,  can  be  given  in  switching, 
concentrating,  and  crossing  fire  without  any 
movement  forward,  if  it  is  desired  to  omit  this 
feature.  Such  adjustments  of  fire  being  made 
to  meet  assumed  phases  of  the  situation,  a 
description  of  which  is  transmitted  verbally 
by  the  umpire  to  the  battalion  commander. 

Scoring: 

The  following  method  of  scoring  by  which 
percentages  made  may  be  reduced  to  points  for 
purposes  of  comparison  is  practicable. 

(a)  Per  cent  of  hits  to  shots  fired. 

(b)  Per  cent  of  figures  hit  to  shots  fired. 
The  highest  percentage  of  hits  to  shots  fired 

is  given  the  value  of  1,000.  All  other  per  cents 
Diade   by   other  battalions   are   proportional   to 

this  value.     Thus: 

3d   Rn.   X    Inf.    (Tlie  highest  l)attali(>n).      Percentage  of 

hits   10.82.     Value   1,000. 
1st  Bn.  Y  Inf.    Percentage  of  hits  9.01.     Vahie  833,  for 

10.82   :   1,000   ::  9.01    :  833. 

TJie  iu'ghest  percentage  of  figures  hit  to 
shots  fired  is  similarly  given  the  value  of  1,000 


254  Battle  Fire  Training 

and  all  other  percentages  referred  to  this  stan- 
dard in  a  similar  manner,  thus : 
3d  Bn.  X  Inf.   (The  highest  battalion).     Percentage  of 

figures  struck  to  shots  fired  2.321.     Value  1,000. 
1st   Bn.   Y   Inf.     Percentage  of  figures   struck  to  shots 

fired  was   1.608.     Value  692,  for 

2.821    :  1000   ::  1.608   :  692. 

The  score  would  be : 

3d  Bn.  X  Inf.  1st  Bn.  Y  Inf. 

(a)  1,000  (a)        833 

(b)  1,000  (b)        692 

2,000  1,525 

If  it  is  desired  to  include  the  element  of 
time  a  third  percentage  may  be  included,  as 
(c)  Percentage  of  figures  hit  to  seconds  of 
firing.  In  this  event  the  possible  total  would 
be  3,000. 


APPENDIX 

THE  CASEY  FIRING  PROBLEM 
Durinp  the  1913  national  and  international  matches 
at  Camp  Perry,  tiiere  was  tried  out  a  problem  in  field 
firinp,  devised  by  Ca])tain  K.  K.  V.  Casey,  Adjutant, 
2d  Infantry,  N.  G.  P.,  which  seems  so  well  adapted  for 
use  on  tiie  ordinary  target  range,  alid  so  full  of  inter- 
esting possibilities,  that  the  following  description  and 
comments  are  given  out  in  hope  that  out  of  any  discus- 
sion of  them  may  come  some  good  to  the  service  in 
general. 

Statement  of  the  Problem 

In  brief,  a  representation  is  made  of  an  attack  by  a 
platoon  of  infantry  over  open  ground  upon  a  prepared 
position  defended  by  an  inferior  force.  The  jilatoon 
consists  of  four  squads,  and  the  target  represents  a  line 
of  16  men. 

Ground:  The  ground  required  is  a  strip  about  1,300 
yards  long  and  200  yards  wide,  with  suital)le  protection 
for  the  observers  at  the  target;  such  a  strij)  as  may  be 
found  on  most  service  target  ranges. 

Target:  The  target  is  mounted  on  eight  fi' x  12' 
target  frames,  so  as  to  form  a  continuous  target  12  feet 
high  and  48  feet  long.  It  is  divided  by  horizontal  lines 
into  six  zones,  each  two  feet  high.  The  background  is 
of  buff  or  neutral  tinted  pa])er.  On  each  of  the  eight 
sections  of  the  target  are  stenciled  or  pasted  two  of  the 
ordinary  jirone  silhouettes,  in  olive  drab  color,  with  the 
bottoms  of  the  figures  on  the  center  horizontal  line,  and 
so  placed  as  to  be  3  feet  apart  from  center  to  center. 
Each  figure  is  marked  with  a  number  10,  that  lieing  the 
value  assigned  to  a  figure  hit.  The  zones  from  the  l)ot- 
tom  upward  are  marked  in  succession  with  the  value 
assigned  to  hits  in  each,  namely:  1,  3,  .'5,  G  (remaining 
space  in  the  zone  of  figures),  4,  and  2. 

Firing  Line:  'I'he  firing  line  is  a  platoon  of  .T2  men, 
properly  organized  as  in  I.  D.  R.,  with  a  j)latoon  leader 


Notk:  This  same  problpin  was  fired  at  Oalvpston,  Texas,  in 
1913.  The  (arcet  jircscnted  for  fire  was  similar  to  the  one 
drRorihpd.  In  addition,  a  sorondary  tarpnt  was  placed  in  a  pit 
in  rear  of  the  first  which  consisted  of  a  series  of  targets  such  as 
are  used  on  the  target  range.  This  i)prniitted  of  an  accurate 
record  of  hits  inade  each  minute  of  firing.      Plate   46. 


11 

1- 

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i 

.           „ 

- 

r~t           V 

d 

-           " 

- 

e 

d 
d 

«           « 

<p 

,.      , 

d 
d 

«           o 

d 

d 

rf>            *o 

- 

d 
d 

«          'n 

- 

\ 

d 
d 

^        f^ 

1 

1^ 


Combat  Practice  25' 


aiicl  ;i  platoon  guitlc.  Ninety  rounds  of  hall  cartridges 
are  issued. 

Other  Arrangeiucnlx :  In  the  ])it  tiicre  should  he  an 
ohserver  for  each  section  of  the  tarj^et,  and  a  chief 
ol);  ervcr,  who  is  connected  l)y  a  field  telephone  with  the 
officer  conducting  the  test.  The  latter  is  accompanied 
by  a  musician  with  a  trumpet.  Under  the  control  of  the 
chief  ohserver  is  a  large  flag  or  disk  so  arranged  that  it 
liiay  be  jilaced  vertically,  lowered  to  an  angle  of  45° 
or  withdrawn  from  sight. 

Conduct  of  the  Test :  The  platoon,  when  the  target 
is  ready,  is  deployed  into  line  of  skirmishers,  with  an 
interval,  for  safety,  of  20  yards  between  squads.  The 
officer  conducting  the  test  then  causes  the  musician  to 
sound  "Attention";  "Conunence  Firing."  No  other  com- 
mands will  he  given  by  him  excejiting  in  ca.-^e  of  acci- 
d'-nt,  iiiiringemcnt  of  the  rules,  or  interruption  of  the 
(vcrci'e.  Tiie  conduct  of  the  jilatoon  is  in  the  hands  of 
the  platoon  leader. 

When  "("onmience  Pairing"  is  sounded,  the  platoon 
Degins  its  advance  and  the  chief  o!).' ervcr  at  the  pit  is 
notified;  also  as  it  reaches  a  j)oint  about  1,200  yards 
from  the  target,  when  he  causes  the  flag  to  be  raised 
••'crtically.  The  chief  obi-erver  is  also  notified  at  what 
ranges  the  firing  is  taking  j)lace.  Firing  may  begin 
\' hen  the  line  has  pas.' ed  the  1,200  yard  point,  and  the 
time  is  taken  as  it  passes  that  point.  In  thirty  minutes 
Ti-om  tliat  tin:e  the  director  causers  "Cease  Firing," 
Assemble,"   to   l)e  sounded   and   the  exercise   ceases. 

Rules:  The  principles  of  attack  over  open  ground 
will  be  observed.  If  the  director  believes  that  the 
advance  is  i)eing  improjierly  conducted,  or  that  signals 
are  not  being  olieyed,  he  uiay  cause  "Halt"  to  i)e 
mounded,  when  all  will  cease  firing.  When  the  nuitter 
has  been  adjusted,  "Commence  Firing"  is  again  sounded. 
\o  time  is  taken  out   for  such   j)ause>. 

While  the  flag  is  vertical,  no  advance  may  be  made; 
when  it  is  at  45°,  advance  may  be  made  by  individuals, 
and  when  it  is  withdrawn,  advance  may  be  made  by 
squad. 

Wlien  "C'ea'e  firing,  Assemble"  is  .sounded,  firing  will 
cease  and  the  jTlatoon  will  a^^scmljle.  If  time  ])erinits  it 
may  i)e  marciied  close  ♦^o  the  targets  to  observe  the  effect. 

Method  (if  (isrcrtdinintj  tchen  superior. ty  of  fire  is 
obtained:     Each  observer  at   the  jiit  endeavors  to  keep 


Combat  Practice  259 


account  of  the  number  of  liits  per  minute  on  his  section 
of  the  tarfret,  and  at  short  intervals  tiie  chief  oi)server 
asks  for  results,  governing  the  ])osition  of  tlie  flag 
accordingly.  y\n  arbitrary  rule  nuist  govern  in  order  to 
obtain  results  for  com])arison. 

The   question   of   distrii)uti()n    and    the    dctcrniiiiation 
of  when  to  change  the  signal  flag,  was  tentatively  solved 
by   the   following  arbitrary    rule   +   hits   of   value   below 
four  not  counted: 
Distance      Shots  per  minute      Distribution  Unit 

in  proper  zone  on  target   ,  to  advance 

1,200—1,000  1  6  out  of  8  Squad 

4  out  of  8       Individual 
1,000—    800  2  G  out  of  8  Squad 

4  out  of  8       Individual 
800—    600  3  6  out  of  8  Squad 

4  out  of  8       Individual 
600—    500  4  6  out  of  8  Squad 

4  out  of  8        Individual 
This  arbitrary  rule  was  determined  upon  after  giving 
due  weight  to  the  following  points: 

1.  In  actual  service  the  attacking  line  will  not  open 
fire  at  such  extreme  ranges  as  1,200  yards  unless  their 
losses  are  so  great  .as  to  make  it  absolutely  necessary. 
In  the  case  under  consideration  it  is  assumed  that  the 
attackers  came  under  effective  rifle  fire  as  soon  as  they 
emerged  from  the  woods — in  other  words,  at  about  1,200 
yards,  and  that  the  advance  was  to  h€  made  over  ground 
without  cover  of  any  kind.  At  tlie  extreme  ranges,  fire 
superiority  would  be  obtained  by  fewer  hits,  or  near  hits, 
than  would  be  necessary  at  the  shorter  ranges.  One  hit 
per  minute  on  six  out  of  eight  targets  at  1,200  yards  was 
assumed  to  give  fire  superiority,  and  one  bit  ]ier  minute 
on  four  out  of  eight  targets  was  assumed  to  be  sufficient 
to  permit  an  advance  to  be  made  I)y  individuals. 

2.  As  the  attacking  line  advanced  to  the  .shorter 
ranges,  its  fire  would  hecome  more  accurate,  but,  at  the 
same  time,  the  fire  of  the  defenders  would  also  increase 
in  accuracy  and  the  greater  number  of  hits  per  minute 
would  be  necessary  in  order  to  obtain  fire  superiority. 
This  increase  in  the  number  of  hits  was  assumed  to 
require  two  hits  ])er  minute  at  800  to  (iOO  yards,  and 
four  hits  per  minute  at  600  yards  and  closer — all  with 
the  same  distribution.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  believed 


260  Battle  Fire  Training 

that  the  distribution  should  have  been  7/8  and  5/8  at  the 
decisive  ranges  in  order  to  obtain  superiority. 

3.  The  rate  of  fire  at  the  long  ranges,  to  obtain  good 
results,  must  be  much  less  than  at  tfie  shorter  ranges, 
and  this  applies  to  both  attackers  and  defenders.  This 
was  an  additional  reason  for  requiring  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  hits  to  obtain  fire  superiority  as  the  attacking 
line  approached  the  objective. 

Deterviining  the  Relatire  Efflc'ency :  At  the  termi- 
nation of  the  exercise,  the  number  of  hits  in  each  zone 
is  counted,  and  the  values  are  given  as  indicated  on  the 
target.  The  method  of  attributing  values  to  hits  on 
different  zones  of  the  target  is  this: 

The  success  of  the  attack  depends  primarily  on 
superiority  of  fire.  This  is  obtained  when  the  enemy's 
fire  is  kept  down,  and  anything  that  makes  him  keep 
his  head  under  cover  contributes  to  superiority.  So. 
shots  striking  close  in  front  or  between  the  figures  are 
valued  next  to  actual  hits,  and  next  come  shots  just 
overhead.      (See  diagram  of  target,  Figure  45.) 

Valuation  for  proper  distriliution  of  fire  is  obtained 
as  follows:  The  target  is  divided  into  four  groups  of 
two  sections  each.  The  value  of  hits  in  each  group  is 
determiried  separately.  Then  the  totals  are  multiplied 
by  the  following  weights :  the  two  highest,  by  1 ;  the 
next  highest,  by  2;  the  lowest,  by  3;  and  the  totals 
added. 

It  is  readily  seen  that  credit  is  thus  given  for  distri- 
bution of  fire.  For  example,  one  platoon  has  made  hits 
of  a  total  value  of  400,  distributed  equally  on  all  four 
sections;    the  score  would  be: 

1st  Section    100  X  1  =  100 

2nd   Section    100  X  1  =  100 

3rd  Section  100  X  2  =  200 

4th  Section   100  X  3  =  300 

Total     700 

Another  platoon  has  the  same  total  value  of  hits,  but 
unevenly  distributed,  then: 

1st  Section    IGO  X  1  =  160 

2nd  Section 150  X  1  =  150 

3rd  Section   60  X  2  =  120 

4th  Section   30  X  3  =    90 

Total     620 


Coi/thdt  Fmctice  -01 


N'ahiation  is  also  pivcn  for  llie  distance  advanced  by 
tilt"  j)lat()on,  as  follows: 

At  tlie  termination  of  tlie  exercise,  note  is  made  of 
the  position  of  the  fractions  of  the  line.  For  purpose  of 
valuation  the  range  is  divided  into  50-yard  zones  and 
vahics  assigned  as  in  tlie  table  below.  The  numlier  of 
men  wiu)  ha\e  a(l\a/iced  into  any  zone  is  multiplied  i)y 
the  value  given  for  the  /.one,  and  tiie  total  is  added  to 
the   target   score. 

Zone  Value 

1,200   0 

1,150    10 

1,100    20 

1,050    30 

1,000   40 

950    50 

900 00 

850   65 

800    70 

750    76 

700   80 

(i50   85 

()00   90 

650    95 

500   100 

For  example,  if  12  men  have  reached  the  700-yard 
zone,  and  20  men  were  at  750  yards,  the  total  score  for 
distance  will  be: 

(80  X  12  =  960)   +   (76  X  20  =  1,500)    =  2,460 

Comments 
The  foregoing  problem  affords  an  excellent  means  of 
drilling  the  company  in  most  of  tlie  features  of  the 
conduct  of  fire.  It  will  be  found  that  imjiroper  distrii)u- 
tion,  incorrect  range,  inattention  to  signals,  indifferent 
rushes,  improjicr  rate  of  fire,  and  in  general  ]ioor  fire 
direction,  control,  and  discijiiine  will  react  very  jironrptly 
and  to  the  great  disadvantage  of  the  firing  unit.  The 
rate  of  advance,  that  is  the  attainment  of  success,  is  in 
delicate  adjustment  with  the  projier  conduct  of  fire. 
Even  slight  errors  make  themselves  manifest  very 
(|uickly.  It  is  this  condition  that  gives  the  problem,  per- 
haps, its  greatest  value.  This  results  from  the  fact  that 
commanders   of   all    grades    are   almo.st   in.stantly    niad* 


262  Battle  Fire  Training 

aware  that  they  have  failed  in  some  particular.  It 
becomes  at  once  incumbent  upon  them  not  only  to  dis- 
cover their  error  but  to  apply  the  remedy.  The  burden 
of  the  fault  is  placed  where  it  belongs  and  this  in  so 
conspicuous  a  manner  that  improvement  is  almost  sure 
to  follow,  for  publicity  of  error  is  a  strong  incentive  for 
advancement. 

The  problem  is  an  artificial  one  and  therefore  it  is 
to  be  expected  that  artificial  conditions  will  arise  in  its 
solution.  As  long  as  good  results  are  produced  these 
conditions  will  do  no  harm  provided  it  is  made  plain  to 
all  that  they  are  artificial  and  not  those  to  be  expected 
upon  the  battlefield.  In  this  connection  may  be  men- 
tioned the  extreme  range  at  which  fire  is  opened,  the 
intervals  between  squads,  the  obliquing  of  the  rushes, 
for  which  there  would  be  no  room  in  battle,  to  avoid 
danger,  the  absence  of  a  tactical  idea,  the  absence  of  a 
support  or  reserve,  and  the  necessity  which  might  at 
times  arise  for  individuals  other  than  unit  leaders  to 
control  rushes  according  to  the  position  of  the  flag. 

It  was  found  in  practice,  that  to  obtain  the  best 
results,  long  and  fairly  slow  rushes  should  bf  made  and 
that  other  things  being  equal  the  rush  should  halt  on  the 
edge  of  a  zone  instead  of  crossing  into  it,  even  though 
a  slightly  better  firing  position  might  be  obtained  a  little 
farther  in  advance.  These  are  mere  expedients  which  do 
very  well  to  meet  the  conditions  at  hand  but  like  the 
points  mentioned  above  must  be  explained  to  the  men 
and  ofBcers  so  that  erroneous  inferences  will  not  be 
drawn. 

While  the  wording  of  the  problem  is  rather  indefinite 
with  regard  to  the  stopping  of  a  rush  once  started,  it 
will  be  found  more  satisfactory  if  a  unit  on  its  feet  and 
advancing  is  allowed  to  continue  the  advance  to  its 
logical  conclusion.  That  is  to  the  most  advanced  posi- 
tion at  that  time  occupied  by  the  platoon.  If  this  is 
not  done  the  platoon  may  be  split  into  several  echelons 
which  increases  the  danger  and  gives  rise  to  unsatisfac- 
tory conditions.  If,  however,  any  fraction  of  a  unit  is 
advancing  to  a  firing  position  not  as  yet  occupied  it 
should  be  required  to  halt  at  once  if  fire  superiority  is 
lost. 


Combat  Practice  263 


THE  RECORDS 

(From  pamphlet  on  Combat  Firing  by  The  School 
of  Musketry) 

TitKRE  AHK  TWO  DISTINCT  TYl'ES  OI'   RECORDS,  THE   "UmFIUe's 

Record"  and  the  "Statistical  Record." 
Ttc'o  Types: 

The  "Umpire's  Record"  furnishes  the  basis  for  the 
critique  delivered  by  the  umpire,  on  the  ground,  at  the 
completion  of  the  exercise,  and  consists  of  two  parts. 
The  first  part  covers  the  tactical  phase  of  the  exercise, 
fire  direction,  control,  and  disci]iline,  as  a  result  of  the 
()l)servation  of  the  umpire.  The  second  part  is  statistical 
in  character  and  covers  essential  data  from  which  the 
umpire  draws  conclusions  and  expresses  an  opinion 
uj)on  the  effectiveness  of  the  fire  as  affecting  the  accom- 
l)lishment  of  the  mission.  The  "Statistical  Record"  is  a 
memorandum  of  the  data  essential  to  a  thorough 
analytical  study  of  the  exercise,  both  as  to  its  execution 
and  the  material  results  obtained. 

The  U.'mpire's  Record 
The  form  for  the  RECtfRu  should  be  simple — The  num- 
ber   OF    figures    hit    is    the    deciding    factor — The 
Umpire's  Reit-:rence  Tables. 
Simplicity  of  Form: 

The  data  for  tiiis  record  should  be  of  such  a  character 
that  it  can  lie  ol)tainod  quickly  without  reference  to  long 
forunilas,  numerous  tal)l('s  of  factors,  etc.  II  must  l)c 
as  simple  as  the  ITmpire's  Record  in  a  maneuver  prob- 
lem, if  not  simpler,  for  tiie  criticpic  i)ased  u])()n  this 
record  is  never  carried  into  tiie  "lecture  tent"  but  deliv- 
ered on  the  ground. 

It  will  l)e  noted  that  the  Umpire's  Record  as  ex- 
l)lained  iierein  contains  all  data  (except  numijcr  of  hits 
i'x])ected)  referred  to  in  "records,"  par.  22fi,  S.  A.  F.  M., 
and  tliat  the  excepted  data  is  contained  in  the  "Statis- 
tical  Record." 

The  following  idea,  which  controls  decisions  in  man- 
euvers, should  govern  in  the  determination  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  "l'in])ire's  Record"  in  a  combat  exercise: 

"The  effect  of  fire  is  influenced  by  so  many  considera- 
tions that  it  is  impossil)le  to  predict  the  result  with 
accuracy. 


264  Battle  Fire  Training 

"Tliere  are  many  factors  whose  effect  cannot  be  com- 
puted. However,  by  practice  in  calculating  losses  in 
liypotlietical  cases,  a  kiiowledfre  of  the  principal  faclors 
governing  the  effect  of  fire  is  obtained,  and  a  faculty 
acquired  of  quickly  estimating  their  influence  or  effect 
upon  troops.  This  faculty,  umpires  are  supposed  to  have 
acquired  by  previous  study  and  experience.  At  maneu- 
vers there  is  no  time  to  make  complicated  calculations 
or  to  consult  a  table  of  losses ;  the  umpires,  therefore, 
decide  promptly  according  to  their  best  judgment." — 
Par.  16,  Regulations  for  Field  Maneuvers,  U.  S.  Army. 

Distribution  Factor: 

The  considerations  influencing  the  effect  of  fire  are 
numerous  and  while  some  of  them  can  be  clearly  shown 
in  terms  of  hits  made,  or  figures  struck,  there  are  many 
which  must  be  based  entirely  on  observation  and  oj^inion. 
However,  so  soon  as  the  prikcipal  factors  are  known, 
ironi  a  consideration  of  the  record  of  any  firing,  a 
trained  umpire  can  at  once  express  an  intelligent  deci- 
sion as  to  the  probable  result  of  the  action.  What  is 
wanted  is  a  proTupt  decision  from  the  best  obtainable 
judgment  as  to  the  efficacy  of  the  fire  and  the  solution 
of  the  fire  problem. 

In  order  to  add  force  to  the  decision,  it  is  sometimes 
advisable  to  make  a  comparison  with  average  shots.  In 
order  that  this  comparison  may  not  involve  "complicated 
calculations"  various  tal)les  have  been  combined  in  order 
that  the  percentage  of  figures  struck  may  be  taken  from 
the  t;ii>!('  at  a  glance  and  without  computation.  The 
combined  table  represents  the  result  expected  from  aver- 
age shots  firing  at  a  correct  maximum  rate  and  distrib- 
uting their  fire  perfectly  while  using  the  correct  sight 
setting. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Accomplishment 
OF  THE  Mission  in  a  fire  problem  is  based  usually  ox 

THE     number    of    TARGETS    DISABLED.       ThE     "COMPARISON," 
therefore,    is    BASED   ON    THIS    FACTOR. 

Ah  Ca])tain  Eames  expresses  it:  "The  ultimate  mea- 
sure of  efficiency  is  not  the  percentage  of  hits,  nor  the 
number  of  hits,  l)ut  the  number  of  figures  disabled  in  a 
giien  space  of  time.'' 

Umpire's  Reference  Tables: 

The  tables  for  use  by  the  umpire  in  making  the  com- 
parison are  shown  and  their  use  explained  below. 


Combat  Pr/ict'ice 


26t 


The  two  tallies  whicli  follow,  if  printed  on  both  sides 
of  a  card  of  convenient  size,  would  be  of  value  to  umpires 
not  only  as  a  ready  reference  in  Judfjiiif;  of  the  results 
of  fire,  but  also  in  formulating  problems  with  ball 
cartridges. 

There  are  problems  in  which  the  use  of  these  tables 
would  lie  neither  feasible  nor  necessary,  and  others  in 
wliich  the  decision  of  the  umj)ire  is  amply  supported  by 
his  own  judpnent.  So  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that 
the  use  of  these  tables  is  in  any  sense  mandatory,  but 
rather  that,  when  the  umpire  believes  their  use  possil)le 
and  desirable,  they  may  serve  liim  as  a  guide  in  arriving 
at  a  decision  or  as  a  st;mdard  whereby  he  may  fortify 
or  confirm  a  decision  already  made. 

"In  all  cases  wiiere  it  is  a  matter  of  passing  on 
the  merits  of  a  combat  firing  exercise,  individual  judg- 
ment must  come  into  play  and  numerous  modifications 
and  allowances  be  made  to  suit  the  particular  circum- 
stances of  the  case." — Mclver. 


(Oltvorse) 


UMPIRE'S  REFERENCE  TABLE 
Pkonk  FiurRis 
Time — Minutes 


Yards 

V4 

66 
63 

% 

1 

\.\<2 

99 

.991 

99 ,100 
09 \ 100 

3'/^ 

4 

5 

6 

10 

15 

20 

25 

30 

200 

4i 
39 

80  Soi  96 
7S   ftVi  93 

300 

30 
30 

23 
23 

52 
51 

41 
41 

66 
63 

55 

77  iJ9 
76     88 

94|  98|  99 
.9^  9S.    99 

99 
99 

98 
98 

99 
99 

99 
99 

100 
100 

99 

100 
100 







400 

66 
66 

80 
80 

88 
88 

93]  96 
9»|  96 

500 

19 
16 

ir, 

12 

34 
29 

28 

22 

46 
40 

38 

31 

57 
30 

48 

40 

71 
63 

62 

5:< 

81 

7.5 

8S;  92 
sa.   87 

95 
91 

90 

83 

97 
94 

92 

87 

99 
98 

"^ 

92 

99 
9.9 

98 

95 

100 
100 

100 

99 

100 



600 
700 

73 
63 

80|  86 
721-78 

-- 

800 

9 

17 

25 

32 

44 

54 

62  68 

5l|  58 

1 
41|  47 

74 
64 
54 

79 
68 
57 

85 
76 
66 

90 

~82 
72 

98 
94 

88 

99 
99 
96 

100 
99 

100 
99 

900 

7 

13 

19 

25 

35 

44 
35 

1,000 

5 

10 

15 

19 

27 

100 

Note:      Figures  in   body   of  table   indicate   the  percentage  of  figures  that 
should  be  struck.     Those  in   italic  indicate   "battle  sight." 


266 


Battle  Fire  Training 


(Reverse)  UMPIRE'S  REFERENCE  TABLE 

Kneeling  Figures 
Time — Minutes 


Range     |      | 
Yards      I  Vi  1 1/2 


I      I 
1111/2 


73l86 
72185 


98|    99 
9S\    99 


93|    99 
921    98 


I  i 

2     2% 


100 
100 


100 
100 


31/2 


I.     I 


\36 

\39 

174 

\84 

\93\ 

98\ 

96 

88 

99\ 

99 

100\ 

500 

32 
24 

54 
41 

69  79 
55\66 

90 
SO 

98 
93 

99 
96 

99 
98 

100 
99 

99 

100 

600 

26 

46 

60 

70 

84 

91 

95 

99 

99 

99 

100 

700 

21 

38 

51 

61 

76 

85 

91 

94 

97 

98 

99 

99 

100 

800 

17 

30 

42 

52 

66 

77 

84 

89 

92 

95 

98 

99 

100 

900 

13 

24 

34 

■ 

42 

56 

67 

75 
64 

81 
71 

85 

89 

94 
87 

97 



91 

99 

100 

1,000 

.0 

18|26 

331  46 

1 

56 

76 

80 

99|100 

1 

Note:  Figures  in  body  of  table  indicate  the  percentage  of 
figures  tliat  siiould  be  struck.  Tliose  in  italic  indicate  "battle 
sight." 

Use  of  Tables  ik  Judging  Results  of  Fire 

General  Use  in  Judging  Results — Description  of  the 
Tables — Use  under  Normal  Conditions — Use  under 
Variable  Conditions. 

General  Use  in  Judging  Results: 

All  tables  of  expected  results  are  based  on  the  theory 
of  probability.  The  tabulated  results  are  therefore 
"probable"  results.  Any  concrete  case  is  mathematically 
as  likely  to  result  in  a  higher  as  in  a  lower  figure  and  in 
a  great  number  of  cases  there  will  be  as  many  on  one 
side  of  the  "probable"  as  on  the  other. 

This  fact  applied  to  tables  of  expected  hits  from 
average  shots  means  tliat  average  shots  firing  an  indefi- 
nite number  of  identical  problems  will  have  an  average 
result  in  direct  hits  equal  to  that  shown  in  the  table,- 
but  with  as  many  results  below  as  above  the  "probable." 
When  we  seek  to  compare  the  result  attained  by  a  firing 


Combat  Practice  267 

group  in  a  concrete  case  with  the  tabulated  probable 
result  of  average  shots,  we  should  renieniljcr  that  the 
averaL'c  sliots  tluMiisi-ives  in  the  firing  would  often  attain 
a  number  of  hits  higher  (or  lower)  than  the  probable 
and  that  the  purpose  of  the  comparison  with  the  prob- 
ai)le  is  merely  that  we  may  have  some  standard  of  com- 
parison. We  would  not  exj^ect  average  shots  to  hit  upon 
this  same  standard  every  time  they  fired  nor  would  we 
expect  the  firing  group  in  any  concrete  case  to  do  so. 
Judgment  is  needed  to  determine  whether  the  departure 
in  the  concrete  case  is  normal  or  abnormal  in  amount. 
The  fact  tliat  it  is  above  or  below  is  al)solutely  imma- 
terial, it  is  only  the  amount  of  the  departure  that  is  of 
value  in  forming  a  judgment  from  the  comparison. 

Description: 

The  amounts  in  the  body  of  the  table  indicate  the ' 
percentages  of  figures  that  should  be  struck  by  any 
number  of  average  shots  firing  at  an  equal  number  of 
figures  arranged  to  represent  a  linear  target  occupying 
a  front  of  one  yard  per  figure.  These  results  are  based, 
too,  on  the  further  assumption  that  the  correct  elevation 
and  rate  of  fire  is  used,  that  the  fire  is  distributed 
equally  throughout  the  entire  front  occupied  by  the 
target,  and  that  the  visibility  is  normal. 

Of  tliese  i^ven  factors,  tlie  following  four  are  depen- 
dent upon  the  skill  and  leadersliij)  of  the  firers,  i.  e.,  the 
use  of  correct  elevation  and  rate  of  fire,  the  equal  dis- 
tribution of  the  fire,  and  the  marksmanship  of  the  indi- 
vidual rifleman  (whether  he  is  good,  average,  or  poor 
shot).  As  these  factors  are,  in  a  .sen.se,  within  the  con- 
trol of  the  firers,  they  may  be  considered  as  constant  in 
so  far  as  the  use  of  the  table  is  concerned,  or,  rather, 
variable  only  in  that  they  would  serve  to  indicate  whether 
the  jierformance  had  been  good,  bad,  or  indifferent. 

The  other  three  factors — number  of  figures  in  the 
target,  number  of  figures  in  the  target  per  yard  front, 
and  the  degree  of  visil)ility  of  the  target — may  vary 
with  every  target  and  exercise,  and  visibility  may  vary 
even  for  the  same  target  at  different  hours  of  the  day. 

The  object  of  these  tables  is  to  give  to  the  umpire  a 
means,  with  the  minimum  of  computation,  of  finding  a 
standard  with  whicli  to  compare  the  results  of  any  firing. 
The  standard  adojited  is  the  single  amount  representing 
the    percentage    of    casualties    that    should    have    been 


2(58  Battle  Fire  Training 

obtained  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  (number  of  figures 
in  the  target  that  should  have  been  struck)  in  a  given 
time. 

In  order  that  the  percentages  of  figures  hit  can  be 
re;id  dircvtiy  fro:u  the  tnlile  and  thus  avoid  unnecessary 
computations  in  the  field,  it  is  suggested,  when  the  char- 
acter of  the  problem  permits,  that  the  target  contain  as 
many  figures  as  there  are  rifles  firing  and  that  the  figures 
be  spaced  on  a  frontage  of  one  per  yard. 
Normal  Conditions : 
Example  1. 

At  a  range  of  900  yards,  100  men  fire  for  two  minutes 
nt  a  line  of  iOO  kneelin<r  fifzures  on  a  front  of  100  yards. 
Visibility  perfect.     In  this  firing  they  strike  24  figures. 

'What  is  the  judgment  of  this  result? 

Consult  the  table  headed  "Kneeling  figures." 

In  the  column  headed  "Range,  yards"  find  the  amount 
900.  Follow  this  line  to  the  right  until  entering  the 
column  headed  "2"  (this  corresponds  to  the  time,  2  min- 
utes, duriilg  which  the  ^fire  continued),  where  is  found 
the  amount  67,  which  is  the  percentage  of  figures  that 
should  have  been  struck.  How  does  this  compare  with 
the  result  that  was  obtained? 

First  reduce  the  percentage  of  figure*  that  should 
have  been'  struck,  67,  to  number  of  figures,  in  this 
case  G7. 

Then   at   a   glance   the   umpire   can   see   that,   in   the 
allotted   time,  the  firing  resulted  in  a  little  more  than 
one-third  the  casualties  it  should  have  produced. 
Variable  Conditions : 
Example  2.     Reduced  visibility. 

Fifty  men  fire  at  50  prone  figures — normal  front — for 
two  minutes,  at  a  range  of  600  yards.  The  figures  are 
not  well  defined.  It  is  manifest  that  the  same  results 
can  not  be  expected  on  a  target  of  this  character  as  in 
one  that  is  clearly  visible,  hence  it  would  seem  advisable 
to  lower  the  standard.  It  is  only  a  question  of  how  and 
how  much.  This  is  a  matter  resting  entirely  upon  the 
judgment  of  the  imipire,  who  makes  an  estimate  of  the 
increased  difficulties  presented  to  the  firers  and  arrives 
at  a  decision  which  he  expresses  simjily  as  an  opinion, 
"The  visibility  of  the  target  is  such  in  this  problem  that 
a    reduction    of    efficiency    is    to    be    expected.      In    my 


Combat  Practice  2G9 


judjriiicnt   tlic  firing  of  this  organization  is  satisfactory 
(deficient,  etc.)." 

Should  tlic  uiii])irc  wish  to  base  this  opinion  upon  a 
computation  lie  may  do  so  in  tlic  manner  shown  below. 

The  umpire,  knowing  the  range  to  i)c  (iOO  yards,  for 
example,  says  to  himself,  "While  this  actual  range  is 
600  yards,  the  targets  aj)pcar  to  me  to  jircsent  all  the 
difficulties  of  a  clearly  visible  target  at  800  yards  and, 
as  there  is  no  aiming  point  that  can  be  used  which  is  as 
clearly  outlined  as  the  targets  themselves,  I  will  judge 
of  this  firing  by  the  800  yard  standard." 

Assume  .that  the  fire  resulted  in  20  figures  being 
struck.  Then  in  the  table  at  the  intersection  of  the 
SOO  yard  line  and  the  2-minute  column  is  found  the 
amount  5t,  which  is  the  percentage  that  should  have  been 
struck,  in  this  case  27  figures. 
Example  3. 
Numiier  of  firers  differing  from  the  number  of  figures 

Ml  the  target. 

Eighty  men  fire  at  40  prone  figures  for  one  minute 
at  a  range  of  700  yards. 

In  this  case  it  becomes  simj)ly  a  question  of  deter- 
mining in  what  time  it  would  take  a  number  of  riflemen 
e(jiial  to  the  number  of  figures  in  the  target  to  deliver 
an  amount  of  fire  equal  to  that  actually  delivered. 

In  this  case   10  men  firing  for  2  minutes  would  give 
the  same  amount  of  fire  as   80   men   for    1   minute,  and 
therefore  .should  strike  ()39'f,  or  25  of  the  figures. 
Example  4. 
'I'argcts  on  front  other  than  1   figure  jier  yard. 

Sixty  men  fire  at  fiO  prone  figures  on  ci  front  of  120 
yards  for  two  minutes  at  a  range  of  fiOO  yards.  As  the 
vuliieraliility  of  this  thin  line  is  only  half  that  of  a  line 
of  normal  density,  then  the  standard  is  sought  in  the 
column  indicating  half  the  time  actually  consumed.  In 
this  case  the  amount  sought  is  at  the  intersection  of 
the  f;00-yard  line  and  the  1-minute  column  and  is  found 
to  be  18'^,  or  29  figures,  which  is  the  number  of  figures 
that  should  have  been  struck. 
These  Tables  jiay  be  used  also  ix  ueteusiinino  Com- 

i>Aii;s()N      Fact.ws     of     Time      Axn      Men — ^And     in 

FORMIII-ATING    PnOBI.EJIS    WITH    BaI.I,    CAnmilKiES    AS    TO 
ni'IlATlON    OF   FIRE    AND   Nl'.MBER   OF  ROUNDS  TO   BE   ISSUED. 


270  Battle  Fire  Training 


Time  and  Men  Comparison: 

(a)  What  time  should  have  been  required  by  the 
firers  to  have  gotten  the  result  obtained? 

(I))  How  many  men  with  proper  sight  setting,  rate, 
and  distribution  could  have  produced  the  same  number 
of  casualties  in  the  actual  time  consumed  by  the  firers? 

Considering  the  first  question  (a)  and  referring  to 
the  example  where  100  men  fired  for  two  minutes  at  a 
range  of  900  yards  on  100  kneeling  figures  on  a  front 
of  100  yards  with  a  result  of  24  figures,  or  24%,  struck, 
visibility  perfect: 

Follow  the  range  line  (900)  to  the  right  until  encoun- 
tering an  amount  approximately  equal  to  the  percentage 
of  figures  actually  struck.  The  heading  of  the  time 
column  in  which  tliis  amount  is  found  will  be  the  answer 
sought,  In  this  example,  the  percentage  24,  is  found  on 
the  900-yard  line.  As  this  amount,  ^4,  is  found  in  the 
yg-minute  column,  the  umpire  arrives  at  the  conclusion 
that  the  firers  should  have  accomplished  what  they  did 
in   one-half  minute. 

Considering  the  second  question  (b)  and  referring 
to  the  same  example: 

This  is   answered  by  solving  this   simple  proportion: 

The  time  actually  consumed  :  The  time  that  should 
have  been  consumed  ::  Number  of  men  actually  firing 
:  The  numlier  of  men  required. 

In  this  example  it  would  be  2  :  i/^  : :  100  :  x,  or 
X  =  25.  That  is,  25  men  should  have  been  able  to  strike 
24  out  of  100  targets  in  two  minutes'  firing. 

Just  how  many  of  these  bases  of  comparison  are  used 
by  the  umpire  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  problem 
and  whether,  in  his  judgment,  the  tactical  situation  calls 
for  additional  emphasis  of  the  need  for  economy  of  time 
or  economy  of  men. 
Duration  of  Fire  and  Number  of  Rounds: 

(a)  How  long  to  continue  the  fire  at  any  particular 
target? 

(b)  How  much  ammunition  to  issue  for  any  par- 
ticular problem? 

(a)  It  is  obvious  that  if  the  fire  is  continued  too 
long  at  a  target,  the  percentage  of  figures  struck  ceases 
to  be  an  indication  of  the  efficacy  of  fire.  Thus,  for 
example,  no  conclusions  of  value  could  be  drawn  from 
the  results  of  fire  continued  for  more  than  one  minute 
on  kneeling  figures  at  200  yards,  or  for  more  than  Sy^ 
minutes  at  prone  figures  at  400  yards. 


Combat  Practice  271 


Hence  in  drawinjr  tip  the  jirohleni  the  uinjiire  may 
decide  on  what  j)erccntaf.'e  of  iifrurcs  lie  desires  to  have 
strucli  in  any  tariret,  and  then  (from  the  tal)le)  he  can 
determine  for  what  period  he  can  allow  thfc  fire  to 
continue. 

For  exain|)lc:  How  lonp  shall  fire,  continue  in  order 
to  strike  30  out  of  100  prone  fifrures  normal  front  at 
KOO  yards:-  From  the  tahle,  ojiposite  Ran^e  800  in  the 
1-minute  column,  is  found  32,  the  nearest  percentage 
to  30. 

For  an  equal  number  of  rifles,  this  would  he  about 
1  minute. 

For  200  rifles,  half  the  time. 

For  .50  rifles,  double  the  time. 

For  half  the  density  of  target  (1  figure  per  two  yards 
of  front),  double  the  time. 

(h)  To  estimate  the  amount  of  ammunition  to  issue 
for  any  ])articular  exercise,  multi])ly  the  duration  of 
fire  by  the  correct  rate  for  that  range  (See  Taiile  I, 
under  "Statistical  Record")  or  by  the  umpire's  estimated 
rate.  It  is  advisable  to  add  10%  to  this  estimate  in 
order  to  provide  ammunition  to  men  who.se  rate  of  fire 
is  greater  than  that  ordered.  This  is  to  equalize  the 
ammunition  unexpended  by  men  who  are  using  a  slower 
rate  than  ordered  due  to  either  lack  of  training,  ground, 
or  vegetation  preventing  vitw  of  assigned  targets,  to 
jams,  etc. 

Assume  an  exercise  in  which  four  targets  of  ]>rone 
figures  were  to  be  used  and  fire  to  be  continued  until 
30  to  iO  ])er  cent  of  the  figures  have  been  struck.  The 
range  to  Target  No.  1  is  about  800  yards,  to  No.  2  is 
700  yards,  to  No.  3  is  (500  yards,  and  to  No.  t  is  500 
yards. 

The  issue  of  anununition  would  be  computed  as 
follows: 

Target  Ranqc         Time         Hate       Rounds 

1    80*0  1  5.8  5.8 

2  .  .  -. 700  1  6.6  6.6 

3    COO  %  7.5  5.6 

4    500  %  8.3  6.2 

24.2 
Add  10%       2.4 

26.6 


272  Battle  Fire  Training 

That  is,  in  this  exercise,  30  rounds  per  man  would  be 
•  issued — 30  instead  of  27  merely  to  save  time  by  issuing 
only  full  clips. 

The    Umpire's   Record  should  embody   sufficient  data 
concerning  the  troops  on  which  to  b^vse  a  decision 

AS   TO 

1.  Leadership  and  Conduct. 

A.    Judged  from  the  Position  of  the  Troops. 
B>    Judged  from  the  Position  of  the  Target. 

2.  Fire  Effect. 

3.  The  Accomplishment  of  the  Mission. 

The  form  should  provide  for  the  principal  points  to 
observe  in  the  leadership  and  conduct  of  troops.  It 
should  include  such  basic  factors  in  the  result  of  their 
"fire  effect"  as  will  assist  in  quick  decisions.  The  ele- 
ments considered  in  1  and  2  above,  taken  in  connection 
with  a  decision  as  to  tlie  estimated  enemy  targets'  "fire 
effect"  (a  factor  too  frequently  neglected)  should  form 
the  basis  for  the  umpire's  decision  as  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  mission,  expressed  above  in  3. 

In  order  to  aid  the  umpire  in  delivering  the  critique, 
the  form  in  detail  should  cover  the  following  points: 
1.    Leadership  and  Conduct: 

(A)    Judged  from  the  PasUion  of  the  Troops. 

The  Major  General: 

(a)  Effective  supervision  of  battalion. 

(b)  Harmonizing  ranges. 

(c)  Tactical  orders. 

(d)  Regulating  ammunition  supply. 

(e)  Control  of  supports. 

(f)  Primary  apportionment  of  target. 

(g)  Provision  for  flank  protection. 

(h)    Observation  of  enemy  and  adjoining  troops, 
(i)     Depth  of  de])loyment,  extent  and  density  of 

firing  line, 
(j)     Fixing  bayonets, 
(k)    The  charge. 
fn  Attack: 

(a)    Selection  of  formation  in  which  to  advance. 
(1))     Direction  of  advance. 

(c)  Objective  for  each  company. 

(d)  The  general  object  or  special  problem  for  each 

company    or    the    order    and    front    of    each 
company. 


('o)uh(it  Pntct'ice  27*} 


(e)  Tlie  base  ooinpany. 

(f)  'rime  or  place  for  optMiiiij^  lire. 
In  Defense: 

(a)  Assigninout  of  sectors. 

(b)  Detcriiiination  of  ranges. 

(c)  Coniiminicalioii  to  companies. 
Captain.  7.v{  Sergeant,  and  IhKjlcrs: 

(a)  Leader's  kiio\vled.ij;e  of  tlie  situation. 

(b)  Explanation  of  the  situation  to  the  company. 

(c)  Reconnaissance  of  the  target. 

(d)  Use  of  field  glasses. 

(e)  Dangerous    grouping   of   platoon   leaders    and 

e-itiiiiators. 

(f)  Estimation  of  tlie  range. 

(g)  Designation  and  a])j)ortionTiient  of  target, 
(h)    Clearness  of  fire  orders  to  subordinates. 

(i)      Advance  of  the  unit  to  the  first  firing  position. 

(J)     Concealment. 

(k)    Time  of  jirepciration   from   receipt   of   situation 

to  "Commence  firing." 
(1)     Oi)servation  of  fire  effect. 

(m)   Correction  of  material  errors  in  sight  setting, 
(n)    Orders,   if  any,  for  distribution  of  ammunition. 

Its  economical  and  judicious  e.\])endiiu. 
(o)    The   position   of   the    1st   Sergeant   and    Buglers 

and  duties  performed, 
(p)    Time  of  cease  firing, 
(q)    Signals. 

Plalonn  Leaders  and  Guides: 
^.t)     Execution  of  the  ca])tain's  commands  and  diree 

tions. 
(!))     Announcement  of  correct  sight  setting. 

(c)  (Mearncss    in    designation    of    target    or    aiming 

point. 

(d)  Additional   instructions  given  to  carry   out  cap- 

tain's will. 

(e)  Correction  of  sight  setting. 

(f)  Designation  of  an  aiming  jioint. 

(g)  Oiiservation  of  fire  effect, 
(h)     U.se  of  field  glasses. 

(i)     Orders  to  platoon  guides. 
(.1)      Use  of  signals. 

(k)    Constant   communication   between   jjlatoon    lead- 
ers and  captain. 


274  Battle  Fire  Training 

(1)     Observation  and  regulation  of  the  rate  of  fire, 
(m)   Their  positions. 
Coiyorals : 

(a)  Alertness    for    commands    and    signals.      Proper 

transmission  of  signals. 

(b)  Observation  of  the  conduct  of  the  squad. 

(c)  Assistance  in  enforcing  fire  discipline  and  abate- 

ment of  excitement.  * 

(d)  Participation  in  the  firing. 

(e)  Their  positions. 
The  Privates: 

(a)  Use  of  cover. 

(b)  Excitement  or  confjision. 

(c)  Use    of    announced    sight    setting    and    change.-. 

directed. 

(d)  Firing  on  designated  objective  or  in  the  assigned 

sector  and  change  of  target  when  directed. 

(f)  Readily   responding  to  the  signals,   particularly 

"Commence,"  "Suspend,"  and  "Cease  Firing." 
(f)  Unnecessary  cessation  of  fire,  particularly  when 
bayonets  were  being  fixed,  sight  setting 
changed,  or  when  supports  joined  the  firing 
line. 

(B)    Judged  from  the  Position  of  the  Target. 

In  order  that  the  umpire  may  draw  a  more  accurate 
conclusion  of  the  "Leadership  and  Conduct,"  an  assis- 
tant, accompanied  by  a  competent  signalist,  should 
observe  the  troo])s,  and  report  on  their  conduct,  from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  enemy.  When  ball  ammunition  is 
not  used  the  assistant  should  take  a  position  similar  to 
and  among  the  targets.  When  ball  ammunition  is  used, 
the  assistant  should  be  provided  with  a  periscope  (or 
improvised  one),  and  take  a  position  in  the  pit  or  on 
one  flank  and  on  line  with  the  target.  In  order  to  aid 
the  assistant  who  observes  the  troops  from  the  position 
of  the  enemy,  the  following  points  may  be  noted,  or  a 
memorandum  given  him  by  the  umpire; 

Advance  of  troops  discerned  from  noticeable 
effect  of  movement  in  the  animal  and  plant  life,  from 
noises,  or  from  sounds  of  the  voice,  bugle,  or  whistle. 

Formations,  preparatory  to  deployment. 

Groups,  exposed  in  observation. 

Deployment,  under  fire. 


Combat  Practice 


275 


Movements  by  the  flank  of  units  and  individuals 
wliile  under  lire. 

Concealnient    of    tlie   fire   direetor   and    controllers 
and  of  the  various  ])arls  of  tlie  line. 
Cover  of  tlie  trooi)S  while  advancing. 
Signals     (flag,    arm,    and    hand)     and    conclusions 
drawn    from    the    jjarticular    signal    observed.      For 
example,  SSS,  AM,  etc. 

Location  of  the  leader  by  observing  messengers 
going  to  and  from  his  position,  or  l)y  location  of 
signal  flag  near  him,  etc. 

Individual  movements,  in  rear  of  the  firing  line. 
In  order  that  the  assistant  observing  tlie  target  may 
better  make  his  report  of  the  exercise,  all  umjiires  and 
observers  near  the  troojis  will  remain  in  rear  of  the  line 
i)ccu])ied  by  the  leader  and  will  attach  a  white  pocket 
liaiulUerchicf  over  the  crown  of  their  head-dress. 
2.   Fire  Effect. 


1 

Data 

Tahoets 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Accuracy 
True   range    

Estimated   range    

Direct  hits  on  assigned  targets 

Ricochet  hits  on  assigned  targets  .  . . 

Distribution 
Figures  in  target  

Figures  hit   (direct  hits)    

Volume 
Number  of  men  firing   

Number  of  shots  fired   

Time    

Rate     

Comparison — Average  Shots 
Figures   hit    

General  Comment. 


276  Battle  Fire  Training 

:?.     Wan  the  Mission  Accomplished? 


(Umpire) 

2.  The  Statistical  Record. 
The   Statistical    Record,   bv   whoji    kept — Its    Disposi- 

Tiox — The  Form  for  Record. 
By  Whom  Kept : . 

The  Statistical  Record  of  combat  firing  Is  kept  by 
the  Statistical  Officer  under  the  direction  of  the  Umpire. 

Disj^osition: 

The  Statistical  Officer  makes  such  disposition  of  the 
records  as  the  Umpire  may  direct. 

The  Form,: 

■  The  form  shown  below  is  a  convenient  one,  though 
no  particular  form  is  prescribed.  It  is  believed,  how- 
ever, tliat  the  data  included  on  this  form  are  essential 
to  a  thorough  analysis  of  any  firing. 

The  columns  lieaded  "Target  1,"  "Target  2,"  etc., 
may  be  used  to  record  the  results  on  several  targets,  on 
a  single  target  from  several  firing  points,  on  several 
fractions  of  a  single  line,  or,  when  the  firing  is  at  a 
single  target  from  a  single  firing  point,  to  record  the 
results  obtained  by  successive  "orders,"  thus  keeping, 
on  a  single  sheet,  the  results  of  as  many  repetitions  of 
the  same  exercise  as  there  are  columns  in  which  to 
record    them. 

In  case  certain  items  of  the  record  are  found  to  be 
not  pertinent  to  certain  exercises,  they  may  be  omitted 
at  the  discretion  of  the  Umpire. 

Both  the  "Umpire's  Record"  and  the  "Statistical 
Record"  should  be  printed  on  yellow  or  green  unglazed 
paper  in  order  to  reduce  the  glare  and  resulting  eye- 
strain when  used  in  the  bright  unshaded  sunlight  of  the 
target  range. 

Statistical  Record  of  Combat  Firing 

Organization   Commanding. 

Exercise Order School  of  Musketry, 

Ft.  SiU,  Okla., 19... 


Coinhdt  Pfdctirc 


277 


Tlit^ 

^1 

e 

6-1 

Hits: 
Direct,    in    sector    or    on 
assigned  ob  jective   

Ricochet,  in  sector  or  on 
assifrned  ob  jective   

Outside   sector    

True   range    

Visibility    | 

Kstirnated   ranee    

Firing  data  used: 

Elevation    

Deflection  

Aiming  point    

Figures  in  target: 

Numi)er  and  kind  in  sector 
or   ob  jective    

Nunii)er  per  yard  of  front. . . 

Struck  by  ricochets  only 

Struck    outside    sector    or 
ob  jective  

Center  of  impact 

278 


Battle  Fire  Training 


RESULT  COMPARED   WITH   STANDARD 


(Same  time  and  s 

trength) 

00 

"i 

CO 

e 

s 

e 

s 

00 

8 

e 

00 

Accuracy : 
Hits    

Distribution: 
Figures  struck 

Volume: 
Rate    

Time    

Shots 

Men  

Ricochets  included, 
yes  or  no 

COMPARISONS  ON   OTHER  BASES 


(a)  Comparative 

strengths    

(b)   Comparative 

time 

(c)   Hits  expected  for 
shots  fired   

(d)   Distribution  ex- 
pected for  hits 
made  

Remarks 

Statistical  Officer. 


Statistical  Officer's  Sources  of  Information 
The  information  required  by  the  Statistical  Officer 
for  the   completion  of   his  record  is  obtained,  in 
general,  by  observation — From  the  Umpire — From 


Combat  Practice  279 


THE  Range  Okiker     Fuo.-m  the  C'd.^uiander  of  the 

FIRING  unit — By  computation. 
By  Observation: 

Estimated  range. 

Firing  data  used. 

Time. 
From  the  Umpire: 

Visibility. 

Ricochets  included,  yes  or  no. 
From  the  Range  Officer: 

True  range. 

Number  of  figures  in  target  per  yard  front. 

Number   and    kind   of   figures    within    the   sector,   or 
assigned  ol)jective. 

Hits,  direct  and  ricochet,  obtained  within  and  without 
the  sector  or  assigned  objective. 

Figures    struck    within    and    without    the    sector,    or 
assigned  ol)jectlve. 

Figures  struck  by  ricochets  only. 

Center  of  impact. 
From  the  Commander  of  the  un't  firing: 

Number  of  men  firing. 

Number  of  .shots  fired. 
By  Computation: 

Such   further  entries   as  are   recjiiircd   in   tlio   record, 
lie  obtains  by  comjiutation. 

Entries  in  the  Record 
Entries    in    the    Record    should    inci.i'de    Hits     True 

Range — Visibii.itv — Estimated  Range — Pairing  Data 

USED — Figures  in  the  Target-  Center  ok  Iimtact. 
Hits: 

After  tlie  firing  is  completed  and  the  targets  have 
been  marked,  the  Statistical  Ollicer  secures  a  record  of 
the  hits  obtained,  direct  and  ricochet,  within  and  without 
the  sector,  or  assigned  objective,  from  the  Range  Officer 
or  from  tlie  signal  sfpiad  as  is  most  convenient.  In  case 
the  Statistical  Officer's  post  is  some  distance  from  the 
signal  station,  then  arrangements  sliould  be  made  to  have 
this  information  sent  to  him  jiromptly  iiy  messenger. 

In  case  all  the  figures  in  tlie  target  lie  within  the 
limits  of  the  olijective  or  sector,  then,  obviously,  there 
would  be  no  entry  on  the  line  "outside  sector." 

Whether  or  not  ricochets  are  to  be  scored  and 
recorded  separately  will  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the 


280  Battle  Fire  Training 

exercise  and  will  be  decided  in  each  case  by  the  umpire. 
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  tables  are  based  on 
direct  hits  only. 
True  Range: 

This  is  obtained  from  the  Range  Officer  and  should 
be  the  result  of  an  exact  measurement,  not  an  estimate. 
Visibility  : 

The  tables  from  which  the  standard  of  comparison  is 
obtained,  as  explained  hereafter,  are  based  upon  the 
hypothesis  that  the  target  or  aiming  point  is  clearly 
visible,  thus  expressing-  the  probable  maximum  of 
expectancy. 

When  this  condition  does  not  exist — and  it  seldom 
does  in  field  firing — it  becomes  necessary  to  modify  the 
standard  by  reducing  it  to  meet  existing  conditions.  The 
amount  of  this  reduction  is  termed  the  "visibility,"  and 
is  the  opinion  of  the  umpire  expressed  in  terms  of  range. 
For  example,  the  true  range  to  a  target  being  600  yards, 
the  umpire  may  estimate  the  visibility  as  "650."  That  is 
to  say,  it  is  his  belief  that  the  conditions  are  such  that 
the  probable  maximum  result  to  be  expected  is  the  same 
as  when  firing  at  a  clearly  visible  target  at  650  yards, 
and  that  the  standard  is  to  be  computed  on  that  basis. 
Estimated  Range: 

The  estimated  range  may  or  may  not  agree  with  the 
sight  setting  announced. 

During  the  progress  of  the  exercise,  the  Statistical 
Officer  remains  in  the  vicinity  of  the  commander  of  the 
unit  engaged  in  the  practice  and,  by  close  observation, 
learns  the  estimated  ranges.  Should  the  result  of  his 
observation  leave  him  doubtful  as  to  the  correct  figures, 
he  may  inquire  of  the  unit  commander  after  the  firing 
is  completed  or  at  such  other  time  as  not  to  interrupt 
the  progress  of  the  exercise. 
Firing  Data  Used: 

Elevation. 
Deflection. 
Aiming  point. 

The  Statistical  Officer  obtains  this  information  in  the 
same  manner  in  which  he  obtains  the  estimated  range, 
i.  e.,  by  observation  and  inquiry. 

When  an  auxiliary  aiming  point  is  used,  it  is  recorded 
briefly  as  "tree,"  "bush,"  "rock,"  "house,"  "hedge,"  etc., 
and  it  sometimes  may  be  of  advantage  also  to  note  its 


Combat  Practice  281 

distance  and  direction  from  tlic  target.  This  may  be 
done  by  recording  the  distance  (in  mils)  in  Arabic 
immerals,  followed  by  the  direction  (clock  notation — tar- 
get at  center  of  vertical  clock)  recorded  in  Roman 
numerals.  Thus  "Tree-50-IV"  would  mean  that  the 
aiming  point  was  a  tree  50  mils  from  the  target  in  the 
direction  of  four  o'clock. 
Figures  in  Target: 

Number  and  kind  in  sector,  or  assigned  objective. 
Number  per  yard  of  front. 
Struck  by  ricochets  only. 
Struck  outside  sector,  or  assigned  objective. 
This  information  is  obtained  !)y  the  Statistical  Officer 
from    the   Range   Officer.     The   first   two   items   may   be 
obtained  from  the  statement  of  the  exercise. 
Center  of  Iinpnct: 

This  information  is  obtained  from  the  Range  Officer 
or  from  the  Signal  Squad,  as  is  most  convenient.  The 
Statistical  Officer  is  informed  as  to  whether  the  fire  was 
equally  distrii)uted  throughout  the  entire  front  of  the 
target  or  v^as  concentrated  in  one  or  more  well-defined 
.shot  groups.  The  record  should  be  brief,  and,  merely 
for  the  sake  of  uniformity,  the  following  abbreviations 
are  suggested.  With  reference  to  the  target,  R,  L,  and  C 
refer  to  its  right,  left,  and  center. 

Right    R 

Left     L 

Center     C 

Right  center  quarter  RC/4 

Left  center  fifth   LC/5 

Center  third    C/3 

Right  half  R/2 

Di.stril)uted    Dist. 

Should  there  be  any  a]>pareiit  necessity  for  more 
precise  information  than  can  be  given  in  this  manner, 
it  is  better  to  divide  the  front  of  the  objective  into  .sev- 
eral parts  and  to  obtain  a  separate  record  of  the  hits 
and  distribution  in  each  part.  Certain  exercises  might 
retjuire  that  a  record  be  kejit  of  the  numiier  of  hits  on 
each  figure  in  the  target.  In  such  cases,  this  informa- 
tion would  l)e  recorded  on  a  separate  sheet  and  attached 
to  the  record,  when  entries  in  the  body  of  the  record 
might    lead   to   confusion   or   misunderstanding. 


282  Battle  Fire  Training 

Result  Compared  with  Standard 
There  are  several  standards  by  which  the  materlal 
results   of   combat   firing   may  be   judged,   but  the 
one    here    used   is   an   expression   of   the   probable 

result    to     be     expected     from     an     equal     NU3IBER     OF 

avt:rage  shots  firing  at  the  correct  rate  and  with 

THE     correct    elevation     AND    FOR     THE     SAME     LENGTH 
OF    TIME. 

Entries  under  Standard  should  include  Hits — 
Figures  Struck — Rate — Tijie — Shots — Men — Rico- 
chets included,  yes  or  no. 

To  compute  the  standard,  the  Statistical  Officer  must 
have  at  hand  the  following  data: 
Visibility, 

Time,  or  endurance  of  the  fire,  in  minutes. 
Number  of  men  firing,  and 
Number  and  kind  of  figures  in  the  target. 
An  example  will  serve  best  to  show  the  method  of 
arriving  at  the  standard. 

Assume   the    following   data:     Range   500,    Visibility 
G50,    time   2    minutes,    men    100,    figures    in    target    100 
kneeling. 
Hits  : 

Consult  Table  I.  In  the  left  hand  column,  headed 
"Range  Yards,"  find  tlie  figure  "650"  (visibility).  Fol- 
low this  650  line  to  the  right  until  entering  the  sub- 
column  "Kneel"  (kinds  of  figures  in  the  target)  in  the 
column  "No.  of  hits."  Here  is  found  the  amount 
"1.074,"  which  is  the  numljer  of  hits  to  be  expected  from 
one  average  shot  in  one  minute.  This  amount  multiplied 
by  2  (time)  gives  2.148,  or  the  number  of  hits  to  be 
expected  from  one  average  sliot  in  two  minutes.  This 
product  multiplied  by  100  (men)  gives  214.8,  which  is 
the  number  of  hits  to  be  expected  from  100  men  firing 
for  two  minutes  and  is  vhe  standard  souglit.  Fractions 
less  than  y^  ordinarily  are  disregarded  and  so  this 
would  be  recorded  as  215. 
Figures  Struck: 

Taking  the  probable  number  of  hits  (215)  as  the 
basis,  first  find  the  number  of  times  each  figure  in  the 
target  would  be  struck  on  the  average.  As  there  are 
100  figures  in  the  target  and  there  are  215  hits,  then 
215  divided  by  100  would  give  the  average  number  of 
hits  per  figure,  or  2.15.     Consult  Table  II.     In  the  col- 


Combat  Prdctice  283 


limn  "!1"  fiiul  tlu-  amount  2.15.  Tlicii  tlic  amount  on 
tlu-  same  line  in  tlic  adjacent  colunni  "D"  to  the  ripht 
cxj)re.s.se.s  the  jicroontafrc  of  figures  in  the  tarjret  that 
should  he  strucic  witii  a  fire  equally  di.strii)uted  throufih- 
out  the  entire  front  of  the  ohjectivc.  In  the  jiresent 
instance  the  amount  2.15  is  found  in  column  H.  Dis- 
regardinp  fractions  less  than  Va  as  equal  to  1,  the 
amount  taken  from  column  D  is  88.  As  this  amount 
expresses  percentage  only  as  it  is  a  number  that  is 
sought,  then  88  multiplied  by  the  number  of  figures  in 
the  target  (100)  and  this  product  divided  by  100  will 
give  the  number  of  figures  that  should  have  been  struck. 
In  this  case,  as  the  numl)cr  of  figures  in  the  target  is 
an  even  100,  the  number  and  percentage  are  the  same, 
88.  Using  the  Umpire's  Reference  Table,  Kneeling 
Figures,  and  interpolating  for  Range  ()50  in  the  2-niinute 
column,  the  percentage  is  found  to  be  88. 
Rate: 

The  expected  rate  of  fire,  expressed  in  shots  per  man 
per  minute,  is  found  in  Table  I  at  the  intersection  of  the 
line  corresponding  to  the  visii)ility  G50  with  the  column 
headed  "Rate  of  Fire."       In  this  example  it  is  7.0. 
Time: 

The  time  recorded  under  "Standard"  and  under 
"Result"  are  identical,  i.  e.,  it  is  the  actual  duration  of 
the  fire  in  minutes. 

The   Statistical    Officer   often    will    find   his    computa- 
tions simplified  if,  in  recording  the  time,  he  will  express 
fractional    parts   of    a   minute   decimally    instead    of   as 
.seconds. 
Shot  a: 

This  is  the  numl)cr  of  shots  that  would  have  i)eon 
fired  had  the  correct  rate  l)cen  used.  Multiply  the  rate 
l)y  the  time  and  this  ])roduct  by  the  number  of  men. 

In  this  example,  7   (the  rate  as  found  in  the  table) 
times  2    (the   time   in   minutes)    times    100    (the   number 
of  men  firing)  equals  1,4'00,  which  is  the  number  of  sliots 
that  should   have  been  fired. 
Men: 

This  is  the  numiier  of  men  in  the  firing  line  who  did 
or  should  have  used  their  rifles  in  the  exercise  in  ques- 
tion. The  men  recorded  under  "Standard"  and  "Result" 
are  the  same. 


284  Battle  Fire  Training 

Ricochets  Included,  Yes  or  No: 

Under  certain  conditions,  it  might  be  expected  that 
a  given  number  of  ricochets  would  occur  in  addition  to 
tiie  direct  hits  found  from  Table  I.  In  such  a  case,  the 
Umpire  would  decide  upon  whether  or  not  he  desired 
to  consider  the  ricochets  separately  and  if  so,  he  would 
notify  the  Statistical  Officer  as  to  the  percentage  to  be 
expected.  The  recording  of  this  amount  as  "20%,"  for 
example,  under  "Standard,"  would  indicate  that  ricochets 
were  to  be  included  and  that  20%  were  to  be  expected 
in  addition  to  the  direct  hits.  If  the  Umpire  decides 
that  ricochets  are  not  to  be  considered,  then  the  word 
"No"  appears  in  place  of  the  percentage. 

In  case  ricochets  are  considered,  the  Statistical  Officer 
increases  the  expected  hits  as  found  in  the  table  by  the 
percentage  of  ricochets  as  announced  by  the  Umpire. 
He  then  uses  this  increased  number  of  hits  in  his  fur- 
ther computations. 
The    entries    under    Result    should    include    Hits — 

Figures     Struck — Rate— Time — Shots — Men — Rico- 
chets Included,  Yes  or  No. 
Hits  and  Figures  Strvck: 

These  amounts  are  the  ones  obtained  from  the  Range 
Officer  as  explained  above,  and  include  ricochets  or  not, 
as  directed  by  the   Umpire. 
Rate: 

This    is    the    rate    of    fire    actually    obtained    and    is 
found  by  dividing  the  total  number  of  cartridges  fired 
by  the  product  of  the  men  and  time. 
Time,  Shots,  Men: 

This  is  merely  a  record  of  fact  as  to  the  duration 
of  the  fire,  the  total  number  of  shots  fired,  and  the  num- 
ber of  men  in  the  firing  line  who  did  or  should  have 
used  their  rifles  during  the  exercise. 
Ricochets  Included,  Yes  or  No: 

This  is  a  statement  as  to  whether  or  not  the  results 
recorded  under  hits  and  figures  struck  include  rico- 
chets. It  would  be  unusual  to  include  ricochets  in  the 
standard  and  not  in  the  result,  or  vice  versa. 

COJIPARISONS    ON    OTHER    BaSES    SHOULD    INCLUDE    CoMPARA- 

Ti\TE    Strengths — Comparativt:   Time — Hits   expected 

FOR      shots      fired DISTRIBUTION      EXPECTED      FOR      HITS 

MADE. 

Comparative  Strengths : 

A  given  firing  line  produces  a  given  number  of 
casualties  in  the  enemy's  ranks   (strikes  a  given  number 


Combat  I'rtictice  285 

of  figures  in  the  target)  in  a  given  time.  What  is  sought 
tlien  is  how  many  riflemen  of  average  ability,  using  the 
correct  elevation  and  rate,  and  distributing  their  fire 
equally  tiiroughout  tiie  entire  front  of  the  target  will  be 
required  to  produce  the  same  munber  of  casualties  in 
tiie  same  time. 

This  may  be  found  from  the  "Um])ire's  Reference 
Tables,"  as  previously  explained,  or,  if  more  precise 
results  are  desired,  by.  the  solution  of  the  following 
equation: 

H     N 

Ms  =  ,  in  which 

BTF 
M     is  the  number  of  men    (standard  conditions) 

producing  results. 
H     is    an    amount    found    from    the    distribution 

table.  Table  II,  as  hereinafter  shown. 
N     is  the  number  of  figures  in  the  target — within 

the  sector,  or  assigned  objective. 
B     is  an  amount  found  from  Table  I,  as  herein- 
after shown. 
T     is  tlie  time  or  duration  of  the  fire  in  minutes. 
F     is  the  number  of  figures  in  the  target  per  j^ard 
of  front. 
To  find  the  value  of  H,  multiply  the  number  of  fig- 
ures struck  by   100  and  tlien  divide  this  jiroduct  by  the 
number  of  figures  in  the  target.     Consult  Table  II  and 
find    an   equal    amount   to   this   quotient    in    Column    D. 
The  amount  on  the  same  line,  in  column  H  to  the  left, 
is  the  value  of  H  sought. 
Example: 

Numi)cr  of  figures  in  target,  50. 
Number  of  figures  struck,  2(). 
Tlien  2H   X    100    :    .50  -  52,  and   in  the  cohmm   D  of 
Table    II    (fourtli    column    from    the    left)    is    found    the 
amount  51.8,   whicii   is   the   closest   ajiproximation   to  52. 
In   the   column    II    to   the   left   and   on   the   same   line   is 
found  the  amount  0.73,  which  is  the  value  of  H  sought. 
To  find  the  zHilue  of  B.  consult  Table  I.     In  the  col- 
umn  "No.  of   Hits,"  select   tlie   apj)ro])riate   sui)-column 
dej>cnding  upon  the  kind  of  fitrures   (kneeling  or  ]>rone) 
in  the  target.     The  value  of  B  sought   will  be  found  at 


286  Battle  Fire  Training 

the  intersection  of  this  sub-column  with  the  line  corre- 
sponding to  the  visibility. 
Example: 

Prone  figures. 
Visibility,  800. 
Follow  the  800   line  to  the  right  until  entering  the 
column  "No.  of  hits,  prone,"  there  is  found  the  amount 
.384,  which  is  the  value  of  B  sought. 

Example  of  use  of  equation: 
Number  of  figures  struck,  43. 
Number  of  figures  in  target,  65  kneeling. 
Visibility,  950. 

Figures  in  target  per  yard  of  front,  i/o. 
Time,  2  minutes. 
Substituting  in  the  equation: 

1.08  (H)   X  65  (N)  70.20 

M,    = = =  148. 

0.474  (B)   X  2  (T)   X   1/3  (F)        .474 
That  is,  it  would  take  148  average  shots,  to  strike  43 
out  of  65  kneeling  figures  in  two  minutes. 

Comparative  Time: 

How  much  time  should  be  used  by  average  shots  of 
a  given  number  to  strike  a  given  number  of  figures? 

This  can  be  found,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  com- 
parative strength,  from  the  Umpire's  Reference  Table, 
or,  with  greater  precision,  by  a  transposition  of  the 
above  equation  to  read 

HN 
"p    n=  

BMF 

The  values  are  the  same  as  in  the  original  equation 
except  tliat  T  c  is  the  time  or  duration  of  the  fire  in 
minutes    (standard  conditions)   producing  equal  results. 

Hits  expected  for  shots  fired: 

Consult  Table  I.  Multiply  the  percentage  of  hits, 
as  found  on  the  line  corresponding  to  the  visibility,  by 
the  number  of  shots  fired.  The  product  is  the  number 
of  hits  expected  for  shots  fired. 

Distribution  expected  for  hits  made: 

Solve  as  "figures  struck"  under  "Standard." 


Combat  Practice 


281 


SrATisTiCAr.  Oi-i'ickh's  Tabi.ks 
The  Rate  ok  Fiue  and  the  Percektage  and  Number  ok 
Hits,  on  the  prone  and  kneeling  figures,  expected 

AT    EACH     RANGE,    ARE    SHOWN    IN    TaBI.E     I.       TlIE     PER- 
CENTAGE OF  Figures  in  a  Linear  Target  that  should 

BE    STRUCK     BY    AN     EVENLY    DISTRIBUTED    FIRE,    BASED    ON 
THE     AVERAGE     NU.MBER    OF     HITS     PER     FIGURE,    IS    SHOWN 

IN  Table  II. 

TABLE  I 


Range 

Rate  of 
Fire 

%  of  Hits 

No.   of 

Hits 

Yards 

Prone 

Kneel 

Prone 

Kneel 

200 

10.833 

20.05 
18.52 

33.41 
33.05 

2.172 
2.006 

3.619 
3.580 

250 

10.416 

16.78 
16.01 

29.19 
28.61 

1.748 
1.668 

3.041 
2.980 

300 

10.000 

14.49 
14.08 

25.87 
25.59 

1.449 
1.408 

2.587 
2.559 

350 

9.583 

12.91 
12.89 

23.40 
2i.41 

1.237 
1.235 

2.242 
2.148 

400 

9.166 

11.67 
11.62 

21.40 
19.72 

1.070 
1.065 

1.962 
1.808 

450 

8.750 

10.79 
10.05 

19.88 
16.13 

.944 
.980 

1.740 
1.411 

500 

8.333 

10.00 
8.30 

18.57 
12.86 

.833 
.692 

1.547 
1.072 

550 

7.916 

9.30 

17.35 

.736 

1.374 

600 

7.500 

8.65 

16.22 

.649 

1.217 

650 

7.083 

8.05 

15.16 

.570 

1.074 

700 

6.666 

7.54 

14.17 

.503 

.945 

750 

6.250 

7.03 

18.27 

.439 

.829 

800 

5.833 

6.59 

12.45 

.384 

.726 

850 

5.416 

6.18 

11.71 

.335 

.034 

900 

5.000 

5.78 

11.00 

.289 

.550 

950 

4..'.8:< 

5.42 

10. ;m 

.248 

.474 

1.000 

4.100 

5.12 

'.>.77 

.213 

.407 

Amounts  in  italic  indicate  "battle  sight." 

The  degree  of  preci.sion  desirable  in  the  u.se  of  thi.s 
table  i.s  dependent  upon  the  duration  of  tlu-  fire  and  ujion 
the  anif)unt  of  aininunition  cx|)end(d.  In  "Rate  of  Fire" 
and  "No.  of  Hits,"  use  one  ]iiace  of  deciniais  wIumi  firinp 
les.s  than  ~>  minutes,  two  ])laces  wlien  firirifr  less  tlian  10 
minutes,  and  three  places  when  firinp  more  than  10  min- 
utes.    In  "%  of  Hits,"  use  no  fraction  when  less  than 


288  Battle  Fire  Training 

100  shots  are  fired,  one  place  of  decimals  when  less  than 
1,000  are  fired,  and  two  places  when  more  than  1,000 
are  fired. 

The  amounts  in  the  body  of  the  table  under  "Rate 
of  Fire"  indicate  shots  per  man  per  minute  when  firing 
at  the  correct  rate. 

The  amounts  under  "%  of  Hits"  indicate  the  percent- 
ages of  hits  to  be  expected  from  average  shots  on  lines 
of  prone  or  kneeling  figures  occupying  a  frontage  of 
one  yard  per  figure.  For  different  spacing  of  the  tar- 
gets, multiply  the  amount  in  the  table  by  the  number  of 
figures  per  yard  of  front. 

The  amounts  under  "No.  of  Hits"  indicate  the  num- 
ber of  hits  to  be  expected  from  one  average  shot  in  one 
minute  (correct  rate  and  elevation  being  used)  on  lines 
of  prone  or  kneeling  figures  occupying  a  frontage  of 
one  yard  per  figure.  For  different  spacing  of  targets, 
multiply  the  amount  given  in  the  table  by  the  number 
of  figures  per  yard  front. 

The  amounts  in  the  body  of  the  table  are  based  upon 
the  further  supposition  that  the  targets  are  clearly 
visible. 


Combat  Practice 


289 


TABLE  II 


H  D 


H         D         H         D         H         D 


H  D 


0.01 

1.0 

0.41    133.6 

0.81 

55.5 

1.42 

75.8 

2.55 

92.2 

0.02 

2.0 

0.42 

34.3 

0.82 

56.0 

1.44 

76.3 

2.60 

92.6 

0.03 

3.0 

0.43 

34.9 

0.83 

56.4 

1.46 

76.8 

0.04 

3.9 

0.44 

35.6 

0.84 

56.8 

1.48 

77.2 

2.65 

92.9 

0.05 

4.9 

0.45 

36.2 

0.85 

57.3 

1.50 

77.7 

2.70 

93.3 

0.06 

5.8 

0.46 

36.9 

0.86 

57.7 

1.52 

78.1 

0.07 

6.8 

0.47 

37.5 

0.87 

58.1 

1.54 

78.6 

2.75 

93.6 

0.08 

7.7 

0.48 

38.1 

0.88 

58.5 

1.56 

79.0 

2.80 

93.9 

0.09 

8.6 

0.49 

38.7 

0.89 

58.9 

1.58 

79.4 

0.10 

9.5 

0.50 

39.4 

0.90 

59.3 

1.60 

79.8 

2.85 
2.90 

94.2 
94.5 

0.11 

10.6 

0.51 

40.0 

0.91 

59.8 

1.62 

80.2 

0.12 

11.3 

0.52 

40.5 

0.92 

60.2 

1.64 

80.6 

2.95 

94.8 

0.13 

12.2 

0.53 

41.1 

0.93 

60.6 

1.66 

81.0 

3.00 

95.0 

0.14 

13.1 

0.54 

41.7 

0.94 

60.9 

1.68 

81.4 

0.15 

13.9 

0.55 

42.3 

0.95 

61.3 

1.70 

81.7 

3.25 

96.4 

O.IC 

14.8 

0.56 

42.9 

0.96 

61.7 

1.72 

82.1 

3.50 

97.8 

0.17 

15.6 

0.57 

43.4 

0.97 

62.1 

1.74 

82.4 

0.18 

16.5 

0.58 

44.0 

0.98 

62.5 

1.70 

82.8 

3.75 

98.3 

0.19 

17.3 

0.59 

44.6 

0.99 

62.8 

1.78 

83.1 

4.00 

98.7 

0.20 

18.1 

0.60 

45.1 

1.00 

63.2 

1.80 

83.5 

4.50 

99.0 

0.21 

18.9 

0.61 

45.7 

1.02 

63.9 

1.82 

83.8 

5.00 

99.3 

0.22 

19.7 

0.62 

46.2 

1.04 

64.7 

1.84 

84.1 

0.23 

20.5 

0.63 

46.7 

1.06 

65.4 

1.86 

84.4 

5.50 

99.5 

0.24 

21.3 

0.64 

47.2 

1.08 

66.0 

1.88 

84.7 

6.00 

99.8 

0.25 

22.1 

0.65 

47.8 

1.10 

66.7 

1.90 

85.0 

0.26 

22.9 

0.66 

48.3 

1.12 

67.4 

1.92 

85.3 

0.27 

23.7 

0.67 

48.9 

1.14 

68.0 

1.94 

85.6 

0.28 

24.4 

0.68 

49.4 

1.16 

68.6 

1.96 

85.9 

0.29 

25.2 

0.69 

49.8 

1.18 

69.3 

1.98 

86.2 

0.30 

26.0 

0.70 

50.3 
1 

1.20 

69.9 

2.00 

86.5 

0.31 

26.7 

0.71 

50.8 

1.22 

70.5 

2.05 

87.1 

0.32 

27.4 

0.72 

51.3 

1.24 

71.1 

2.10 

87.7 

0.33 

28.1 

0.73 

51.8 

1.26 

71.6 

2.15 

88.4 

0.34 

28  8 

0.74 

52.3 

1.28 

72.2 

2.20 

88.9 

0.35 

29.5 

0.75 

52.8 

1.30 

72.7 

2.25 

89.5 

0.3C 

30.2 

0.76 

53.2 

1.32 

73.3 

2.30 

90.0 

0.37 

30.9 

0.77 

53.7 

1.34 

73.8 

2.35 

90.4 

0.38 

31.6 

0.78 

54.2 

1.36 

74.3 

2.40 

90.9 

0.39 

32.3 

0.79 

54.6 

1.38 

74.8 

2.45 

91.4 

0.40 

32.9 

0.80 

55.0 

1 

1.40 

75.3 

2.50 

91.8 

If  every  fiprure  in  the  target  is  hit  H  times  on  the 
average,  then  from  table,  D  ])cr  cent  of  tlie  figures  will 
be  hit. 


290  Battle  Fire  Training 

INFANTRY  DRILL   REGULATIONS 

Arm  Signals 

43.  The  following  arm  signals  are  prescribed.  In 
making  signals  either  arm  may  be  used.  Officers  who 
receive  signals  on  the  firing  line  "repeat  back"  at  once 
to  prevent  misunderstanding. 

Forward,  march.  Carry  the  hand  to  the  shoulder; 
straigiiten  and  hold  the  arm  horizontally,  thrusting  it  in 
direction   of  marcli. 

This  signal  is  also  used  to  execute  quick  time  from 
double  time. 

Halt.  Carry  the  hand  to  the  shoulder;  thrust  the 
hand  upward  and  hold  the  arm  vertically. 

Double  lime,  march.  Carry  the  hand  to  the  shoulder; 
rapidly  tlirust  the  hand  upward  the  full  extent  of  the 
arm  several  times. 

Squads  right,  march.  Raise  the  arm  laterally  until 
horizontal;  carry  it  to  a  vertical  position  above  the  head 
and  swing  it  several  times  between  the  vertical  and 
horizontal  positions. 

Squads  left,  m,arch.  Raise  the  arm  laterally  imtil 
horizontal;  carry  it  downward  to  the  side  and  swing  it 
several  times  between  the  downward  and  horizontal 
positions. 

Squads  right  about,  march  (if  in  close  order)  or. 
To  (he  rear,  march  (if  in  skirmish  line).  Extend  the 
arm  vertically  above  the  head;  carry  it  laterally  down- 
wai-d  to  tiie  side  and  swing  it  several  times  between  the 
vertical  and  downward  positions. 

Change  direction  or  Column  right  (left),  march.  The 
hand  on  the  side  toward  which  the  change  of  direction 
is  to  be  made  is  carried  across  the  body  to  the  opposite 
shoulder,  forearm  horizontal;  then  swing  in  a  horizontal 
plane,  arm  extended,  pointing  in  the  new  direction. 

As  skirmishers,  march.  Raise  both  arms  laterally 
until  horizontal. 

As  skirmishers,  guide  center,  march.  Raise  both  arms 
laterally  until  horizontal;  swing  both  simultaneously 
upward  until  vertical  and  return  to  the  horizontal; 
repeat  several  times. 

As  skirmishers,  guide  right  (left),  march.  Raise  both 
arms  laterally  until  horizontal;  hold  the  arm  on  the 
side  of  the  guide  steadily  in  the  horizontal  position; 
swing  the  other  upward  until  vertical  and  return  it  to 
the  horizontal;    repeat  several  times. 


Signals  291 

.{.iKcnihle,  mnrch.  Raise  tlic  arm  vertically  to  its  full 
extent  and  describe  Iiorizoiital  circles. 

Ranffe,  or  Chancre  elevation.  To  announce  rarKje, 
extend  the  arm  toward  the  leaders  or  men  for  wVioni  the 
signal. is  intended,  fist  closed;  by  oju-ninf;  and  closing 
llie  fist,  exjiose  thunii)  and  fingers  to  a  number  ecpial  to 
the  hundreds  of  yards;  to  add  50  yards  describe  a  short 
horizontal  line  with  forefinger.  To  chaiu/e  elevation, 
indicate  the  amount  of  increase  or  decrease  by  fingers  as 
above;  ))oint  u])ward  to  indicate  increase  and  downward 
to  indicate  decrease. 

Svspend  firing.  Raise  and  hold  the  forearm  steadily 
in  a  horizontal  {position  in  front  of  the  forehead,  j)aliu 
of  the  hand  to  the  front. 

Cease  firing.  Raise  the  forearm  as  in  suspend  firing 
and  swing  it  up  and  down  several  times  in  front  of  ihe 
face. 

Platoon.  Extend  the  arm  horizontally  toward  the 
platoon  leader;  descrii)e  small  circles  with  the  hand. 
(See   par.  H.) 

Squad.  Extend  the  arm  horizontally  toward  tlr.  })la- 
toon  leader;  swing  the  hand  up  and  down  from  the  wri.st. 
(See   par.   44.) 

Rush.     Same  as  double  time. 

44.  The  signals  platoon  and  squad  are  intended  ))ri- 
marily  for  communication  l)etween  the  captain  a"d  liis 
platoon  leaders.  The  signal  platoon  or  squad  indicates 
tliat  the  platoon  conunander  is  to  cause  the  signal  uliich 
follows  to  be  executed  by  platoon  or  scjuad. 

iNrANTRY    DrII.I,    REGULATIONS 
ClIANGEa   I 

No.  14.    \ 

War  Dkpartment, 

Washington,  May  18,  lOlG. 
raragra|)h  43,  Infantry  Drill   Regulations    (corrected 
to  November,  1913),  is  changed  as  follows: 

Insert  after  eighth  line,  ])age  19,  the  following: 
What    range   are   i/ou   using.'    or    What   is   the   range? 
Extend  the  arms  toward  the  yierson  addressed,  one  hand 
open,  palm  to  the  front,  resting  on  the  other  hand,  fist 
clo.sed. 


292  Battle  Fire  Training 

Are  you  ready?  or  /  am  ready.  Raise  the  hand, 
fingers  extended  and  joined,  pahii  toward  the  person 
addressed. 

Commence  firing.  Move  the  arm  extended  in  full 
length,  hand  palm  down,  several  times  through  a  hori- 
zontal arc  in  front  of  the  body. 

Fire  faster.  Execute  raj)idly  the  signal  "Commence 
firing." 

Fire  slower.  Execute  slowly  the  signal  "Commence 
firing." 

To  stt'intj  the  cone  of  fire  to  the  right,  or  left.  Extend 
the  arm  in  full  length  to  the  front,  palm  to  the  right 
(left);  swing  the  arm  to  right  (left),  and  point  in  the 
direction  of  the  new  target. 

Fi.c  bayonet.  Simulate  the  movement  of  the  right 
hand  in  "Fix  bayonet"  (paragraph  95). — C.  I.  D.  R., 
No.  14,  May  IS,  1916. 

Changes  \ 
No^l3.    j  War  Department, 

Washington,  February  4,  1916. 
Paragraph  47,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (edition 
approved  August  19,  1911,  and  edition  corrected  to 
November,  1913),  as  amended  by  C.  I.  D.  R.  No.  9, 
W.  D.,  1914,  is  rescinded  and  the  following  substituted 
therefor: 

47.  (1)  For  communication  between  the  firing  line 
and  the  reserve  or  commander  in  the  rear,  the  subjoined 
signals  (Signal  Corps  codes)  are  prescribed  and  should 
be  memorized.  In  transmission,  their  concealment  from 
the  enemy's  view  should  be  insured.  In  the  absence  of 
signal  flags,  the  headdress  or  other  substitute  may  be 
used. 


Signals 


21);j 


I-ptter  «if 

If  signaled  from  the  rear 

If  signaled  from  the  firing 

alphabet 

to  the  firing  line 

line  to  the   rear 

A  M 

Ammunition     going     for- 
ward. 

Ammunition  required. 

C  C  C    

Charge      (mandatory      at 

Am  about  to  charge  if  no 

all  times). 

instructions  to  the  con 
trarv. 

C    F    

Cease   firing    

Cease   firing. 

n  T   

Double  time  or   "rush".  . 

Double  time  or   "rush." 

F     

Commence    firing    

Commence  firing. 

F   B    

Fix    bavoncfs     

Fix  bayonets. 

F   L    

Artillery    fire     is    caiising 

Artillery     fire    is    causing 

us  losses. 

us  losses. 

G    

Move    forward    

Preparing    to    move     for- 
ward. 

H  H  n 

Halt     

Halt. 

K 

L   T    .    ... 

I.eft     

Left. 

0    

What  is  the  (R.  N.  etc.)  ? 

What  is  the  (R.  N.  etc.)  ! 

Interrogatory. 

Interrogatory. 

(Ardois    and 

semaphore 

onlv.) 

What  is  the  (R.  N.  etc.)  ? 

What  is  the  (R.  N.  etc.)  ! 

(All  methods 

Interrogatory. 

Interrogatory. 

but    ardois 

and    sema 

phore. 

P    

Affirmative     

Affirmative. 

R     

Acknowledgment. 
Range. 

H  N    

Range      

R  T    

Right     

Right. 

Supjjovt   needed. 

S   S   S    

Support  going  forward.  . 

SUP 

Suspend  firing    

Suspend  firing. 

T     

Target   

Target. 

(2)    The  Two-arm  Semaphore  Code 

(See  illustrations  on  page  295) 

CAVALRY  SERVICE   REGULATIONS 
Changes  ) 
No.  2.     I 

War  DEPAnT.-MKNT, 

Washin;rt()n,  Fchniary   l,  Ifllfi. 
The    Cavnlry     Service     Ilepulation.s     (Experimental), 
1914,  are  changed  as  follow.s: 


294  Battle  Fire  Training 

Appendix  B,  pages  329  and  330,  as  amended  by 
C.  C.  S.  R.,  No.  1,  W.  D.,  1915,  is  rescinded  and  the 
following  substituted  therefor: 

Appendix  B 

1.    Semaphore  Code  for  Cavalry 

A   M    Ammunition    going    forward     (if    signaled 

from  the  rear  to  the  front). 
Ammunition    required     (if    signaled    from 

the  front). 
C  C  C Charge    (if  signaled   from  the  rear  to  the 

front). 
About  to  charge  if  no  instructions   to  the 

contrary   (if  signaled  from  the  front). 

C  F   Cease  firing. 

D  T Double  time,  rush,  or  hurry. 

F    Commence  firing. 

F  L   Artillery  fire  is  causing  us  losses. 

G    Move   forward    (if  signaled   from   the   rear 

to  the  front). 
Preparing    to    move    forward    (if    signaled 

from  the  front). 
H  H   H    ...  Halt. 

K    Negative. 

L  T Left. 

M    Bring  up  the  horses  (if  signaled  from  front 

to  rear). 
Horses    going    forward    (if    signaled    from 

rear  to  front). 
()    What  is  the   (R.  N.,  etc.)?     Interrogatory. 

(Ardois  and  semaphore  only.) 
What  is  the   (R.  N.,  etc.)?     Interrogatory. 

(All  methods  but  ardois  and  semaphore.) 

P    Affirmative. 

R    Acknowledgment. 

R  N   Range. 

R  T  Right. 

S  S  S   Support   going  forward    (if  signaled   frofn 

the  rear  to  the  front). 
Support     needed     (if     signaled     from     the 

front). 

S  U  F Suspend  firing. 

T    Target. 

2.    The  Two-arm  Semaphore  Code 

fSee  illustrations  on  page   following.) 


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